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During a civil war intervention, understanding the importance of local-level grievances 
and interactions is crucial for making policy choices that lead to successful outcomes. However, 
policymakers often disregard the role of local factors in influencing violence, as making sense of 
their complexity poses a significant challenge. This dissertation proposes an Agent-Based Model 
(ABM) that captures the complex interactions between civilians and militants during a conflict, 
demonstrating their aggregate effects on militant strength and the likelihood of violence. The 
model is then used to simulate the introduction of different diplomatic, economic, and military 
intervention strategies to the conflict setting, capturing their effects on violence outcomes. These 
simulations demonstrate how the arrangement of local grievances and affiliations between 
civilians and militants can have significant and often unexpected impacts on broader conflict 
outcomes, possibly reducing the success of foreign intervention. The dissertation builds on these 
findings by performing explorations of conflict intervention cases in Somalia in 1992, 
Afghanistan in 2001, and Libya in 2011, examining the role that grievances played in each of 
these wars and the limited attempts made by foreign interveners to address them. It concludes 
that intervention may struggle to mitigate violence that stems from local grievances, and may 
even exacerbate fighting. The best hope for improving conflict outcomes if and when an 
intervention occurs is through support for traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, which are 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The problem of persistent violence in conflict-ridden states has troubled U.S. foreign 
policymakers for decades. Despite attempts to achieve stability in other countries through 
various forms of intervention, intrastate conflicts have proven difficult to extinguish. In some 
cases, weak or collapsing governments create an absence of security in which violent non-state 
actors proliferate. For example, clan-based militia fighting in Somalia persists despite the 1992 
UNITAF (United Task Force) intervention, creating an environment for al-Qaeda affiliated al-
Shabaab to control substantial territory in spite of counterinsurgency operations. In other cases, 
the U.S. has deposed regimes perceived as threats to national security, only to struggle to 
establish a new system. Since the 2001 overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
has maintained an active military presence, but after 18 years of war the country remains divided 
and violent, with the Taliban battling for territory and pitting local tribal and religious 
communities against one another. In both Somalia and Afghanistan, attempts to undermine these 
groups and bring an end to violence have largely failed. Instead, conflict between the 
government and militants, amongst tribal or clan-based militias, and by terror organizations 
against civilians continues to persist in regions where the U.S. has spent billions of dollars on 
varying packages of diplomatic, economic, and military intervention strategies. Why the dismal 
record? 
 This project explores the local, or micro-level reasons that foreign intervention strategies 
may fail to achieve stability in the form of reduced violence. It examines political violence from 
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the perspective of local actors in regions experiencing conflict, and how different strategies or 
tools impact their incentives. I investigate the dynamics of a system in which non-state armed 
groups, or militants choose to extort, benefit, or attack local civilian populations based on their 
own strategies for survival. In turn, civilians may provide support and form alliances with these 
groups in pursuit of their own interests. The overall lack of control may threaten the national 
security of outside states through the proliferation of illegal weapons, unrestricted activity of 
terrorist organizations, and destabilization of foreign allies. Foreign countries may respond with 
varying strategies of intervention, but these efforts may fail to achieve stability. Intervention 
fundamentally alters incentives in this system with the introduction of economic resources, 
political advantages, or military force. In response, armed militants may adjust their strategies, 
and civilians may shift their support from one group to another in order to reap economic gains 
or to benefit from external protection (Kalyvas 2006). These shifts could support or undermine 
the goals of intervention in unanticipated ways. I limit my scope to intrastate conflicts taking 
place in anarchic or semi-anarchic regions where the government provides little to no local 
administration. Weak control may be worsened by regime turnover, long histories of territorial 
contestation, poverty and underdevelopment that limits government capacity, or the sudden 
decapitation of longstanding regimes with little institutional structure to replace them. 
I investigate the following two research questions: (1) what are the effects of foreign 
intervention strategies that vary in addressing local grievances on militant strength and levels of 
civil war violence; and (2) to what extent have previous interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, 
and Libya attempted to address grievances, and were these efforts effective for achieving 
intervention goals? I also discuss the feasibility of intervention for addressing local grievances, 
and make recommendations specifically directed towards U.S. policymakers.  
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First, I develop a computational agent-based model that simulates the strategic 
interactions that take place between civilians and militants. I perform initial tests by varying 
different parameters and make some initial observations about their effects on conflict dynamics. 
Second, I design a hypothetical conflict environment to simulate using the model, and set some 
initial social, economic, and political conditions to represent those of common civilian 
communities and militant groups. I plot expected baseline patterns of violence and changes in 
actor behavior in this environment over time. Then, I analyze how different individual and 
combined strategies of diplomatic, economic and military intervention tools alter conditions in 
this system by introducing them to the model as external shocks. These strategies vary in 
whether or not they address the underlying grievances held by civilians who may provide support 
to fighting groups. I hypothesize that changes in incentives resulting from the intervention may 
increase violence for some strategies rather than reduce it, thereby contributing to a lack of 
reduction in conflict as observed during past civil wars.  
Fourth, I perform a case exploration of past foreign interventions in Somalia in 1992, 
Afghanistan in 2001, and Libya in 2011. These cases are selected due to their recency and their 
relevance to U.S. policymakers. I explore the extent to which civilian grievances were influential 
in these conflicts, and then examine to what degree foreign interveners attempted to tackle these 
grievances. I assess the effectiveness of the overall intervention for accomplishing its goals and 
draw conclusions about the feasibility of addressing disputes at the local level. Fifth, I perform 
modeling simulations of the same interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya, and discuss 
the agent-based model’s potential for simulating true conflict outcomes. To do so, I set initial 
parameter conditions using demographic and economic statistics reported by a variety of sources, 
including the U.S. military, international organizations, and academic researchers. I then 
 4 
simulate the introduction of the same intervention tools used in these cases and compare the 
results to actual outcomes. 
 Finally, I make policy recommendations for improving U.S. intervention strategies used 
to confront violence in unstable states. I also compare my results with existing academic research 
and practitioner “lessons learned,” and suggest both strategic and bureaucratic policy changes 
that are consistent with my research findings.   
   
1.1 Defining Failed Intervention  
Before critiquing foreign intervention strategies, it is necessary to first acknowledge the goals 
and objectives for which they are intended and recognize their successes. In Somalia, 
Afghanistan and Libya, several short-term objectives were successfully achieved with great 
speed and efficiency. Operation Restore Hope or UNITAF in Somalia was a brief, five-month 
long effort intended to stabilize the civil war in order to allow the access of relief organizations 
to famine-stricken areas. The mission swiftly established a ceasefire amongst warring factions 
and curbed the humanitarian crisis (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2004). During Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, U.S. forces quickly succeeded in ousting the Taliban and al-
Qaeda, and in cooperation with the British established a new democratically-elected central 
government. In Libya, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s Operation Odyssey 
Dawn successfully provided air support to opposition groups that also quickly ousted dictator 
Muammar Qaddafi and installed a new transitional government, neutralizing surface-to-air 
weapons threats along the way (Hamid 2016). In all three cases, in addition to their strategic 
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goals the U.S. and its partners also achieved some short term gains in conflict prevention, 
conflict management, and conflict resolution.1  
Unfortunately, in the mid to long-term none of the interventions succeeded in any of 
these three tasks, and they all failed to achieve stability or security from violence. In Somalia, 
repeated attempts by the United Nations to negotiate between the numerous clan-based militant 
groups failed to bring about any enduring agreement. The United States withdrew its troops 
without having established security, and the country backslid into renewed civil war that once 
again contributed to humanitarian crisis (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2004). In 
Afghanistan, after an initial retreat the Taliban returned with renewed strength and continued to 
engage Afghan forces in battle and retake territory. A BBC study released in January 2018 
estimated that the Taliban remained openly active in 70 percent of the country’s districts (Sharifi 
and Adamou 2018). In Libya, the newly-installed democratic government failed to adequately 
secure much of rural and southern Libya, and was unable to unify a country with longstanding 
tribal and regional divisions. A civil war erupted in 2014, with multiple local-level militias 
competing for power and engaging in violence (Wehrey 2017). The instability has allowed for 
unrestricted weapons proliferation and human trafficking across the Sahel, contributing to 
extremist activity and instability in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and 
Cameroon.  
Instability and violence pose serious threats to regional and U.S. interests. According to 
the U.S. Department of State and USAID Joint Strategic Plan FY2014-2017, “when states cannot 
control their territory, protect their people, support sustainable growth, or help those in need, the 
resulting instability disrupts economic activity and fosters permissive environments for violent 
                                                
1 Three tasks important for foreign involvement in civil wars, as defined by Oudraat (1996) in "The United Nations 
and Internal Conflict."  
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extremists and weapons proliferation” (2014a). The FY2014 U.S. Department of Defense 
Quadrennial Defense Review also states that, “the potential for rapidly developing threats, 
particularly in fragile states, including violent public protests and terrorist attacks, could pose 
acute challenges to U.S. interests” (2014b). Fighting permits insurgents and militias to gain 
traction and provides a safe haven for terrorist organizations (Kalyvas 2006). This destabilizes 
countries and their neighbors who cooperate with the United States on important economic and 
securitization goals. Conflict also impedes political development, weakening government 
capacity to improve on democracy and human rights issues. Countries embroiled in civil war are 
more likely to expend their resources on military power, with less to spare for the provision of 
goods and services (Boyle 2014, Ritter 2014, Walter 2015). Finally, because the U.S. is a global 
leader in publically advocating for the protection of civilian life, violence that persists because of 
or in spite of U.S. actions undermines its credibility and public image.2 
Foreign intervention policies are not necessarily intended to tackle mid to long term 
security and stability in conflict states. More often, short-term goals appear to motivate strategies 
for involvement, despite the risks of longer-term instability and violence.3 Instability may even 
work to the strategic advantage of the U.S. and its allies. For example, Ethiopia’s easternmost 
region is populated primarily by ethnic Somalis, and Ethiopia may worry that a strong Somalia 
would try to claim that territory as it did during the 1970 invasion led by President Siad Barre 
(De Waal 1991). The U.S. may therefore have an incentive to permit instability in Somalia in 
order to maintain the territorial integrity of its regional partner, to whom it provided $7.5 billion 
in economic assistance and $531 million in military aid in FY2018 (USAID). Instability might 
                                                
2 An important aspect of U.S. foreign policy strategy is maintaining credibility by upholding international 
commitments; see Brookings report by Felbab-Brown (2017) on Afghanistan for an example. 
 
3 Planning for short-term outcomes often prevails during a crisis. See Hudson (2014); Keller (2005); Mercer (2005). 
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also benefit foreign economic interests that gain from decreased regulation and limited oversight. 
However, policymakers continue to publically lament security failures in post-intervention states, 
despite whatever strategic objectives they may potentially achieve. By President Obama’s own 
admission, “failing to plan for the day after” in Libya was the “worst mistake” of his Presidency 
(BBC 2016). Unfortunately, the extent of ensuing violence and other negative long-term 
consequences often only become apparent after severe destabilization has already occurred.  
To avoid these consequences, there is clearly a motivation for policymakers to improve 
strategy from the outset in order to reduce the risk of instability later on. They may also aim to 
resolve conflict, to mitigate it, or at least to manage it once it occurs. Failing to do so inflicts 
costs on foreign interests. This is not to say that every destabilizing outcome of civil conflict is 
inherently the responsibility of the international community to “fix,” nor that foreign countries 
are necessarily at fault. In an interview in September 2016, President Obama stated that “we 
shouldn’t assume that every time a country has problems that it reflects a failure of American 
policy” (Landler 2017). A policy failure is characterized first and foremost as a failure to achieve 
its stated objectives. I further refine my definition of failed intervention to include (1) violence 
that erupts as an unintended result of intervention, and (2) the continuation of violence despite 
actions designed to stop it.  
 
1.2 Explanations for Intervention Failures 
Interventions have often resulted in early military successes, with transition processes designed 
to hand over responsibility for administration to a local country or an international organization. 
Why do these efforts fail to prevent conflict? Scholars and analysts provide several arguments 
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for why this might be the case, some pointing to ineffective strategies and others citing a flawed 
policymaking process. 
First, many critics believe that foreign interveners do not use the right combination of 
tools when intervening in weak states, relying too heavily on tactical military operations and 
weapons assistance. Studies indicate that military intervention prolongs civil conflict 
(Cunningham 2010, Regan 2002a, Sambanis and Elbadawi 2000), and others find that providing 
military assistance also increases the incidence of violence against civilians (Wood, Kathman, 
and Gent 2012). Therefore, some argue that countries must engage in improved nationbuilding 
efforts in order to rectify the problem of weak governance capacity (Davis et al. 2011, Fukuyama 
2006). Nationbuilding refers to political and economic reconstruction efforts that are designed to 
establish governing institutions and provide public goods where the previous government was 
either incapable or nonexistent (Fukuyama 2006). Since the Vietnam War in 1968, U.S. 
policymakers have recognized the need to develop local infrastructure and provide goods and 
services as part of an overall counterinsurgency strategy. Without strengthening the governing 
capacity of a weak state, insurgents are able to step back in and fill the void, even following 
successful military operations. Scholars argue that interventions need to devote greater resources 
to developing local partner governing capacity and providing services before withdrawal (Davis 
et al. 2011, Fukuyama 2006).   
However, other critics suggest that nationbuilding efforts may themselves be a cause of 
violence. Militants may target nationbuilding activities with violent attacks, as they seek to 
undermine local support for development projects and threaten the credibility of the intervener 
(Sexton 2016). Nationbuilding activities may also be interpreted as a violation of sovereignty 
through meddling in local affairs (Sexton 2016, Walt 2005). Some scholars posit that building 
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institutions which are well-adapted to the history and culture of a local state may be an 
impossible task, and other countries may not sufficiently understand the political dynamics of the 
local country to effectively end violence (Bull 2008, Lake 2016). Promotion of foreign 
democratic governance structures may also be inherently ill-suited to the fragile conditions of a 
weak state, which may not have achieved the government legitimacy or rule of law needed to 
peacefully transition power (Davenport 1995, Paris and Sisk 2009). Critics may argue that 
nationbuilding efforts are best attempted by international organizations with more neutral 
interests such as the United Nations, or interests more similar to the warring parties such as the 
African Union. Otherwise, they are doomed to failure. 
Other external obstacles impede even the most concerted of international efforts. Multiple 
intervening states may have oppositional objectives in a host country, and they may use their 
resources to counter one another’s gains and influence. Further, instability in neighboring states 
may spill over and fuel unrest, either contributing to a spread of violence and weapons or 
providing a safe haven for fighters (Campana and Ducol 2011). For example, Iran and Russia 
provided assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and Taliban fighters received education, 
training and refuge in neighboring Pakistan since before the war with the U.S. began (Malkasian 
2013). Despite effective use of available strategies, these outside factors may counteract any 
successes and may be difficult if not impossible to control. 
 A second category of argument is that failed intervention outcomes are caused by 
weaknesses in foreign policymaking and the bureaucratic process. For the United States 
specifically, critics point to an overwhelming imbalance in funding and capabilities that favors 
the U.S. Department of Defense as compared to the U.S. Department of State. They argue that as 
a result, the military tends to control most of the planning and implementation of interventions, 
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leading to success in attaining forceful objectives but a poor record of achieving political ones 
(Adams 2014, Marks 2014). The military either neglects the political tasks needed to encourage 
stable governance, or in attempting to accomplish them, steps outside the boundaries of its 
appropriate role. Greater participation of the U.S. Department of State, these critics argue, would 
improve conflict outcomes (Adams 2014, Marks 2014). Skeptics more critical of U.S. diplomatic 
efforts counter that the civilian corps consistently fails to implement concrete programs and 
deliver results, requiring the military to step in and fill the void (Schake 2013). Others believe 
that the problem starts at the top of the interagency, where decisionmakers may develop 
strategies that are ill-adapted to the realities of the conflict environment due to limited 
information (Hudson 2014, Mercer 2005). They may not invest enough time or resources to fully 
investigate those realities, or they may overly rely on faulty or biased sources. Policymakers 
themselves may be biased by their own preexisting beliefs about a conflict, or by pressures to 
conform to the interests of a group in a decisionmaking failure known as “groupthink” (Hersh 
1983, Hudson 2014). They may also choose to inform foreign policy based on domestic political 
interests rather than the situation on the ground, perhaps catering to the objectives of a specific 
interest group (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012, Holsti 2004, Meernik 1994). These failures 
may doom U.S. interventions from their inception. 
Although the above arguments suggest serious obstacles to intervention success, none of 
them provide an all-encompassing explanation for why interventions still fail. First, concerted 
attempts to resolve each of these potential problems have not led to success. Across multiple 
U.S. Presidential administrations, which have expended immense resources on varying 
approaches, we still observe little change in results. This is not to say that practitioners have not 
learned a great deal from prior experience; in fact, small-scale successes in the field due to 
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implementation of “lessons learned” have promisingly lessened casualty rates and prevented 
worse outcomes.4 However, instability and protracted conflict remain unresolved. Following 
criticisms of the Bush administration’s handling of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama 
administration was eager to attempt a different strategy during the Libya intervention. With 
improved interagency collaboration and civilian ownership of the planning process, the 
administration worked alongside an international coalition of NATO allies, taking a less invasive 
approach by not deploying U.S. troops on the ground. The U.S. relied more heavily on 
diplomatic engagement and political cooperation to advise and empower Libyans to set the 
course for their own future (Chesterman 2011, Chollet 2016, Joyner 2011, Quartararo, Rovenolt, 
and White 2012). However, Libya still suffered from a spike in violent infighting between rival 
militias and collapsed into civil war in 2014, with conflict continuing to this day. Obama also 
spent his entire Presidency confronting instability in Afghanistan. Despite eighteen years of 
experience fighting the Taliban, the U.S. remains unable to wrest much of the country from their 
control (BBC 2016, Robinson et al. 2014).   
This poor track record could indicate that intervention does not succeed under any 
circumstances, particularly not in states without stable governments. It may be that processes like 
conflict resolution, political development and societal change require long periods of time in 
order to successfully lead to a cessation of violence. Interventions may be rushing to accomplish 
in a few years what naturally requires decades to occur. However, on-going conflicts in the 
Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan where the UN serves light, long-term 
peacekeeping functions indicate that a strategy of limited or non-intervention also does little to 
improve violent conflict outcomes. If intervention has at least the potential to reduce conflict 
                                                
4 Some examples include increased interagency cooperation, greater investment in security sector reform, and 
counterinsurgency strategies that prioritized civilian needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Robinson et al. (2014). 
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violence, then there is still value in exploring under what conditions this may be possible and the 
obstacles standing in the way of success. Some practitioner “lessons learned” have already 
observed which strategies appear to be more promising than others, and identified ones that have 
ultimately fallen short. The task still remaining is to investigate the underlying reasons why those 
strategies have ultimately failed such that they can be improved upon in the future. 
 
1.3 The Roots of Civil Conflict and the Impacts of Intervention 
Most research in the study of civil war examines the motivations of actors at the level of the state 
and its institutions. This includes non-state actors such as insurgencies or rebel groups, who may 
fight against the state or have state-level aspirations. However, local actors such as households or 
individuals also participate in violence and have their own incentives that may either encourage 
or discourage fighting (Balcells and Justino 2014, Kalyvas 2006, Wood 2014, Weidmann 2016). 
Individuals may choose whether or not to support a conflict actor based on motivations that stem 
from ideology, loyalty, or personal gain. They may also choose to organize at the community 
level, for example by forming a local militia (Balcells and Justino 2014).  
Scholars have explored numerous explanations for conflict occurrence at the broader 
level. One example is nationalism and ethnic cleavages, which provide a source of contention for 
different groups over which to compete for power, security, or resources. Some studies explain 
how ethnic diversity can lead to tensions and fighting between groups (Dunning and Harrison 
2010, Kaufmann 1996, Posen 1993). However, critics counter that many countries with 
significant grievances split along ethnic lines do not experience civil war (Fearon and Laitin 
2003, Posner 2004); instead, factors related to their environment and the political system prompt 
conflict. The presence of natural resources may create a “resource curse” in which groups vie for 
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power in order to benefit from profits and rents (Basedau and Lay 2009, Humphreys 2005, 
Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005). Natural geography, high population levels, and low 
economic prosperity are also cited as potential contributors to civil war onset (Brown 1996). 
Regime type and political structure are other important factors; authoritarian systems are more 
likely to suppress grievances that may ultimately inspire secessionist movements or revolutions 
(de Mesquita and Smith 2009, Fjelde and De Soysa 2009, Walter 2015), and democratization 
may weaken overall state control while simultaneously introducing more competing political 
actors (Davenport 1995).   
Closer examination of these theories reveals that interactions across multiple levels of 
analysis act as mechanisms for the patterns observed between conflict actors. For example, 
different ethnic groups may form armed local militias and fight with one another when 
individuals feel threatened enough to pay them for protection, in a process commonly known as a 
security dilemma (Posen 1993). The incentives of individuals to ensure their own defense against 
crime or warfare, or to pro-actively “settle scores” against their neighbors contributes to the 
strength of armed groups at the higher levels (Balcells and Justino 2014, Kalyvas 2006). 
Similarly, businesses and entrepreneurs may choose to cooperate with rebel groups who extort 
them for taxes in order to gain protection and other benefits, rather than reporting this activity to 
their opponents (Collier 2000, Tilly 1985). The motivations of individual-level actors can set the 
conditions that enable or encourage groups to fight. Fighting also occurs between individuals and 
households; they may take up arms against one another when weapons are available but policing 
is not (Barter 2012, Grossman 2009, Kalyvas 2006). They may also choose whether to submit to 
suppression or join insurgencies due to societal pressures and their positions within social 
networks (Siegel 2011b, a). U.S. counterinsurgency forces have reported difficulty 
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differentiating between combatants and civilians since the Vietnam War, as the lines become 
blurred between who qualifies as a rebel combatant and who is a civilian bystander. 
Underlying grievances, or perceived injustices and inequities may drive civilians to 
pursue support for militant groups. Poverty may motivate increased support for rebel fighting, 
either due to economic hardships that justify a rational violent response, or because of the 
decreased opportunity costs of fighting (Collier and Hoeffler 2000, Sambanis 2004). For 
example, violence in the Sahel is frequently attributed to a lack of economic opportunity in 
remote regions that leaves civilians disproportionately more impoverished than their urban 
counterparts (Guichaoua 2012, Khan and Cheri 2016, Lecocq and Klute 2013). Citizens may also 
blame their relative poverty on corrupt government practices and a lack of service provision. 
Tuareg separatists in northern Mali and Niger, as well as Boko Haram in northern Nigeria cite 
persistent underdevelopment as a justification for rebellion, successfully mobilizing local 
civilians who feel “left behind” by state governments. Further, civilians may feel excluded by 
laws and policies created in capital cities whose identities and values differ from their own. 
Muslim communities in northern Nigeria have long decried religious marginalization by the 
government, calling for a greater recognition of Islamic law in the adjudication of disputes 
(Bienen 1986, Khan and Cheri 2016). Government leaders in Afghanistan disenfranchise 
landless tribes by denying them access to property rights, prompting them to ally with the 
Taliban (Malkasian 2013). Given a delegitimized system of dispute adjudication and lack of rule 
of law, citizens may resort to violence to rectify injustice or to resolve conflicts on their own 
(Beardsley and Lo 2014, Bull 2008).  
Generally, civilians have the agency to choose whether or not to collaborate with 
militants based on calculated costs and benefits, although they may be coerced rather than 
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persuaded if the actor has a high level of forceful control. Collaboration provides a system of 
support for a group, and a source of new fighters. It typically occurs somewhere on a continuous 
spectrum, where civilian support can vary fluidly from fully supportive of one group to fully 
supportive of its opponent, with neutrality in between (Kalyvas 2006). Civilians may fulfill their 
own local agendas by forming alliances with a broader organization. Communities may align 
opportunistically with a rebel group because the group can provide protection against a rival, 
bestow benefits that enhance their local power, or supply weapons (Kalyvas 2006). They could 
also reflect ideological similarities that lead to greater trust (Dunning and Harrison 2010, 
Habyarimana et al. 2007). Alliances change frequently depending on the advantages that 
communities gain or lose over time.  
These interdependencies add complexity to understanding civil wars, and to 
understanding the effects of an intervention. An intervention strategy designed to address only 
broader-level interactions risks neglecting underlying local tensions that fuel the conflict; or 
worse, exacerbating them. For example, tactics that forcefully remove individuals engaged in 
conflict may be less effective than “hearts-and-minds” type approaches which are less disruptive 
of existing interdependencies (Siegel 2011a). Alternatively, negotiating a ceasefire between two 
rebel groups may lead to an end in fighting in the short run, but it could also encourage 
community-level violence. Tensions may rise amongst local populations who profit from rebel 
force, which may serve law enforcement and protection purposes. In such a case, criminal 
networks may increase or militias may form to fill the void and provide a new source of violent 
policing (Byman 2013). The overthrow of Qaddafi removed the threat of regime violence against 
civilian populations, but it also created a security vacuum that incentivized clan-level actors to 
form militias where they could not or did not need to do so previously. This shifted the nexus of 
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conflict from the state to the local level, leading to greater levels of violence overall (Wehrey 
2017). This example demonstrates that by examining the impact of intervention on the 
interdependent structure of incentives between different levels of conflict actors, assessments 
may become more accurate and predictive. 
Thankfully, there are an increasing number of studies that explore interdependency 
between the governing leadership and civilians in the context of local responses to intervention. 
The core supporters of governments or rebel groups, or their “coalitions of support,” respond to 
intervention in ways that are highly influential to organizational behavior (de Mesquita and 
Smith 2007). These supporters can impose “audience costs” on both states and rebel elites; they 
can hold them accountable for commitments made during negotiations (Crescenzi et al. 2011, 
Greig 2015), punish them for economic losses (Drezner 2011, Kirshner 1997, Nincic 2010, 
Nielsen et al. 2011), or abandon them when faced with external threats to security and well-being 
(Sexton 2016). They may also rally in sympathetic support following foreign attacks (Azam and 
Thelen 2010, Byman and Waxman 2002, Carter 2015, Mack 1975), in response to external 
infringement of sovereignty (Goldsmith and Horiuchi 2009, Nye 2008), to reap the gains from 
economic aid (Bader and Faust 2014, Lektzian and Patterson 2015, Licht 2010, Nincic 2010, 
Wright 2009), or to benefit from outside protection (Sexton 2016). The extent of their impact 
may vary depending on leadership type. Democratic or representative groups have broad ruling 
coalitions and are more sensitive to the interests of constituents, while autocracies have narrow 
ruling coalitions and only need to appeal to a small core group of supporters (de Mesquita and 
Smith 2007, Lai and Morey 2006). These patterns can help explain complex changes in conflict 
behavior that result from external involvement. 
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Academic research on intervention generally focuses on the effects of different strategies 
or “tools” one at a time. I divide these tools into three categories: diplomatic, economic, and 
military force. The least coercive is the use of diplomacy, or “soft power.” Diplomacy is 
exercised in various forms in order to influence conflict actors to behave in the foreign interest, 
including conflict mediation, public diplomacy, or offering inducements or “carrots.” While 
diplomacy is traditionally understood in the context of international relations between state-level 
leaders, I use the term loosely to also describe political engagement and capacity-building efforts 
with non-state actors. For example, political advisors may serve a diplomatic role by providing 
leadership and decisionmaking advice to local leaders. Another “soft power” strategy is the 
provision of foreign economic assistance. This tool may be used to encourage or incentivize 
favorable behavior through financial assistance or in-kind transfers. It can also support local 
institutions by providing the funds needed for infrastructure and development, empowering local 
leaders, and enabling the provision of benefits and services to civilians. Economic aid provided 
to military institutions strengthens a government or group’s ability to provide security and 
control its population. 
By contrast, economic coercion can be used to undermine markets and sanction actors. 
The U.S. may cut off supply chains for black markets that fund the operations of militant groups. 
They may also sanction organizations and individuals by excluding them from foreign markets in 
order to coerce changes in behavior. In some cases, the U.S. may use the military to impose 
economic restrictions, such as bombing oil production sites or factories, but I consider these 
methods to be economic by design. When economic threats and punishments are insufficient, 
military force can be used to bolster one side’s capabilities, undermine support for a group or 
regime, threaten the safety of its leadership, or to directly fight combatants, denying them 
 18 
battlefield success (Byman 2013, Byman and Waxman 2002, Jones 2017). Forceful tools used to 
achieve these aims include air strikes, invasions and land grabs, targeted assassinations, military 
advising, securitization and policing assistance (Byman and Waxman 2002).  
Studying each tool separately allows researchers to isolate and understand their effects. 
However, policymakers do not use these tools individually; rather, they are implemented in 
combination in order to counteract the negative effects of each (Art 1996, Azam and Thelen 
2010, Barber 1979, Byman and Waxman 2002, Clark and Reed 2005, Kydd and Straus 2013, 
Lektzian and Regan 2016, Regan 2000). They should be studied as compliments, as simply the 
threat of one could result in successful outcomes of another, or the misuse of one could result in 
the failure of another (Art 1996, Clark and Reed 2005, Drezner 1999, Sartori 2013). This poses a 
major methodological challenge, especially when studying a conflict environment with an 
interconnected system of actors at different levels of analysis. Researchers must identify and 
isolate the precise mechanisms for how broader processes affect the local level, and vice-versa 
(Balcells and Justino 2014). In order to investigate how U.S. intervention fails to reduce 
violence, I will attempt to do just that.  
 
1.4 Investigative Road Map 
This study is comprised of five parts. In Chapter 1, I have introduced the problem of failed 
foreign intervention and the importance of local-level causes of conflict. Intervention strategies 
may fail to reduce conflict violence because they do not address the underlying grievances that 
motivate civilians to take sides and support militant actors, threatening international security and 
strategic interests. Therefore, it is necessary to understand exactly how varying packages of 
intervention tools impact local incentives, and whether addressing the underlying roots of 
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conflict could improve foreign policy outcomes. In Chapter 2, I introduce a theoretically-based 
computational model that demonstrates how interactions between militant groups and civilians 
during civil war impact baseline patterns of violence and militant strength over time. In a system 
of weak control, armed militants may choose to extort, benefit, or attack local civilian 
populations based on their own strategies for survival. In turn, civilians may provide support and 
form alliances with these groups in pursuit of their own interests. Different communities of 
civilians may be more likely to ally with certain groups based on their underlying grievances and 
local-level competition. This can encourage violence between different groups, shift the balance 
of power, and encourage civilians to arm themselves for their own defense.  
In order to demonstrate the dynamics of the model, I vary different model parameters 
individually and observe the change in outcomes. This reveals some interesting insights into the 
relationships between civilians and militant groups during civil wars, and I discuss how some of 
these findings support or conflict with the existing conflict literature. I create a list of some initial 
observations that hold implications for the effectiveness of foreign intervention. Overall, I 
demonstrate how complex networks of local grievances and affiliations between civilians and 
militants create unpredictable levels of civilian support. Civilians may shift their support of 
different groups in ways that are unexpected, and this leads to strengthening and fighting 
between groups that foreign interveners may or may not support.   
In Chapter 3, I use the computational model to analyze the impacts of varying 
intervention tools and strategies on civil conflict, and determine whether efforts to resolve 
underlying grievances have a greater effect on the reduction of violence. I first set the initial 
conditions of the model based on a hypothetical conflict environment that includes a weak 
government struggling to maintain power, a strong rebel group that challenges the government 
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and holds territory, and a small extremist organization that hides amongst the rebel group 
members and executes attacks on civilians to intimidate them into providing support. Then, I 
create five different combinations of diplomatic, economic and military intervention tools and 
introduce each tool and strategy to the model as an external shock by changing the values of 
corresponding parameters. For example, if the intervener chooses a strategy that provides 
military support to a militant group, I represent this as an exogenous positive increase in militant 
strength. If the strategy also includes holding negotiations between two local communities in 
order to resolve their grievances, I represent this as a removal of grievances from the model 
parameters. The five strategies vary in their use of tools that address underlying grievances and 
in their degree of force, and they reflect hypothetical approaches that the international 
community could take towards a foreign conflict.  
I then measure the effects of each tool and strategy using an Interrupted Time Series 
(ITS) analysis to compare militant strengths, violence levels, and incidents of civilian defending 
before the intervention to those following the intervention. I also compare the impacts of the five 
strategies at medium and low levels of efficiency, and their introduction to the model during both 
a short and indefinite period of time. These analyses indicate whether some strategies become 
more effective than others if obstacles or inefficiencies are expected, or if the intervener chooses 
to withdraw its intervention after a short rather than long-term period. I find that resolving 
grievances alone may result in little to no effect on intervention success. Many of the 
intervention tools that address local interactions, while they may alter the strength of militants 
and the behavior of civilians, lead to shifts in support that are not necessarily advantageous to the 
intervener. I explain why this might be, and develop an optimal strategy that consists of 
providing civilians with external benefits as well as many of the more traditionally-employed 
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intervention tools such as funding and training some militants and conducting direct attacks on 
others.  
In Chapter 4, I perform a case exploration of historical conflicts of great interest and 
political relevance to current U.S. policymakers: the 1992 intervention in Somalia, the 2001 war 
in Afghanistan, and the 2011 overthrow of Qaddafi in Libya. I examine the relevance of local 
grievances and disputes to these conflicts, and then explore the effectiveness of foreign 
interveners in attempting to resolve them. For each conflict, first I provide an overview of the 
community dynamics that play a role in each country. I describe how internal disputes escalate 
into local conflict and militarization, and explore the ways in which militant groups benefit from 
this instability. Next, I provide background into the history and causes of each conflict, and 
recount the chronology of the foreign intervention. Then I examine any attempts that the 
interveners made to address local grievances more specifically, and assess their effectiveness at 
both the local and broader level. I provide overall assessments for each conflict case, and discuss 
implications for policymakers.  
I find that serious obstacles impeded any attention to grievances by outside actors, and 
genuine attempts were rarely made during any of the three cases. The few that were, primarily 
during the later years of the intervention in Afghanistan, yielded few perceptible results and were 
not implemented on a widespread scale. I note the importance of internal factors such as the 
strength of the government, the availability of weapons, and the alignment of grievances with 
broader conflict goals, finding that these factors can help interveners shape their expectations 
about how local disputes will contribute to conflict outcomes. I conclude that grievances are 
undoubtedly critical to the trajectory of violence in these three cases, and that perhaps rather than 
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tackling them directly, foreign interveners could do more to support local traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms that have proven to be more effective in conflict resolution. 
In Chapter 5, I simulate the same three intervention cases using the computational model 
in order to explore how the model’s generated outcomes compare to actual historical events. I 
research a wide variety of data sources and use them to estimate parameters and initial 
conditions. I then introduce simulated foreign intervention strategies based on the actual 
intervention tools that were used. Although agent-based modeling is a tool intended for exploring 
the mechanisms underlying collective outcomes, rather than for prediction, I am able make some 
initial assessments as to whether the tool can be used as an indicator for how a civil war may 
evolve, based on the influence of local support interactions. Although I find that many of the 
outcomes generated by the model differ from historical events, many are also consistent with 
empirical observations. I discuss how these differences help inform the usefulness of this agent-
based model for examining real conflicts.    
Finally, in Chapter 6 I conclude with a summary of my findings and recommendations 
for policymakers for improving violence and stability outcomes in civil wars. These 
recommendations suggest how foreign interveners could address weaknesses in their intervention 
policies in a manner that is also mindful of political and bureaucratic constraints. Countless 
assessments of current and past intervention policies have previously been performed, and many 
of them also contain nuanced recommendations for strategic and bureaucratic approaches to 
intervention. I describe how previous work is or is not consistent with my analysis, referencing 
existing academic and practitioner reports. Ultimately, I advise that quick military operations 
may be effective for establishing security in the short-term, but indirectly supporting traditional 
dispute resolution institutions may be required to resolve the underlying grievances which 
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perpetuate local conflict in the long term. I build upon this assessment by providing additional 
insight from the perspective of local governments, civilians, and international observers.  I 
conclude with a discussion of the broader ethical implications of foreign intervention, and I 
suggest that policymakers consider these and other effectiveness arguments when making the 







CHAPTER 2: AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF CIVILIAN  




In order to anticipate the possible outcomes stemming from a planned civil war intervention, 
policymakers should have a thorough understanding of the roots of the conflict and the causes of 
violence. This requires knowledge of the underlying dynamics that lead to conflict and violence, 
which are dependent on interactions between civilians and militant organizations. Although 
numerous studies provide explanations for fighter decisionmaking and behavior between 
militants such as governments or rebel groups, I focus on those explanations specific to the 
interactions between militants and civilians. I use an agent-based model to represent these 
interactions and draw initial conclusions about the impacts of underlying civilian grievances and 
alliances on violence outcomes.  
 
2.1 Relationships Between Civilians and Militants 
 
Severine Autesserre in The Trouble with Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International 
Peacebuilding (2010) argues that the inability of the international community to end conflict in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is due to a failure to address micro-level tensions. She 
explains how the dominant peacekeeping culture favors macro-level strategies such as holding 
elections, but such top-down approaches are not adapted to local dynamics (Autesserre 2010). In 
reality, intertwined social, economic, and political agendas motivate conflict, leading community 
groups to seek power or revenge by forming alliances with rebels. Her account is consistent with 
the theory of Kalyvas (2006), who argues that militants actively seek collaboration from 
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civilians. This collaboration can range from simply not betraying the militants to the enemy, to 
providing substantial material support. Civilians may form alliances with militants in order to 
gain protection or services from them, while the militants receive resources and a safe haven in 
return. Collaboration may also be forced; civilians often switch sides in civil war based on which 
group they fear, or the group that they think is the winner based on their control over new 
territory (Kalyvas 2006). They may also opportunistically switch sides when they seek to 
leverage power over another civilian rival.  
Factors such as identity, economic incentives, and political motivations further influence 
civilian collaboration and rebel violence. Identity cleavages such as ethnicity can form a basis of 
trust that supports cooperation with the in-group but may decrease the likelihood of alliances 
between groups (Dunning and Harrison 2010, Habyarimana et al. 2007). Research also suggests 
that politicization of identities can make them more salient as a cleavage that contributes to 
violence (Fearon 2006, Fjelde and Hultman 2014, Posen 1993, Posner 2004, Ottmann 2017).  
Other researchers examine conflict through the economic interactions that provide rebel 
groups with support. Tilly (1985) describes conflict as an environment of civilian extortion in 
exchange for the provision of security under anarchic conditions, and Olson (1993) shows that in 
this system civilians and rebels are better off if a rebel group establishes itself as a monopoly and 
extracts taxes. Collier (2000) finds that greater feasibility of such economic predation is a 
predictor of conflict. Weinstein (2006) demonstrates more specifically how rebel groups vary in 
their treatment of civilians based on their alternative sources of financial support, showing that 
groups who can profit from natural resources are less dependent on localized extortion and 
therefore inflict more violence. Wood (2014) finds that battle losses further increase a group’s 
incentives for looting and predation. 
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Political incentives are also important for understanding local-level interactions. Rebels 
may wish to achieve territorial control and engage in local governance, providing civilians with 
benefits and services in exchange for their support (Huang 2016, Malejacq 2017, Stewart 2018). 
They may also choose to strategically employ violence against civilians in order to compel 
support or intimidate defectors (Kydd and Walter 2006, Valentino 2014, Wood 2010). These 
interactions will be elaborated in greater detail in the ensuing sections.  
 
 
2.2 Computational Agent-Based Modeling  
 
Most conflict research focuses individually on specific types of civilian-militant interactions. 
However, multiple identity, economic and political interactions simultaneously occur as part of a 
complex system of behavior that produces violence outcomes. By combining theories from the 
work of previous scholars using computational modeling, I can explain complex collective 
behavior in a systematic and comprehensible way.  
In 1987, computer graphics expert Craig Reynolds in Flocks, Herds, and Schools: A 
Distributed Behavioral Model explained how simulating the highly complex and seemingly 
random movement of a flock of birds can be difficult, complicated and prone to error if the flock 
is modeled in aggregate. However, the flock can be more easily and accurately simulated as 
multiple instances of one bird that interacts with others according to a set of predictable and 
relatively simple rules. This approach, called Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), is used to explain 
system-level dynamics that emerge from local-level interactions among adaptive agents (Macy 
and Willer 2002). After creating rules based on existing research about how militant groups 
interact with civilians and vice versa, I can computationally use ABM to observe the systemic 
patterns that emerge from these bottom-up interactions. Then, based on the assumption that this 
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research is correct, I will use the model to examine the effects of outside intervention on conflict 
violence. 
There is precedent within the U.S. military for using computational tools to understand 
conflict, and for applying that knowledge to intervention implementation. Commanders already 
use computer models to simulate the effects of their kinetic actions on the physical battlefield 
(Upal 2015). A 2014 report published by the RAND Corporation finds that modeling and 
simulation has been effectively used in support of tactical, logistics, and force protection 
objectives during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Connable et al. 
2014). This work has been primarily grounded in physics-based analysis. Social science 
modeling and simulation has also been attempted for achieving both kinetic and non-kinetic 
objectives. Non-kinetic activities have included understanding the “human terrain” or the 
sociological environment, mapping social networks, and information and civil operations 
(Connable et al. 2014). The military has identified variables of interest such as DIME 
(Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic) and PMESII-PT (Political, Military, Economic, 
Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical Environment, Time) for “dissect[ing] the 
sociocultural environment” (Connable et al. 2014). To date, simulation of these variables has 
proven less successful than physics-based computation. Nevertheless, military “human terrain” 
researchers have still used software platforms such as IBM’s i2 Analyst’s Notebook to analyze 
intelligence data using Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Geospatial Information Systems 
(GIS) tools (Finney 2008). 
Agent-based models provide an opportunity to simplify analysis of information about 
large numbers of individual agents or actors who carry unique characteristics or attributes (Siegel 
2018). While the use of ABM in the social sciences is relatively new (Epstein 1999, Johnson 
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1999, Macy and Willer 2002), the political science field has used it to explore a diverse selection 
of research areas. For example, Hammond and Axelrod (2006) demonstrate how ethnocentric 
favoritism can spread in a population, and Leifeld (2014) shows how political discourse can 
become increasingly polarized. Nardin et al. (2014) use ABM to show how Mafia-like criminal 
organizations extort civilian populations. Rousseau and Van Der Veen (2005) demonstrate how 
identities change and shared ones emerge. Some researchers have also used ABM to study 
conflict and violence specifically. Bhavnani and Backer (2000) demonstrate why patterns of 
genocidal violence might vary, using the cases of ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi as 
examples. Epstein (2002) models the escalation of two types of civil violence, rebellion and 
government suppression of two warring ethnic groups. Johnson, Weidmann, and Cederman 
(2011) find that overconfident states are more likely to win in interstate wars because of other 
behaviors that arise as a result of being overconfident. Moro (2016) explains the heterogeneity of 
outcomes that may result from popular uprisings such as the Arab Spring. Finally, Duffy et al. 
(2019) demonstrate how economic coercion of civilians influences the growth and demise of 
rebel groups.  
This project uses an agent-based model developed using Python programming to 
illustrate the patterns of violence that result from multiple local-level incentives for conflict. I 
assume an environment with weak or non-existent government control, defined as a condition 
where civilians have the potential to be extorted by one or more local militant groups who may 
themselves compete for power. I incorporate several factors and interactions into the model: pre-
existing power relationships between identity-based communities of civilians, the propensities of 
these communities to support or oppose a militant group, militant extortion and punishment of 
civilians, militant provision of benefits to civilians, civilian provision of materiel or intelligence 
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support to militants, and civilian reporting of militant groups to a government or other militant 
group. I also incorporate civilian self-protection and militant conflict with other actors.  
 
Varying initial conditions based on realistic expectations of a typical conflict environment, I will 
use the model to show: 
- The importance of local grievances for altering support, militant strength, and violence 
outcomes 
- How shifts in affiliations between civilians and militants change the strength of militant 
groups  
- How militant strengths and violence levels change when militant groups provide more 
benefits to civilians or reduce punishment 
These dynamics have implications for the effects of intervention on the local causes of conflict. 
For example, if local grievances and alliances have a large positive effect on violence, then 
negotiations between local actors may be effective for reducing fighting. I will address the 
implications of these dynamics for policymakers in greater detail in the next chapter, in which I 
will discuss the impacts of different intervention strategies on the conflict environment.  
 




I model interactions that take place between two types of agents: Civilians and Militant Groups. 
Figure 1 is a diagram of the model showing these two agent types and their possible interactions. 
Civilians exist in a population that can number any size, and there may also be multiple Militant 
Groups. Militant Groups are defined as any group that seeks to control a population through 
extortion, whether that be a rebel movement, secessionists, insurgents, a terrorist organization, or 
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an expansionist militia. Their territory of expansion is be defined as any locations, or regions 
where they attempt extortion of Civilians. A country’s government may also be represented as a 
Militant Group if it engages in the same indistinguishable interactions. This may be the case in 
conditions of very weak government control or where recognition of an official government is 
contested; multiple militaries may compete with one another and may behave in the same way as 
Militant Groups when trying to capture or recapture territory. Therefore, representation of a 
government as a Group will occur as a variation on initial condition parameters.  
 
Figure 1: Block Diagram of Agent-Based Model 
 
A Civilian is any member of a population that is not a decisionmaker in a Militant Group. I 
ascribe it with three attributes: community membership, wealth, and geographic location. 
Community membership is a one or a set of salient identities to which a Civilian belongs, which 
can be used to predict the behavior of multiple Civilians. For example, a Civilian in Somalia may 
be a member of a clan, and may subordinate themselves to behavior dictated at the clan level. If 
the clan has an alliance with a Militant Group, then it is assumed that the Civilian is also part of 
that alliance and behaves accordingly. Civilians are modeled individually rather than as 
communities in order to capture multiple identities, and because each individual has its own 
wealth, measured as one of three levels Low, Medium, or High. These values are relative and 
may vary depending on the country case, but I define them roughly as the minimal earnings 
 31 
earned through a local economy (Low), moderate earnings gained through modest business in a 
broader economy (Medium), and high earnings gained through elite status or corporate enterprise 
in a large-scale economy (High). Examples include a subsistence farmer, the owner of a small 
restaurant, and an executive in a mining industry, respectively.  
A Militant Group is an agent that seeks to extract resources from Civilians using the 
threat of force, in order to increase its own strength. It has four attributes: external income, 
military strength, notoriety, and a terrorism indicator. External income is any resources or 
funding that a Group receives external to its interactions with Civilians, for example from 
resource extraction or from foreign sponsors. Military strength (henceforth referred to simply as 
“strength”) is measured as the combined total sum of a Group’s external funding, all of its 
extortion revenue, and a monetized value for any additional support provided by Civilians. I 
assume that all Groups in a particular conflict setting convert their funding and resources into 
increases in strength with equal efficiency. In reality this is not the case; different resources are 
more fungible than others, and some Groups may budget their resources more efficiently. 
However, assuming approximately equal technologies of warfare and types of resources 
available to local belligerents in one conflict, I can reasonably make this simplification.  
Another Militant Group attribute is notoriety. Notoriety, or a Group’s reputation for the 
use of force, provides an indication of the level of fear instilled by the Group that could motivate 
support by Civilians. This is measured as the proportion of Civilians who have been punished out 
of a total population available for extortion. Increased incidents of punishment therefore result in 
incrementally increasing notoriety. When an extorting Group has relatively high notoriety, 




Figure 2: Model Parameters and Variation Range 
 
Parameter Source Range 
   
Civilian    
community identification Exogenous, empirical  value > 0 
region Exogenous, empirical  value > 0 
wealth Exogenous, empirical  L, M, H 
support for each militant Endogenous  0 / 1 
     
Militant    
external income Exogenous, empirical  value > 0 
terrorism indicator Exogenous  T / F 
benefit threshold Exogenous  0 – 100 
notoriety Endogenous  0 – 100% 
extortion condition Endogenous  T / F 
punishment condition Endogenous  T / F 
     
System    
number of civilians Exogenous, empirical  value > 0 
number of militants Exogenous, empirical  value > 0 
communities Exogenous, empirical  list 
regions Exogenous, empirical  list 
value of L, M, H wealth Exogenous, empirical  3 values > 0 
percent extortion rate Exogenous, empirical  0 - 100% 
percent support rate Exogenous, empirical  0 - 100% 
community grievances Exogenous, empirical  -1 / 0 
community affiliations with groups Exogenous, empirical  -1 / 0 / 1 
weapons in region Exogenous, empirical  0 / 1 
fighting condition Endogenous  0 - 100% 
defend/local militarization condition Endogenous  0 - 100% 
 
 
The last Militant attribute which can also endogenously increase its notoriety is a terrorism 
indicator that denotes whether or not a Militant engages in terrorism activity. It captures a 
particularly high incidence of violence targeted against Civilians. When the terrorism indicator is 
True, the Militant’s punishment of Civilians does not depend on the strength of adversarial 
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Militant Groups; instead, attacks are fixed at an adjustable high likelihood. Figure 2 above shows 
all of the model parameters, whether they are defined exogenously as initial conditions or update 
endogenously, and the ranges of variation in their values.  
Militant control takes place through an extortion racket in which the militants extort 
funds from Civilians in order to gain resources, which it uses to increase its own strength. This is 
consistent with Tilly’s (1986) portrayal of competition for control as a coercive process of 
exploitation, in which Groups levy taxes against local populations who seek protection and 
benefits. According to Olson (1993), such extorting is accepted by Civilians when a Group forms 
local relationships and protects Civilians, incentivizing the Group to provide goods and increase 
productivity. Therefore, Militant Groups may also benefit Civilians, providing them with goods 
and services such as infrastructure projects like roads and wells, services like schools and 
healthcare, legal adjudication, and inputs to business production like transportation or raw 
materials (Huang 2016, Malejacq 2017, Stewart 2018). Such benefits improve the Group’s 
reputation with Civilians, who may provide reciprocal support through material resources, 
funding, shelter, and information about an enemy Group in return (Arjona 2016, Beardsley and 
McQuinn 2009, Huang 2016, Mampilly 2011, Weinstein 2006). Some observations made by 
policymakers are consistent with these dynamics. According to a report on clan dynamics in 
Somalia published by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1992, “Enclave leaders must 
persuade rivals to cooperate in order to avoid subclan fragmentation and civil war, and they are 
unlikely to succeed in this endeavor if they cannot provide economic patronage and political 
prestige in return for such cooperation and support” (7). 
However, in a semi-anarchic environment, there may be multiple Militant Groups 
competing for control, attempting to extort the same populations of Civilians. Militants may 
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therefore have an incentive to commit violence against Civilians, or punish them. They may do 
so to punish support for opposing Groups (Fjelde and Hultman 2014), terrorize Civilians to 
signal strength (Kydd and Walter 2006, Weinstein 2006), or intimidate Civilians into providing 
support when they are too weak to entice them with benefits (Weinstein 2006, Wood 2010). I 
model the first two examples as forms of punishment, but consider intimidation to be an aspect 
of extortion. In response to punishment, Civilians may choose to support a Militant’s opponent, 
if the Militant does not have a high enough notoriety for the Civilian to fear further retribution. 
Two outcomes indicate the potential for violence. First, fighting between Militants occurs 
with increasing probability as multiple Groups of similar strength attempt extortion of Civilians 
in the same regions. Second, a condition of “local militarization” may occur in which civilians 
also participate in local violence by arming and defending themselves. A Civilian could defend 
itself from a Group if weapons are available and the Civilian has a high enough wealth (Arjona 
2016, Kaplan 2017). This occurs only when the Civilian’s community has such a negative 
propensity towards a Group to the extent of forming a local militia to fend them off.  
 
Intercommunal Grievances and Militant Propensities 
 
The model interactions above capture economic and coercive relationships that exist between 
Civilians and Militant Groups. There are also political and identity-based relationships that shape 
behavior. Civilians with local-level grievances vary in their interactions with conflict actors 
based on their own self-interests and strategic posturing. They may be more likely to cooperate 
with and support a Militant Group whose ideology aligns with their own and who can improve 
their position of power with respect to other citizen communities. As described above, Civilians 
are more likely to support a Militant Group that provides them with benefits. However, if support 
were based solely on benefits provision, then a Militant Group that provides the most benefits 
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would always win the most support. Instead, strategic posturing and shared ideology also 
influence Civilian support.  
To capture these influences, I create a measure called the Civilian’s propensity towards a 
Group that is based on two factors: its grievances and affiliations. Propensity conditions how 
Civilians respond to a Group that provides them with benefits. If they have a positive propensity 
towards the Group, they are more likely to support them. If they have a negative propensity, they 
are less likely. As Groups continue to provide benefits and punish defectors, this support is 
updated. I use citizens’ community membership to determine their grievances and affiliations, 
rather than identifying them individually. This is consistent with patterns observed in society, 
where relationships may be organized at the level of clans, tribes, villages, towns, religious 
communities, or other sources of identity-based, societal organization (Balcells and Justino 
2014). 
The first type of relationship that I use to determine propensities is intercommunal 
grievances. Different communities may have underlying grievances or disputes that may 
encourage animosity or competition if not resolved by adjudication. They may stem from one 
community antagonizing another in some way, or holding disproportionate power. Communities 
may compete over land, water or another resource, and one may act as a gatekeeper restricting 
access from the others. One community could inspire grievances against itself by dominating 
control over an economic market, committing violence or crime against another, or exercising 
absolute political control. These grievances are directional; one community can have a grievance 
against another that is not reciprocated in the other direction. Grievances that do act in both 
directions represent mutual animosity and contention. They may be affected by population sizes, 
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for example a minority community may invite animosity by disproportionately controlling 
mineral resources.  
The second type of relationship that exists as an initial condition in the system is  
the affiliation of a community with a Militant Group, which indicates whether the interests of a 
community are aligned with or opposed to the Group. Affiliations can be positive, negative, or 
neutral. They can stem from identity; for example, a tribal Militant Group in Libya is likely 
aligned with its respective tribal community, resulting in a positive community affiliation. This 
can also be determined through political or religious ideological beliefs that may be shared or 
oppositional, such as a Sunni Group’s relationship with Sunni communities (positive), or an 
Islamic fundamentalist Group controlling religiously moderate communities (negative). 
Similarities and differences in identity or ideology are not automatically determinative; the 
presence of ethnic or religious differences does not presume a negative affiliation.5 Setting this 
initial condition requires justification for those identities to be used as a basis for determining 
positive or negative affiliation, such as evidence that the two identities hold animosity towards 
one another in the context being modeled. For example, Somali communities are strongly 
opposed to any Ethiopian military control due to longstanding mistrust, so the affiliation of any 
Somalis towards Ethiopian occupying forces will be negative.  
Thus, the affiliation of a community towards a Militant Group is initially positive, 
negative, or neutral. However, their overall relationship updates based on both the underlying 
intercommunity grievances and the Group’s behavior towards the community over time. Rather 
than updating the initial affiliations, I preserve them and generate a third variable: each 
community’s propensity towards a Group. Despite their initial affiliations, Communities may 
                                                
5 Contrary to the “ancient hatreds” viewpoint proposed by Samuel Huntington in Clash of Civilizations (1996) that 
has been repudiated by numerous scholars; see Said (2001), Ikenberry (1997), Rubenstein and Crocker (1994) 
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have a positive or negative propensity towards a Group if it benefits them vis-à-vis their 
grievances with other communities. They may hope that the Group will settle intercommunity 
disputes in their favor, or may be concerned that the Group will take the side of their opponent. 
Communities may engage in opportunistic behavior and form allegiances if their support of a 
Group could improve their local power or bring them increased benefits.  
A challenge in determining propensities is deciding whether Civilians base their 
propensities towards a Group more heavily on their affiliations or on their grievances. They may 
set aside local grievances and rally around an ideological goal espoused by a Militant Group, or 
they may cast aside their ideologies in order to confront contentious strategic realities. Unless I 
am demonstrating a specific empirical case in which the general preference is already known, I 
assume that propensities result from an average of these two factors. If the two factors conflict, I 
assume the resulting propensity to be neutral. I create the following procedure for determining 
the initial propensities: 
(1) Assume complete information; i.e. that grievances and affiliations are known by all 
local communities, so that they can form propensities based on this knowledge. 
(2) If a community has no grievances against other communities, it has no need to 
strategize its propensity towards a Militant Group. Its propensity therefore matches its 
initial affiliation towards the Group. 
(3) If a community does have grievances against other communities, and its affiliation 
with a Group is neutral, the community forms a propensity based solely on those 
grievances.  
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(4) If a community has grievances against other communities, and it already has an 
affiliation with a Group that is positive or negative, then if its grievances lead to a 
propensity that is opposite it’s affiliation, its propensity becomes neutral or zero.  
(5) If a community has grievances against other communities, and it already has an 
affiliation with a Group is positive or negative, and its grievances lead to a propensity 
that is the same as its affiliation, then the two are consistent and its propensity is the 
same as its affiliation.  
In order to illustrate this procedure, consider a Community A that has a neutral affiliation with an 
incoming Group X, as they hold no aligned or opposed identity or ideology. However, 
Community A has a grievance towards another Community B, and Community B has a positive 
affiliation with Group X due to a shared religious identity. Community A will therefore form a 
negative propensity towards Group X. This is because Community A may observe that 
Community B and Group X have a positive affiliation, perceiving that the Group may be likely 
to uphold the status quo in favor of Community B. Therefore, Community A is more likely to 
oppose their power. This is consistent with a “friend of my enemy is my enemy” theory (Maoz et 
al. 2007). If two tribal factions are enemies and a Militant Group arrives whose members belong 
to the first side’s tribal faction, then the second tribe is likely to oppose the Militant Group. 
By contrast, if Community A has a grievance towards another Community B, but 
Community B has either a neutral or a negative affiliation with Group X, then Community A has 
a positive propensity towards the Group. This is because Community A may take advantage of 
Community B’s neutral or negative relationship and try to ally itself with Group X in order to 
improve its strategic position. It may hope that in exchange for support of the Group, it could 
gain benefits vis-à-vis Community B. This is consistent with an “enemy of my enemy is my 
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friend” theory of alliances (Maoz et al. 2007). If two tribal factions are enemies and a Militant 
Group arrives whose members are ideologically opposed to the first side’s tribal faction, then the 
second tribe is likely to support the Militant Group for its own strategic benefit. 
In many cases, these relationships may be much more complicated. When there are 
multiple community grievances and affiliations present in an environment, they are likely to have 
conflicting impacts on Civilians’ judgement of how the arrival of a power-seeking Group might 
impact their power. It may also be difficult to observe which relationships are most influential, 
and which the community considers to be most important. Because I cannot observe or predict 
the valuations that Civilians may place on their different grievances and affiliations, I simplify 
my model such that if there are multiple conflicting grievances, I set the propensity of a 
community towards a Group to neutral, or zero. Only if there are multiple grievances that all 
align do I still assign either a positive or negative propensity of the community towards a Group. 
So, if a Community A has grievances towards more than one community, and all of those 
communities have neutral or negative affiliations with a Group, then Community A has a 
positive propensity towards the Group. If all of their affiliations are positive, then Community A 
has a negative propensity towards the Group. If there is any variation across affiliations, the 
propensity is neutral.  
The (1) grievances between communities, (2) affiliations of communities with Groups, 
and (3) community propensities towards Groups can each be represented in matrix form. (1) and 
(2) can also be graphically represented together in a network graph. The grievances matrix is an 
n x n matrix that indicates the presence of grievances between every possible n community, as 
either existing (-1) or neutral (0). Any unknown relationships can be treated as neutral. The row 
represents the originating community, and the column represents the target. See an example 
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(Figure 3) for four hypothetical communities. An affiliations matrix (Figure 4) n x m provides 
the affiliations for n Communities towards m Groups; in this example, of four Communities 
towards one Group X. Based on the rules explained above, I can create a propensities matrix n x 
m for the overall propensities of each community to the Group (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 3: Grievances Matrix Between Four Communities A B C and D 
 A B C D 
A 0 0 0    0 
B 0 0 0 -1 
C -1 0 0 0 
D -1 -1 0 0 
 
 














Because Community A has no negative grievances towards any other community, it has 
no mitigating tendencies towards the Group X and its propensity remains the same as its 
affiliation at 1. Because Community B has a grievance towards D, which has a neutral propensity 
towards X, B should have a positive propensity towards X. But this conflicts with B’s original 
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affiliation of -1, so B’s propensity becomes 0. For the two communities C and D with neutral 
affiliations towards X, C’s propensity becomes -1 due to its grievance with A and A’s positive 
affiliation, and D has a neutral propensity of 0 because A and B’s affiliations conflict.  
Figure 6 shows a network representation of the grievances and affiliations. Grievances 
are represented in black as directed links of one community towards another; an outward link 
pointed away from a Community node (represented by a value -1 in the matrix) indicates that the 
node is the one holding the grievance against another. Links in both directions represent mutual 
contention between two communities. A negative affiliation is represented as a directional arrow 
towards the Group node and away from the community, and a positive affiliation is a directional 
arrow away from the Group and towards the community.  
 








Sequence of Events 
Having explained the manner in which I derive propensities, I will now step through the model 
and the interactions that take place between the two agents. Figure 7 below also shows the 
sequence of events that occur through the model’s complete execution.  
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Figure 7: Flow Diagram of the Model Sequence of Events 
 
 
An environment contains a finite population of Civilians, and each Civilian has a community 
identity, such as clan or tribe, a wealth Low Medium or High, and a specific geographic location. 
A Militant Group enters the environment with the goal of establishing control over the 
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population through extortion. The Group has an initial level of strength, notoriety, and support 
from external sources. The Civilian’s response to the Group depends on the Group’s relationship 
with the Civilian’s community, which is either allied, neutral, or an enemy. In the first round, 
this is determined solely based on initial propensities from the matrix, which are positive, 
neutral, or negative respectively. During subsequent rounds, propensities are updated based on 
the Group’s provision of benefits to individual Civilians. Figure 8 shows the conditions and 
values used to set the probabilities of the possible agent actions. 
 
Figure 8: Probabilities and Conditions for Agent Actions 
Allied Communities: 
Group provides benefits (p1) As ExternalIncome / MaxSupport decreases, p 
increases. P median = 4, select thresholds/ stdv  
Civilian supports Group in response to 
benefits (p2) 
Highly likely: (normal fn around this value) 
p= .75 if z= 0, p= .5 if z= -1, p = 1 if z= 1 
Civilian supports Group in response to no 
benefits (p2) 
Less likely: (normal fn around this value) 
p= .45 if z= 0, p= .2 if z= -1, p = .7 if z= 1 
 
Neutral Communities: 
Group provides benefits (p1) As ExternalIncome / MaxSupport decreases, p 
increases. P median = 4, select thresholds/ stdv 
Group punishes Civilian (p3) Increases as strength ratio to opponent 
increases; strong enough to not be defended  
Civilian supports Group in response to 
benefits (p2) 
p = .5 if z =0, p = .25 if z = -1, p = .75 if z = 1 
Civilian supports Group in response to no 
benefits (p2) 
p = .2 if z= 0, p = 0 if z = -1, p = .45 if z= 1, & 
Group notoriety low 
Civilian supports opponent (p4) p increases as Group notoriety decreases 
 
Enemy Communities: 
Group punishes Civilian (p3) Increases as strength ratio to opponent 
increases; strong enough to not be defended 
If no opponent, p3 = 1 
Civilian supports Group in response to 
benefits (p2) 
Unlikely: (normal fn around this value) 
p= .25 if z= 0, p= .5 if z= 1, p = 0 if z= -1 
Group provides benefits (p1) As ExternalIncome / MaxSupport decreases, p 
increases. P median = 4, select thresholds/ stdv 
Civilian supports Group (p2) Certain if civilian does not defend  
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Allied Communities 
The Militant Group approaches each Civilian one at a time. The order of the Civilians is 
randomly shuffled such that patterns in characteristics of groups of Civilians do not result in 
observable trends in the results. If the current Civilian’s community is majority supportive of the 
Group, i.e. approximately 66% of Civilians in the community provide the Group with support (or 
in the case of the first round, the propensity is positive), then the community is allied with the 
Militant Group. The likelihood of being allied is determined using a logistic probability function, 
whose mean and standard deviation result in a gradual probability increase after Group support 
surpasses 66%. In other words, the likelihood of being allied increases as support approaches 
66% and increases towards certainty as support becomes even higher. The Group then extorts the 
Civilian, adding a certain percent of the Civilian’s wealth to its total strength. This wealth value 
varies depending on whether the Civilian wealth is Low, Medium, or High. For example, a Low 
wealth could equal 20 monetary units, Medium could equal 100, and High could equal 500. 
These values are defined as a variable in the model and defended using empirical data from a 
typical conflict environment.  
Therefore, a 10% extortion rate would result in 2, 10, or 50 units added to Militant 
strength. Such extortion could represent tax on income, a toll, or bribery that is given in 
exchange for protection from attacks or punishment from other Groups. I do not subtract the 
amount from the Civilian and I assume that the extortion rate is sustainable; the Civilian 
continues to earn income that replenishes the loss taken by the militants so that extortion can 
continue in successive rounds. This might normally create a problem in which a Civilian could 
run out of income, as there may be multiple Militant Groups that the Civilian supports. 
Hypothetically, if there are five Groups that extort 10% income from a Civilian and which it also 
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supports with 10% income, then the Civilian would run out of money. I assume that Civilians are 
able to replenish their money from other sources and are never drained of funds. 
The Group may choose to benefit the Civilian in an effort to maintain Civilian support. 
Benefits can take the form of protection from criminals, provision of goods and services, or 
providing inputs to production for a Civilian’s business activities. It chooses to benefit with an 
increasing probability if the maximum amount of support that it could win from the total Civilian 
population is substantial as compared to the Group’s external sources of income. As this 
potential income increases, the probability of providing benefits increases as the Group weighs 
the payoffs from investing in local communities. However, if the Group receives enough external 
income, it has no incentive to provide benefits (Weinstein 2006), and investment becomes less 
likely.  
There is a benefit threshold parameter which defines at what ratio of support to external 
income the Militant chooses to cease extortion. This may vary at the level of each individual 
Militant or the whole conflict setting. In addition, I assume no variation in benefits provision; a 
Militant upon deciding to provide benefits does so with no differentiation between different 
Civilians within a community. In reality, a Militant may be more likely to favor benefits for the 
richest Civilians in order to maximize the value of the support that it could earn.   
If the Group benefits the Civilian, the Civilian provides the Militant Group with support 
with a high probability. Support may come in the form of material resources, funding, shelter, 
and intelligence about an enemy. I treat this support similarly to extortion and calculate it as a 
certain percentage of the Civilian’s income (for example, 10%). I add this to the Militant 
Group’s total strength. Like the extortion rate, this also does not deduct from the Civilian’s long-
term income level. If the Group does not provide benefits, there is a probability that the Civilian 
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ceases to provide support. If there is a positive propensity of the Civilian’s community towards 
the Group, then this probability is lower than if there is a neutral or negative propensity.  
 
Neutral Communities 
When a Militant Group approaches a Civilian whose community is likely neutral towards 
the Group, i.e. approximately more than 33% but less than 66% of Civilians in the community 
provide the Group with support (or in the first round, the propensity is neutral), the militant still 
extorts the Civilian and adds the gains to its total wealth. The Group may also benefit the 
Civilian, who may respond by providing support with some probability dependent on their 
propensity towards the Group. If the Civilian does not respond by providing support, it also has 
the choice to support a Group’s opponent, which is more likely if the Group does not provide 
benefits. An opponent Group is any other Group that also extorts Civilians in the same region. In 
this case, the Civilian considers a Militant’s notoriety. Notoriety indicates a Group’s reputation 
for punishment, causing the Civilian to fear retribution for supporting another. When faced with 
the option to support a different Group, the Civilian is less likely to do so as the notoriety of the 
current Group increases. The probability of supporting an opponent equals one minus this 
notoriety. The Civilian then selects a new Militant to support from multiple Groups based on 
which one it has the highest propensity towards. If it has the same propensity towards multiple 
Groups, it randomly selects one.  
When the Civilian has already shown support for a different Militant Group, then the 
Group is more likely to punish it. Here, punishment is considered a form of selective violence 
that can be administered either through an institutionalized process, or with brutality in a raid or 
attack. It is separate from any punishment for criminal acts adjudicated by the Group as part of 
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their social services provision. The Group punishes with some probability that increases as the 
ratio of its strength to that of its opponent increases. A logistic probability function with a mean 
at .5 will result in an equal chance of punishing or not punishing if the Group is equal in strength 
to a potential protecting opponent; i.e., the ratio of their strengths is equal to 1. An opposing 
Group that is sufficiently stronger than the current Group can protect its supportive Civilians, 
rendering the current Group incapable of punishing. If it does punish, then its notoriety increases.  
 
Enemy Communities 
When a Militant Group approaches a Civilian whose community is not supportive towards the 
Group, i.e. less than approximately 33% of Civilians in the community provide the Group with 
support (or in the first round, the propensity is negative), then the Civilian’s community is an 
enemy of the Group and it resists extortion. The Group may punish them, increasing their 
notoriety, if they are not adequately protected by other Groups based on their strength ratios. The 
Civilian has two options. If weapons are available for purchase in the environment and the 
Civilian has a medium or high wealth, it may defend. An increase in the number of defend 
actions is interpreted as an increasing level of local militarization as more wealthy civilians who 
have access to weapons are punished by enemy Groups. This is therefore another outcome 
variable that also indicates violence. If a Civilian cannot defend, it is coerced into supporting the 
Group in response to the punishment, thereby leading it to also pay extortion. If the Group 
cannot or chooses not to punish the Civilian, it may also provide benefits, and the Civilian may 





Once a Militant Group has completed this process with each one of the Civilians in the 
population individually, the process is repeated for each Militant Group in the environment. 
When each Militant Group has approached each Civilian once, this is considered the completion 
of one round and the process starts over from the beginning. Values for the number of Civilians 
providing support, Group strength, and Group notoriety are recorded at the end of each round. 
Then, they are reduced back to initial conditions before the start of the next round. I assume that 
for each round a Group retains any support or parameter changes that have occurred that make it 
stronger or weaker, but that Groups do not grow or shrink in capability over subsequent rounds. I 
assume that during each time period, the Group spends all of the income that it earns, with 
supply equaling demand.  
Civilian communities may change whether they are supportive, neutral, or not supportive 
based on the updating support percentage of individual Civilians. Violence between the Groups 
occurs at the end of each round in any location or region in which more than one Militant Group 
extorts the same Civilians. It is measured as the probabilistic variable fighting (p5), or the ratio of 
the strengths between two Militant Groups. It is assumed that, if two Militants are equal in 
strength, they have a 100% likelihood of fighting because neither can be defeated by the other. 
As two Groups’ strengths increasingly diverge, their likelihood of fighting one another 
decreases. The number of instances in which there is local militarization, or civilians defend, is 
also recorded. 
The values recorded at the end of each round are graphed on a chart over time. 
Adjustments are made to different parameters to demonstrate their effects on model outcomes, 
such as the strength ratios between militants that indicate probability of fighting, or changes in 
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support from Civilians. Certain members of populations can be geographically denied to 
particular Militant Groups; that is, the model only initiates the extortion and decisionmaking 
process between a Group and a given set of Civilians within a certain geographic area rather than 
the entire population. Different community memberships can also be used to shape Civilian 
propensities. Any other definitions or parameters used to define the probabilities of interactions 
can be adjusted.  
 




The remainder of this chapter will demonstrate the use of the model for examining the effects of 
local interactions on conflict outcomes. I perform fourteen experiments in order to observe 
effects on Militant Group strength, notoriety, support, and fighting that result from the following: 
- Incremental changes in grievances and affiliations between communities 
- Increases in the number of communities and the complexity of their grievances, 
affiliations, and wealth 
- Increases in the number of Groups with varied affiliations 
- Increases in the willingness of Groups to provide benefits 
- Variation in terrorism behavior and the presence of weapons 
- Increases in initial militant strength  
The first two categories of tests explore how variation in the characteristics of Civilian 
communities impacts the strength of Militant Groups and fighting between them. The remaining 
four show the effects of variation in the characteristics of Militants. These experiments provide 
some initial conclusions about the impacts of Civilian and Militant interactions, as well as 
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insights into the behavior of the model. The findings are subsequently used to structure testing of 
the impacts of foreign intervention, to take place in the following chapter.  
In order to perform these experiments, various simulations are executed using the agent-
based model presented above. The model is programmed using Python programming. This 
programming language is well-suited to Agent-Based Modeling because it is an object-oriented 
language, which allows the programmer to create many different objects that contain their own 
characteristics and perform actions. Thus, the Civilian and Militant agents can be represented in 
the Python program as objects. The pseudocode for programming the agent interactions is shown 
below. 
 
Pseudocode for Extortion and Governance Interactions 
for each Militant Group: 
for each Civilian:  
if Civilian Community has greater than ~66% of members with Support = 1 towards the Group 
 Group extorts (generate probability using logistic function) 
add value to Group’s strength based on whether the Civilian wealth is high, medium, or low  
Group benefits Civilian with probability p1 that increases as ExternalIncome/MaxSupport decreases 
if Group benefits Civilian 
Civilian supports Group (= 1) with probability p2 based on community propensity towards the 
Group  
//normal function for probability around specific values 
else 
Civilian does not support Group (= 0) with probability 1-p2 based on community propensity 
towards the Group 
//normal function for probability around specific values 
 
else if Civilian Community has more than ~33% and less than ~66% of members with Support = 1 towards the 
Group (generate probability using logistic function) 
 Group extorts 
add value to Group’s strength based on whether the Civilian wealth is high, medium, or low 
 if Civilian supports opponent = 1 
Group punish with probability p3 that increases as strength ratio to opponents increases  
//if it is strong enough and the opponent cannot protect 
  if Group punish 
   update Group's notoriety for this Civilian = 1 
else 
 update Group's notoriety for this Civilian = 0 
Group benefits Civilian with probability p1 that increases as ExternalIncome/MaxSupport decreases 
if Group benefits Civilian 
Civilian supports Group (= 1) with probability p2 based on community affiliation 
towards the Group 
//normal function for probability around specific values 
  else 
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Civilian does not support Group (= 0) with probability 1-p2 based on community 
affiliation towards the Group 
//normal function for probability around specific values 
Civilian supports opponent (= 1) with probability p4 based on Group's notoriety ratio 
 
else if Civilian Community has less than ~33% of members with Support = 1 towards the Group (generate 
probability using logistic function) 
Group punish with probability p3 that increases as strength ratio to opponents increases, and with certainty 
if there are no opponents  
//if it is strong enough and the opponent cannot protect 
 if Group punish 
  update Group's notoriety for this Civilian = 1 
if weapons are available or the Civilian has medium/high wealth 
 Civilian does not support Group (= 0) 
 Local militarization possible 
else if weapons are not available or the Civilian has low wealth 
   Civilian supports Group (= 1) 
//no potential to defend itself so it is coerced to support 
 else 
Group benefits Civilian with probability p1 that increases as ExternalIncome/MaxSupport 
decreases 
if Group benefits Civilian 
Civilian supports Group (= 1) with probability p2 based on community affiliation 
towards the Group 
//normal function for probability around specific values 
repeat for each Civilian and Militant Group 
output parameter values at the end of each round 
fighting increasingly likely as number of militants of comparable strengths increases in a region 
 
As explained previously, the model simulates the process of multiple Militants interacting with 
multiple Civilians several times in turn over multiple rounds. This process loosely represents the 
passage of time in a conflict setting. The number of rounds necessary for achieving results is 
determined by identifying the number of rounds necessary before the values produced from the 
model reach an equilibrium value, or steady state. At steady state, the values remain 
approximately constant about an average value. The model is run for 100 rounds in order to 
ensure that a consistent steady state is reached. For most simulations in this chapter, this occurs 
after approximately 20 rounds. In some cases which are noted, steady state occurs at about 60 
rounds.  
 Because the model incorporates several probability functions in order to simulate the 
uncertainty of nature and other omitted effects, each individual simulation yields varying results. 
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Therefore, in order to obtain consistent results whose effects can be measured with significance, 
the model runs 40 identical simulations of 100 rounds and takes the mean of their results in order 
to create values for one complete simulation. Standard deviation values are determined using 
deviations from this mean. Using a power calculation method suggested by Ritter et al. 2011, a 
process of averaging 40 rounds was selected in order to measure an effect size of 0.2 standard 
deviations. A minimum power of 0.90 was chosen because the execution of simulations is 
computationally expensive, requiring processing memory and time (Ritter et al. 2011). The 
equation used for the power calculation is shown below.  
 
 𝛿 = effect	size	×	√(.
/
) (Equation 1) 
 
 For each experiment, multiple simulations were run in order to systematically test the 
effects of changes to model parameters. Parameter values in the form of grievance and affiliation 
matrices, demographic characteristics, and Civilian or Militant attributes were adjusted 
individually for each simulation. Values were strategically chosen in order to systematically test 
the effects of incremental changes. The motivation for their selection is explained in the 
presentation of the results. The values for Civilian wealth are chosen in order to create some 
consistency with empirical economic demographics. The wealth values are used in order to 
ascribe a certain relative value to represent a Civilian’s income, and to determine how much 
wealth it can provide to a Militant Group when extorted or providing support.  Data from the 
World Bank Poverty and Equity Brief is used to determine what percentage of civilians globally 
live below the poverty line, using a sample of countries in Africa and Asia. The CIA World 
Factbook “household income or consumption by percentage share” is used to calculate how 
many civilians should hold what percent of a population’s income. For low income populations, 
a distribution is selected of 70%, 28%, and 2% to have wealth values of 20, 100, and 500 units 
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respectively. For middle income populations, a distribution is selected of 10%, 84%, and 6% to 
have incomes of 20, 100, and 500 units respectively.  
Two other model parameters are selected based on estimation and some evidence from a 
relevant empirical example. The percent extortion rate of Militants is set consistently at 10%, 
based loosely on information about the Somali rebel group al-Shabaab that engages in 
widespread taxation practices. A support value of 10% is selected to represent a willingness to 
roughly match extortion amounts. In reality, al-Shabaab’s level of taxation varies significantly 
between the context; individuals such as farmers are taxed at about 2.5% of their income and 
businesses pay 2.5-5%, while groups engaging in piracy are taxed at about 15-20% (Levy and 
Yusuf 2019). To also account for additional extortion on land, vehicles, livestock, and the use of 
roadways and ports, the taxation rate per civilian is roughly estimated at 10%. 
 
Results 
I now present the parameters and the outcomes of the fourteen experiments conducted in this 
chapter. The values for the outcome variables of notoriety, community support, and fighting 
between militants are in the form of probabilities, and range from 0-1. The values for militant 
strength can equal any number greater than zero, depending on initial conditions. For these 
experiments, the values range between approximately 1000 and 9000.  
In Experiments 1 through 4, two Militants exist in a region containing two communities 
of 150,000 Civilians each. Due to the high amount of time and memory required by the model, 
this total population is divided by 1000 and the program representatively models Militant 
interactions with 150 Civilians per community. Both Militants are equal in initial strength and 
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have a benefit threshold value of 4. Neither have terrorism characteristics and weapons are not 
available to Civilians in the environment.  
Experiment 1 tests the effects of varying the value of grievances between the two 
communities, holding affiliations constant with no affiliation between either of the Militants and 
any of the communities. In Simulation 1, neither of the communities have grievances. In 
Simulation 2, community 1 has a grievance against community 2. In Simulation 3, both 
communities have grievances against one another. The results are shown in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: Experiment 1- Variation in Community Grievances With No Militant 
 
 
The incremental introduction of grievances increases the strength of both Militants equally. As 
shown by corresponding increases in community support for each Militant, this is because 
having grievances increases the support provided by a community towards both Groups. When 
one community has a grievance against another, its support of both Militants increases from 
approximately 50% to 90%. Real-world implications of this result are fairly intuitive. Civilians 
may provide widespread support with the hope that their interests will be backed by the 
Militants, so they may be less selective. Militants therefore gain evenly from an increasingly 
aggrieved population when none of the Civilians are affiliated with them. Because the Civilians 
do not have a particular affiliation with either Group, it does not matter who they support. 
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Additionally, as the Groups remain at the same strength, the probability of fighting between them 
remains equally high, with a slightly higher probability in a setting of mutually opposed 
grievances. 
In Experiment 2, any grievances between the communities are removed and remain 
unchanged, while the affiliations between communities and Militants are varied between 
simulations. In the first simulation, there are zero affiliations; in the second community 1 is 
affiliated with Militant 1; in the third communities 1 and 2 are both affiliated with Militant 1; and 
in the fourth, community 1 remains affiliated with Militant 1 while community 2 is affiliated 
with its opponent Militant 2. Table 2 shows the results of these four simulations. 
 
Table 2: Experiment 2- Variation in Militant Affiliations With No Community Grievances 
 
 
Adding an affiliation with Militant 1 in Simulation 2 leads community 1 to increase its support of 
Militant 1 to 99.5%, while dropping support of Militant 2 to 20.9%. Militant 1’s notoriety also 
increases from 10.4% to 37.5%, indicating an increase in punishment. Possibly as a result of this 
punishment, community 2’s support of Militant 2 decreases from 51.6% to 44.1%. The overall 
result is a significant increase in the strength of Militant 1 and a decrease in strength for Militant 
2. In Simulation 3 when both communities 1 and 2 are affiliated with Militant 1, they both 
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almost fully support this Group, which no longer has any support for Militant 2 to punish. 
Militant 2 is also stronger than in the prior test. In the last simulation with opposed affiliations, 
communities are each strongly supportive of their affiliated Militant Group. While they both 
continue to support their unaffiliated group, this support is punished by both Militants. These 
results are intuitive, and are expected outcomes given the programmed behavior of the model. 
When communities are affiliated with Militants, they provide them with additional support, 
increasing their strength. In terms of fighting outcomes, in this setting with no grievances, 
fighting is most likely when there are also no affiliations.  
This makes empirical sense, as different groups fighting amongst themselves with no 
grievances or affiliations to motivate civilian support may likely be of similar size and strength, 
barring significant differences in outside sources of income. This could lead to extended fighting, 
as no group is able to gain hegemony over the others. Such conditions may occur in a highly 
fractured conflict environment. For example, while militia fighting in Somalia and Libya has 
generally been rooted in community divisions, some factions may have split off in order to fight 
in the interest of personal gain, rather than on behalf of any civilian interest. This may be another 
reason why militia fighting in these contexts continues for so long and appears so intractable, as 
these militias struggle to defeat one another without any additional support. 
 Experiment 3 introduces varying configurations of grievances to the opposed 
affiliations setting in which community 1 supports Militant 1 and community 2 supports Militant 
2. Simulation 1 remains a case in which there are no grievances, Simulation 2 introduces a 
grievance of community 1 towards community 2, and in Simulation 3 both community 1 and 




Table 3: Experiment 3- Variation in Community Grievances With Opposing Militant Affiliations 
 
 
In response to the addition of one grievance from community 1 against community 2, Militant 1 
gains in strength while Militant 2 loses, but in this Simulation community 1 support for Militant 
2 falls to almost zero while community 2 support for Militant 2 is now higher. The addition of a 
grievance when the communities support opposing Militants leads to greater polarization, rather 
than simply an overall increase in support as in Experiment 1 when there were no affiliations. In 
this case, affiliations appear to limit the possible increase in support. Civilians seek the backing 
of Militants to resolve their grievances, but now they only do so from a Militant with which they 
are affiliated. This therefore decreases the likelihood of fighting, due to a greater disparity in 
strength created when support is provided by only one community to only one Militant. In 
Simulation 3 with opposing grievances between communities, the strength of both Militants is 
equal but drops significantly as each community supports primarily their affiliated Militant. 
Again, this may indicate that Civilians could be limited by their affiliations in their ability to 
leverage support to resolve their grievances. Militant strengths are even lower than when there 
were no grievances in Experiment 2 Simulation 4.  
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These results indicate that grievances in a polarized environment decrease the strength of 
Militant Groups and increase the probability of fighting. Therefore, groups that are able to 
overcome or “rise above” local affiliations with aggrieved communities may be more likely to 
gain in strength and defeat other Militant Groups that maintain affiliations. This is because these 
affiliations do not impose a limit on their support. For example, the Taliban in Afghanistan 
promote themselves as a group fighting on behalf of Islamic ideals, shared by the vast majority 
of the Afghan population, rather than for any particular ethnic or tribal affiliation. As a result, 
they receive support from many different communities who have grievances throughout 
Afghanistan. Prior to the rise of the Taliban, no tribally-affiliated group had been able to gain 
hegemony in the country, which caused an extended civil war between the comparatively weak 
groups.  
 Experiment 4 is the last experiment that tests the effects of incremental changes in 
grievances and affiliations. It demonstrates the impacts of disproportionate civilian wealth 
between communities on the effects of these changes. In the prior three experiments, both 
communities were assigned to the same low income wealth distribution. In this case, community 
1 is given a medium income distribution while community 2 retains the low income. The 
procedure from the prior experiment is repeated, in which all simulations have mutually 
opposing affiliations while grievances are added incrementally. Table 4 shows the results from 
three simulations where Simulation 1 has no grievances, Simulation 2 has one from community 1 










The results in this case show similar effects as Experiment 3, except that Militant 1 affiliated 
with the richer community 1 is substantially stronger in all three simulations. It also has a higher 
notoriety than seen in any prior simulations. This is because the higher wealth disparity now 
makes it much less likely that Militant 2 can protect its affiliated Civilians from punishment by 
Militant 1. This could be the reason that community 2 support for its own affiliated Militant 2 is 
also weaker than in Experiment 3. The effects of adding affiliations and grievances remain the 
same, although in this case fighting is overall less likely because Militant 2 is not as strong and 
poses less of a challenge to Militant 1. Ultimately, increasing the wealth of a Civilian population 
likely results in an increase in strength to any Militants that they support. 
 Experiments 5 through 7 examine the results of shifts in grievances and affiliations 
between Civilians in conflict settings with five and ten communities. In the five-community 
setting there are 100,000 Civilians per community, or 100 in the model. In the ten-community 
setting there are 5,000 Civilians per community, or 50 in the model. The wealth distributions for 
low income and middle income groups remain the same, at 70%-28%-2% and 10%-84%-6%, 
respectively for incomes of 20, 100, and 500. In Experiment 5 all communities have low income 
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distributions, and in Experiments 6 and 7 40% of the Civilian communities have medium income 
distributions. There remain no militants engaging in terrorism activity and no weapons available 
to Civilians.  
  Experiment 5 consists of four simulations modeling different combinations of low and 
high grievance and affiliation configurations. The low grievance configuration represents an 
arbitrary condition in which there are grievances between a few of the five communities, but 
overall most communities do not have grievances against one another. The high grievance 
configuration represents a condition in which three communities have grievances against the 
other two, who have grievances between one another. Similarly, the low affiliation condition 
ascribes most communities with a positive affiliation with one militant or the other, but with no 
negative affiliations towards any Militants, which would indicate an active opposition to those 
Militants. The high affiliation condition aligns all communities positively with a Militant and 
ascribes negative affiliations towards the Militant that is not so aligned.  
 
Low Grievances Matrix: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0 0 0    -1 0 
2 0 0 0 -1 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 -1 
5 0 0 0 0 0 
 
High Grievances Matrix: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0 0 0    -1 -1 
2 0 0 0 -1 -1 
3 0 0 0 -1 -1 
4 0 0 -1 0 -1 
5 0 0 0 -1 0 
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In Simulation 1, both grievances and affiliations are low. In Simulation 2, grievances are high 
and affiliations are low. In Simulation 3, grievances are low and affiliations are high, and in 
Simulation 4, both grievances and affiliations are high. The results are shown in Table 5. 















In this setting with a greater number of communities, consistent with the results of the prior set 
of experiments, adding more grievances while keeping affiliations constant from Simulation 1 to 
2 increases the strength of both Militants. Adding affiliations from Simulation 1 to 3 also 
decreases the strength of one Militant and increases the incidence of fighting. A highly polarized 
environment in Simulation 4 results in much clearer levels of support for each Militant, mostly 
hovering near either 0% or 100%. Because Militant 2 has a higher number of affiliated 
communities in this experiment, it is ultimately much stronger than Militant 1. Polarized 
grievances and affiliations result in Militant strength depending clearly on the number of 
affiliated Civilians. This experiment exhibits consistency with the previous observations and also 
shows that an increase in complexity due to a greater number of communities may create more 
opportunities for Civilians to support one Militant or the other as grievances encourage them to 
do so. This is demonstrated in Simulation 3 with the high number of affiliations in a low 
grievance setting, where the strength of both Militants is about equal due to some level of 
continued Civilian support for unaffiliated Groups. 
 Experiment 6 repeats the above simulations in a setting of five communities, but changes 
the wealth of communities 4 and 5 from low to medium income distributions. Now, the high 
grievances simulation represents a scenario in which the three lower income communities have 
grievances against the two medium income communities, who in turn have grievances against 
one another. This could model a real-world situation in which less wealthy communities resent 
richer communities who compete against one another. The results shown in Table 6 indicate that 
the addition of wealth to some of the communities does not change the effects of grievances and 
affiliations. While the Militants are stronger overall due to greater extracted income from the 
richer civilians, their strengths relative to one another are about the same, although somewhat 
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closer in values as shown by about a 10% increase in fighting in all simulations from the prior 
experiment. Some of the change in these values is also dependent on which communities receive 
the increased income and with which Militants they are aligned.  
 
Table 6: Experiment 6- Variation in Grievances and Affiliations in Five-Community Setting With 
Uneven Wealth 
 
Experiment 7 simulates the same low and high grievance and affiliation tests from the prior 
experiment, except in a setting with ten communities. 40% of the communities remain middle 
income: communities 7, 8, 9, and 10. The power dynamic in which the six lower income 






Low Grievances Matrix: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 0 0    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
High Grievances Matrix: 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 0 0 0    -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 
2 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 
3 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 -1 -1 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 
5 0 0 0 -1 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 
6 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 -1 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 0 -1 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 0 
 






































The results from the ten-community setting, along with all remaining data tables for this 
chapter can be found in Appendix A. They are consistent with those from the five-community 
setting. Militant 1 becomes stronger when grievances are added, and it is strongest in all 
simulations due to the higher wealth of its supporting communities. The highest incidence of 
fighting occurs when there are low grievances but high affiliations, and fighting decreases from 
Simulation 3 to 4 as high grievances are added alongside high affiliations. It is also clear that, as 
Militant 1 becomes stronger and its notoriety increases to 68.1%, Civilians in communities that 
would otherwise support Militant 2 are intimidated into supporting Militant 1 instead. 
Communities 9 and 10, which have affiliations with Militant 2, only provide Militant 2 with 
35.6% and 36% support respectively. By contrast, these two communities support Militant 1 
60.1% and 59.4% respectively. Some of this effect may also be caused by the configuration of 
grievances, as support for Militant 2 decreases when grievances are added from Simulation 3 to 
Simulation 4. 
There are substantial differences in the levels of community support between this 
experiment and Experiment 6, as this experiment uses different grievance and affiliation 













leads to no apparent variation in the main observations. The increased complexity simply 
provides more opportunities for variation in Civilian and Militant interactions. 
 In Experiments 8 through 10, additional Militants are added to a conflict setting with five 
communities. The same two communities 4 and 5 from Experiment 6 have medium income 
distributions, while the others have low income distributions. The same low and high grievance 
configurations from Experiments 5 and 6 also apply, as well as the low affiliations matrices for 
Militants 1 and 2. The affiliations of the additional Militants vary.  
First, in Experiment 8 only one additional Militant is added, and the grievances between 
communities are varied across the three simulations. In Simulation 1 the Civilian communities 
have no grievances, in Simulation 2 they have low grievances, and in Simulation 3 they have 
high grievances against one another. The results are shown in Table 8 in Appendix A.  Across all 
of the simulations, Militants 1 and 2 have low affiliations and Militant 3 has no affiliations.  
At first, Militant 3 emerges as the weakest group, however its strength increases 
significantly over simulations as grievances are added to the conflict setting. While community 
support for Militants 1 and 2 is divided based on affiliations and the influence of grievances, all 
communities increase their percentage of support for Militant 3 as they become more aggrieved. 
This result may seem counterintuitive, as one might assume that civilian support to Militants 
with whom they are affiliated would substantially boost a group’s strength above those groups 
who are unaffiliated. However, the previous experiments indicate that while this is the case when 
there are no grievances, once grievances are included they become a motivation for Civilians to 
try to attract Militant 3 as their ally, unconstrained by affiliation differences. It suggests that an 
unaffiliated Militant could please all communities and could try to adjudicate or resolve 
grievances without being restricted by ties to any particular community. In the simulations, its 
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lack of affiliation leads it to quickly grow strongest, which could be interpreted empirically as 
“rising above” affiliation-connected disputes. This supports the implications of the results found 
in Experiment 3. The observed variation in the strengths of Militants 1 and 2 and their 
probabilities of fighting are likely driven by the specific configurations of grievances, 
affiliations, and the distribution of wealth between supporting communities modeled in this 
particular Experiment. 
In Experiment 9, the first three Simulations also vary from no grievances to low 
grievances to high grievances. However, rather than being completely unaffiliated, the third 
Militant is now affiliated with community 2, which is not affiliated with either Militants 1 or 2. 
Then in Simulations 4 and 5, Militant 3 is affiliated with all of the present communities, and 
there are no grievances and low grievances respectively. Table 9 in Appendix A shows these 
results. 
Experiment 9 produces approximately the same strengths and notorieties for Militant 3 as 
in Experiment 8 for the first three simulations. Militant 3’s affiliation with a previously 
unaffiliated community results in little to no change in the results. However, when Militant 3 is 
affiliated with all of the available communities in Simulations 4 and 5, the addition of grievances 
from none to low leads to a large drop in the strengths of Militants 1 and 2 and a small decrease 
in the strength of Militant 3. In short, when there are no grievances, Militant 3’s affiliation with 
all communities results in nearly universal support. When there are grievances, support is shifted 
across all communities but Militant 3 emerges much stronger relative to the others. Therefore, 
fighting is lowest between Militants 1 and 3 and 2 and 3, while it is highest between Militants 1 
and 2. Fighting between Militants 1 and 3 decreases from 63.3% to 50.4%, and between 
Militants 2 and 3 decreases from 54.3% to 43.0%, with Militant 3 being the stronger combatant 
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in both cases. Being affiliated with all the communities rather than none of them may put 
Militant 3 in a stronger position.  
Experiment 10 then adds two additional Militants 4 and 5 to the same environment and 
repeats two earlier tests of interest: Militants affiliated with all of the communities in a setting 
with no grievances, and Militants affiliated with no communities in a setting with low 
grievances. This experiment provides no new insights. The addition of Militants results in the 
approximately same strengths, levels of support and probabilities of support as in the prior 
experiments. The addition of a greater number of Militants does not in itself lead to any 
additional changes.  The results can be found in Table 10. 
 Experiment 11 is the only experiment that measures the effects of varying the benefit 
thresholds of the Militants. The benefit threshold is the ratio of external income to maximum 
potential income that can be received from Civilian supporters. If the amount of external income 
divided by possible support exceeds this threshold, a Militant does not offer Civilians any 
benefits because it calculates that it does not need their support. For example, with a benefit 
threshold of 4, a Militant will provide Civilians with benefits until its external income is four 
times the total amount of support it could possibly receive. Experiment 11 runs four simulations 
of a 3-Militant, 5-community setting with low grievances and low affiliations. In Simulation 1, 
the Militants do not receive any external income, and their benefit thresholds differ at 1, 4, and 
10 for Militants 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In Simulation 2, these benefit thresholds are also 1, 4, 
and 10, but all of the Militants receive 3000 units of external income. In Simulation 3 they all 
receive 3000 units of external income and all have a benefit threshold of 1, and in Simulation 4 
they all receive 3000 units of external income and have a benefit threshold of 10. 
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 Table 11 in Appendix A displays the results of Experiment 11. As would be expected, 
with no external income, varying the benefit thresholds between Militants results in minimal if 
any change in Militant strengths, notorieties, support levels, or probabilities of fighting. The 
Militants always gain from Civilian support and therefore they always choose to provide 
benefits. Once they do receive external income, the likelihood of providing benefits increases 
from Militant 1 to Militant 2 and from Militant 2 to Militant 3 as their respective benefit 
thresholds increase. The rising likelihood of benefiting corresponds with increased strength, 
increased notoriety, and increases in community support from Militants 1 to 3. This pattern is 
observed despite the presence and influence of low grievances and low affiliations, possibly due 
to the high value of the external income. This suggests that Civilian support in response to 
benefitting is a significant contributor to overall Militant strength.  
 Similarly, when the benefit threshold increases from 1 to 10 for all Militants from 
Simulation 3 to Simulation 4, all Militant strengths increase and the support received from each 
community increases in all but three cases. The likelihood of fighting between all combinations 
of Militants also increases significantly. 
 Experiments 12 and 13 test the effects of terrorism behavior with and without weapons 
presence in a conflict setting. All the previous conflict environment parameters from Experiment 
11 remain the same, with external income reduced to zero and a benefit threshold of 4. In 
Experiment 12, Simulations 1 through 4 test the presence of terrorism behavior in none, one, two 
and all three Militants respectively, with no weapons contained in the environment. In 
Experiment 13, Simulations 1 through 4 also test the presence of terrorism behavior in none, one, 
two and all three Militants respectively, except with weapons present in the environment. 
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“Present” is used here to mean that civilians can readily purchase weapons if they have the 
financial means. Tables 12 and 13 show these results. 
 The use of terrorism activity is implemented in the model as a very high likelihood of 
punishing supporters of other Militants, despite disparities in strength. In Simulation 1 of both 
Experiments 12 and 13 where there is no terrorism behavior, despite the presence of weapons in 
Experiment 13 the values for Militant strengths, notorieties, support and fighting are about the 
same. Once Militant 1 begins engaging in terrorism, it becomes substantially stronger than 
Militants 2 and 3 in both experiments. These results suggest that terrorism activity removes 
grievances and affiliations as significant influencers of Civilian support. Instead, in response to 
terrorism Civilians may provide support based on fear, at a predictable level that does not vary 
between groups. Terrorism tactics could therefore be a way of securing a certain level of support 
based on fear of punishment. This finding is supported by empirical observations, as countless 
small militant organizations that have been significantly weaker than other groups or 
governments have historically managed to assert control over populations using terror attacks.  
As stated above, the disparity between support given to Militants that engage and do not 
engage in terrorism is significantly smaller in the environment with weapons. Comparing 
Simulation 2 results across Experiment 12 and Experiment 13, community 4 which has three 
times as many Civilians who are able to afford weapons has a dramatically smaller likelihood of 
support for a Militant 1 engaging in terrorism when weapons are available. Its support for 
Militants 2 and 3 is dramatically larger when weapons are available as well. Community 4 is 
affiliated with Militant 2, making this shift all the more expected. Community 5 which also has a 
medium income distribution is, by contrast, affiliated with Militant 1 and does not experience 
any shift in support in response to terrorism or the weapons presence. The effect of weapons on 
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shifts of support in response to terrorism only occurs for communities unaffiliated with the 
Militant engaging in terrorism tactics. This also implies that terrorism tactics are not enough to 
deter the support of affiliated communities. 
The results from Experiments 12 and 13 suggest that overall, the use of terrorism 
represented as a very high likelihood of punishing civilians increases the strength of a Militant as 
compared to its competitors, but this effect is reduced if other Militants also use terrorism tactics. 
The effect is also mitigated by the ability of Civilians to defend themselves when weapons are 
available, especially if Civilian communities are wealthy enough to afford them and 
communities are not affiliated with any groups engaging in terrorism. More research should be 
conducted in order to determine support for these findings.  
Table 14 shows the results of the last experiment performed in this chapter. Experiment 
14 tests the effects of Militant groups starting the conflict with different initial strengths. This 
difference in strength could be used to represent immutable differences in sizes, capabilities, or 
equipment. In Simulation 1 all Militants are equal, in Simulation 2 Militant 1 is 2000 units 
stronger, and in Simulation 3 Militants 1 and 3 are both 2000 units stronger. No weapons are 
available. Simulations 4 through 6 model the same scenarios but in a setting where weapons are 
available.  
Similarly with Experiment 13, in Experiment 14 the presence of weapons mitigates the 
effects of changes to the Militant attributes. In Simulations 2 and 3, when Militants are bestowed 
with a larger initial strength they gain greater strength overall. This greater strength results in less 
fighting with other Militants. However, in Simulations 4 and 5 Civilians can defend themselves 
particularly in richer communities, and the effect is smaller. This may be because more Civilians 
have the option to fight back rather than be intimidated into support. The presence of weapons 
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limits the strength gains of Militants that enter a conflict with larger initial strengths. The overall 




The fourteen experiments conducted in this chapter produce the following observations: 
Effects of variation in Civilian community characteristics 
1. If no Civilian communities are affiliated with any Militants, then as grievances between 
communities increase, all Militants gain strength equally. 
2. Fighting between Militants is most likely when there are neither grievances between 
communities nor affiliations with any Militants, because all else being equal they are all 
equally strong. 
3. Affiliations of communities with Militants reduces the likelihood that Civilians support 
another Militant as their grievances increase. 
4. The presence of grievances in a polarized setting, where one community is affiliated with one 
Militant and another community is affiliated with another Militant, decrease the strength of 
Militant Groups and increase the probability of fighting. 
5. In a polarized setting and when grievances are present between communities, Militant 
strength increases more clearly with increases in wealth and number of affiliated Civilians 
than in a non-polarized setting. 
6. All else being equal, in a conflict setting with grievances between communities, a Militant 
without any community affiliations has greater strength than Militants with some affiliations, 
as Civilian support for the unaffiliated Militant is unconstrained.  
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7. All else being equal, Militants may be stronger than other Militants when all communities are 
affiliated with them rather than none of them. 
8. Greater wealth of a Civilian population increases the strength of any Militant Groups they 
support. 
9. Greater wealth of a Civilian population does not change the impacts of grievances and 
affiliations on Militant strengths and fighting. 
10. A greater number of communities creates more system complexity, in the form of increased 
opportunities for Civilians to support different Militants based on their grievances and 
affiliations, but this greater number of communities does not itself lead to variation in 
Militant strengths and fighting. 
 
Effects of variation in Militant characteristics 
11. A greater number of Militants in a conflict environment does not itself lead to variation in 
Militant strengths and fighting. 
12. All else being equal, Militants with a higher benefit threshold have higher strength, higher 
notoriety, and higher Civilian support than other Militants. 
13. All else being equal, Militants that engage in terrorism, or elevated targeting of civilians, 
have greater strength than Militants who do not use terrorism tactics. 
14. When weapons are available in a conflict setting, Civilians defend themselves and the 
strength advantage of Militants who engage in terrorism is less than when weapons are not 
available.  
15. Militants with larger initial strengths than other Militants have larger strengths overall, 
resulting in less fighting with weaker Militants.  
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16. When weapons are available in a conflict setting, the advantage in strength of Militants that 
enter a conflict with larger initial strengths than other Militants is smaller than when weapons 
are not available. 
 
Observations 4 and 6 demonstrate particularly interesting findings about the interrelated impacts 
of grievances and affiliations on the strengths and fighting between militants. These results 
indicate that, without the presence of affiliations between civilian communities and militant 
groups, grievances lead to greater support of groups because civilians are no longer constrained 
to support one group. Instead, they may provide support to any group that could potentially 
resolve disputes in their favor. Likewise, if there exists one group that is unaffiliated with any 
civilians, all else being equal, this group will become the strongest because civilians from across 
many different affiliations may still support it.  
 At first glance, this finding contradicts the existing literature. Scholars have found that 
affiliations such as ethnic identity are extremely beneficial in helping militant groups recruit 
fighters and earn support, because they can facilitate group cohesion (Gates 2002, Kaufmann 
1996, McDoom 2012). The politicization of civilian identities can also galvanize communities to 
rally behind an associated fighting group (McCauley 2017, Sambanis and Shayo 2013, Valentino 
2004). Further, not only does identity facilitate supportive relationships, but it also overcomes 
collective action problems by uniting groups around a cause through their common identity 
(Habyarimana et al. 2007, Parkinson 2013). The results from Experiment 2 are consistent with 
these findings, as the addition of affiliations in an atmosphere of no community grievances 
dramatically increases support of affiliated rather than unaffiliated militant groups. This result 
holds in Experiment 3, where the addition of affiliations sharply polarizes to whom civilians turn 
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to provide support when grievances exist. Instead of seeking support to resolve grievances from 
any militant group, support strongly shifts in favor of the affiliated group. 
 However, subsequent experiments as well as additional literature indicate a more 
complicated effect of the interactions between affiliations and grievances. Some existing 
research discovers that many groups manage to cut across different identities or “rise above” 
them in order to gain support, either by appealing to the grievances of the population instead or 
by emphasizing a separate identity (Ahmad 2016, Dunning and Harrison 2010, Robinson 2014, 
Walter 2017). When they successfully do so, they may receive support from a broader range of 
civilian communities. Civilians may also behave opportunistically by switching sides or 
realigning themselves with groups based on perceived benefits, rather than their identities 
(Kalyvas 2006, Mueller 2000, Staniland 2012, Seymour 2014). The findings of Experiments 6 
and 7 are consistent with this literature. When groups are either affiliated with all or none of the 
civilian communities, then they become the strongest groups as compared to those which remain 
affiliated with one community or another. This is because, with the presence of grievances, even 
those civilians who are affiliated with another militant group may support the non-affiliated 
group when it may be to their advantage.  
 As noted previously, the Taliban in Afghanistan serve as one example, choosing to avoid 
involvement in tribal affiliations and instead crafting a message of unity based on Islamic 
principles (Jones 2010, Malkasian 2013, Ruttig 2010). Al-Shabaab in Somalia has also benefitted 
from a similar appeal over the past decade, gaining support from Somalis throughout the country 
by stressing its commitment to Islam (Ahmad 2016, Schaefer and Black 2011, Solomon 2014). 
Other actors have taken a more secular, but similarly unifying, approach. Although President 
Muammar Qaddafi in Libya maintained his grip on power by strategically distributing oil wealth 
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and pitting communities against each other, he also maintained a degree of popular support by 
appealing broadly to a nationalist Libyan and pan-African identity rather than associating his 
leadership with any one particular identity (Wehrey 2018). 
The results from Experiments 4, and 6 suggest that these three conflict actors were able to 
maintain strength and limit fighting with other militants partly because they garnered support 
from civilians across multiple affiliations due to their ability to address grievances. It is also 
possible that these three actors ultimately faced declines in support because their abilities to 
address grievances came under question. Overall, these findings demonstrate that grievances 
play an important role in shifting civilian support for militants, even given the presence of 
affiliations, which do not strictly define when civilian support is provided. If this were the case, 
then one might expect the group with the largest base of affiliated civilians to always remain the 
strongest, all else being equal. Instead, grievances may motivate civilians to support groups with 
whom they are not affiliated, and such groups may benefit from being affiliated with many 
different groups or none at all. Ultimately, the findings support the importance of addressing 
grievances in a foreign intervention in order to either unite civilians in favor of a new 
government or to address the root causes of support for an opposing militant.  
 Many of the other findings expressed in the observations above have rarely been studied 
in previous conflict research. This is likely because the outcome variables that they examine such 
as Militant strength, probability of fighting, and Civilian defending are difficult to observe and 
measure empirically. Quantifying Militant strength requires some unit of measure, such as 
numbers of fighters, net financial worth, or an indicator for fighting effectiveness. Perhaps 
strength may be better assessed through proxies such as battles won or territory held, which are 
easier to observe. Despite having been previously tackled in some isolated studies, civilian 
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defending is also difficult to observe, and difficult to distinguish from crime and low-level 
violent clashes between communities (Gurcan 2015, Sarosi and Sombatpoonsiri 2011, Wasara 
2002). The creation of private militias could be one way to measure this variable, but obtaining 
this information is also difficult. Probability of fighting can be measured using statistical analysis 
of conflict panel data, but the independent variables above have not previously been examined. 
Further, existing research has commonly used probability of a broader civil war onset as a 
variable rather than probability of confrontation between two specific groups (Fearon 2011, 
Hegre and Sambanis 2006, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002, Muchlinski et al. 2016). By using 
computational representations of all dependent and independent variables, the approach used in 
this study can help provide a helpful introduction to examining factors that have been previously 
out-of-reach. Additional research that examines local-level dynamics and uses creative methods 
of analysis is necessary to test the validity of this study’s findings.  
What is clear is that the findings do provide interesting insight on the outcomes of this 
particular model, and they demonstrate the variety of information that the model can provide 
about a conflict setting. Although outcomes vary significantly from setting to setting depending 
on several conditions, the above tests with their incremental adjustments to key variables help 
reveal how certain conflict outcomes may result from local factors. They also provide helpful 
context for interpreting the results when modeling empirical cases in later chapters. Finally, these 
findings yield interesting implications for the effects of intervention, to be examined in greater 
detail in the next chapter.   
There are a few limitations to the use of the computational model that limit the validity of 
the findings. First, the validity of observed effects are limited by the validity of the model design. 
Although the interaction rules of the model are grounded in existing, tested theories, these 
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assumptions still oversimplify nuanced dynamics that are much more sophisticated in practice 
and conditional on many other factors. Some of the model’s findings may be “baked in” such 
that the assumptions made in the model design deterministically lead to certain results. This 
chapter makes an effort to ensure that its observations stem from patterns that emerge from the 
program, but it should be kept in mind that results at least partially stem from an aggregation of 
predetermined assumptions. 
Second, Civilian grievances and affiliations are also oversimplified through assumptions 
about which ones are most influential, and through their aggregation at the community level. The 
model further simplifies these factors by combining them into propensities in order to implement 
them computationally. However, grievances and affiliations play a role that is much more 
complex. These factors may vary between different individuals within the same community, may 
change frequently, and one may have a greater influence over another at a given time for a 
variety of sociological reasons not explored in this study.6  
Third, the interactions and variables in the model do not comprehensively represent all of 
the factors that influence Civilian and Militant Group behavior. There is no manner for 
controlling for them, and the many top-level factors that influence conflict outcomes are also not 
included in this study. Finally, defining probability values such as the probability that two 
Groups fight is somewhat arbitrary, and only meaningful as compared relatively to other 
probability values. For all of these reasons, the model is unlikely to reflect historical patterns 
with accuracy. Therefore, policy recommendations for intervention methods drawn from this 
study must be made cautiously and carefully contextualized alongside historical examples. Later 
                                                
6 Sociological and anthropological research delves further into social behavior and community hierarchies when 
explaining civilian behavior in conflict. An example relevant to this study is Coburn (2011a) on social and political 
dynamics in the small market town of Istalif in Afghanistan. 
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chapters will integrate case examples with these model findings in order to mitigate this 
weakness.  
 In the next chapter, I will perform a systematic analysis of the effects of different 
intervention tools that could be used by a foreign intervener. I will then group those tools into 
strategies and examine their outcomes under varying time and efficiency conditions. I will also 








CHAPTER 3: MODELING THE OUTCOMES OF INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 
 
 
A foreign intervener leverages various diplomatic, economic, and forceful military tools in 
response to foreign conflict. These instruments may be designed to bring an end to fighting, or to 
incentivize or coerce conflict actors to behave in a manner that is consistent with their own 
interests. However, the tools may fail to achieve the objectives for which they were intended, and 
other unanticipated “side effects” may also result. This may be due to inefficiencies in the 
implementation process, or the policies may fundamentally alter the actions and incentives of 
conflict actors in unfavorable ways. Kalyvas (2006) states that “political actors external to the 
community play a critical role in the conversion of local and private conflicts into violence 
because they provide incentives without which local actors would be unable or unwilling to 
undertake violence” (383). External political actors may also fuel violence by providing financial 
or material incentives for actors to continue fighting (Kuperman 2008, Regan 2002b). 
 Having explored the effects of varying interactions between civilians and militant groups 
in the previous chapter, I now use the computational agent-based model developed in the 
previous chapter to examine circumstances in which foreign involvement may not result in its 
intended outcomes, analyzing the impacts of external influence on these underlying interactions 
that lead to violence. I test fifteen different diplomatic, economic, and forceful intervention tools, 
as well as five combined strategies comprised of these tools, and observe whether strategies that 
address the underlying grievances and civilian support of groups have a more positive or 
negative effect on militant strengths and probability of fighting. First, I create a list of possible 
policy tools available to the foreign governments and provide examples of corresponding 
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programs and actions. Second, I develop five strategies or “packages” of tools that vary in their 
emphasis on addressing local level conflict causes and in their reliance on forceful military 
options. Third, I represent each tool and each strategy as a set of changes to the values of specific 
variables or parameters in the model. Finally, I use the model to perform simulations of changes 
in actor actions and incentives that result from these parameter adjustments, observing any 
deviations in expected violence patterns using an Interrupted Time Series (ITS) analysis. Not 
only do I compare differences in militant strengths and violence outcomes between each of the 
simulations, but I also examine the effects of each tool and strategy at a reduced level of 
“efficiency” and for a reduced duration.  
 
3.1 Tools of Foreign Intervention  
 
Figure 9: Foreign Intervention Tools Represented in the Model 
Diplomatic Economic Military 
• Negotiating disputes between 
communities 
• Supporting militants income • Attacking militants 
• Negotiating agreements between 
militant groups 
• Increasing the wealth of civilians • Punishing support of militants 
• Waging information campaigns 
against militant ideology 
• Providing in-kind benefits to 
empower community leaders 
• Weapons removal 
• Providing governance benefits 
for militants to pass on to 
civilians 
• Providing in-kind benefits to 
militants to pass on to civilians 
• Providing military training or 
assistance to militants 
		 • Providing benefits to civilians 
with condition of ceasing 
militant support 
• Providing protection from 
punishment to civilians 
		 • Cutting off resources to militants   
 
Figure 9 is a chart of diplomatic, economic, and military intervention tools available to 
intervening policymakers. I have categorized them based on the forcefulness of each approach 
 82 
and the intended mechanism for their effect; for example, cutting off resources to militant groups 
leverages pressure on them economically. A variety of different types of organizations or 
agencies may perform any of these tasks, so it should not be assumed that diplomatic services 
always perform the diplomatic tasks, trade negotiators or aid agencies perform the economic 
tasks, or that only militaries engage in military action. For example, the U.S. military may wage 
information campaigns or provide benefits to community leaders, separate from their traditional 
use of military force. In the subsections below, I provide examples of programs or actions 





Negotiating disputes between 
communities 
Local dialogues, community-level 
meetings and workshops 
Negotiating agreements between 
militant groups 
Traditional diplomacy meetings and 
negotiations 
Waging information campaigns against 
ideology 
Public affairs programs, cultural 
exchanges, information campaigns 
Providing governance benefits for 
militants to pass on 
Governance and capacity-building 
meetings, workshops 
 
There are several common diplomatic, or non-coercive tools that may be used by interveners to 
influence conflict outcomes. First, an intervener may negotiate agreements between different 
localized actors. Civilian communities may have grievances against one another due to 
competition between them or distributions of power over one another. With effective negotiation, 
an intervener could negotiate disputes between communities diplomatically, resolving some of 
these underlying tensions. For example, diplomats and military negotiators sometimes met with 
local community leaders in contested districts of Afghanistan during the 2001 war against the 
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Taliban and al-Qaeda in order to better understand and address their needs and concerns 
(Malkasian 2013). The intervener may also negotiate agreements between militant groups. The 
United Nations and other international organizations met with militia leaders during the 1992 
UNITAF mission in Somalia in order to halt the fighting by encouraging ceasefires.  
 Public diplomacy and information campaigns are designed to change the minds of 
civilians in favor of ideas that may promote foreign interests. This could entail swaying public 
opinion in favor or against a militant group using television, print and radio news outlets, social 
media, public engagement events, exchange programs, or the distribution of leaflets. The U.S. 
Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Defense and several intelligence agencies all 
engage in some form of public diplomacy, and many countries host media programs 
administered by American Cultural Centers and the international radio broadcast Voice of 
America (VOA). Interveners may also provide governance assistance to a militant group whose 
rule it seeks to strengthen over a population of civilians that it extorts. Such assistance, offered 
through meetings with diplomats and sometimes humanitarian aid personnel, may increase the 













Supporting militants income Government or rebel funding, Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS), weapons transfers 
Increasing the wealth of civilians Economic investments, cash transfer and 
micro-loan programs 
Providing in-kind benefits to 
community leaders 
Development assistance provided to 
local community leaders 
Providing in-kind benefits to militants 
to pass on 
Development assistance provided to 
organization leaders 
Providing civilians with conditional 
benefits 
Development assistance provided to 
civilian organizations 
Cutting off resources to militants  Sanctions, interrupting/intercepting 
supply routes 
 
Economic tools may come in the form of assistance, which provides local actors with additional 
financial or in-kind resources, or coercion, which leverages denial of access to resources to 
induce changes in behavior. First, an intervener may provide financial or in-kind support to 
militants in order to increase their strength. According to a report published by the CIA about 
U.S. experience in Somalia, “high-profile assistance from the international community- 
including food relief, development assistance, and possibly diplomatic recognition—can provide 
enclave leaders with both the material for patronage and the perception of international approval 
needed to enhance their legitimacy” (CIA 1992, 7). Such funding could be delivered through 
diplomatic and humanitarian channels, or provided by deployed military troops (Tarnoff and 
Lawson 2018). The foreign intervention may also consciously attempt to improve the local 
economy and raise civilian wealth, by encouraging investment in local business or directly 
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engaging in civilian-focused cash transfer and micro-lending programs. 7 Further, assistance 
could be given to civilians through their local community leaders in order to empower these 
leaders and improve their legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Civilians may grow to trust 
these leaders as interveners support their ability to deliver benefits. 
 An intervener may provide assistance tied to conditionality terms that are designed to 
alter conflict actor behavior. It may provide in-kind resources such as humanitarian food 
deliveries to a militant group with the condition that the aid be passed on to a civilian population. 
This would allow the group to also provide civilians with benefits in order to win their support. 
Benefits may also be provided to civilians directly under the condition that they cease their 
support of militants. Finally, the intervention may engage in economic coercion of militant 
groups by directly cutting off their external sources of income to reduce their strength. They may 
impose sanctions, block transportation routes, or destroy production assets such as oil rigs, 
agricultural fields, or factories.  
I can also model the presence of business activity in a conflict environment, and its 
mitigating effect on violence outcomes during each of the five different intervention strategies. 
Countries may continue to engage in business such as the drilling of oil or the mining of other 
natural resources during a civil conflict, effectively continuing to funnel wealth to a certain 
number of civilians. A militant group may benefit from this continued activity by extorting from 
the civilians who are earning money. Additional wealth may also increase civilians’ ability to 
turn against a group and defend themselves, as they may now be able to obtain weapons. I can 
model these conditions simply by providing additional, high levels of income to a subset of 
civilians and observing any mediating effect on the effects of each strategy. 
                                                
7 For examples, see “In Wake of Ebola, Cash Transfers Rebuild Livelihoods in Sierra Leone,” USAID (2018)  and  
“Microfinance Development Credit Authority (DCA),” USAID (2015). 
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The clearest use of military force exercised during a foreign intervention is through physical 
attacks on militant groups. Successful attacks erode the strength of the target group in order to 
limit their ability to control territory and expand into new geographic areas. An intervener may 
use force in ground combat operations, or to attack groups through more physically-distanced 
bombing campaigns. It may also, through the use of Special Operations, kill or detain specific 
civilians to punish their support for militants. Attacks in this case might only occur if the civilian 
is considered to be an active member of the group, but it may often be difficult to differentiate 
between civilians and combatants. The intervention may also punish support by providing 
training and funding to local law enforcement authorities, who punish on their behalf. 
 Interveners may remove weapons from a conflict environment by blocking their delivery 
or confiscating them, in order to lessen the likelihood that fighting groups gain access to those 
weapons or that civilians gain the ability to militarize themselves. They may also provide 
Military 
Tool Examples 
Attacking militants Direct combat, bombing campaigns 
Punishing support Creation or support of local law 
enforcement, Special Operations attack 
or detainment 
Weapons removal Disarmament programs, Special 
Operations missions 
Providing military training & assistance International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), Special Operations 
train and assist missions 
Protection from punishment Ground patrols, creation or support of 
local law enforcement 
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protection to civilians. This may shield them from extortion, possibly cutting off another militant 
group’s source of funding, or it may physically protect them from militant punishment.  
Addressing Local Grievances  
As discussed in Chapter 1, some of the underlying issues that lead to grievances at the local level 
include poverty and a weak economy, a lack of adjudication of disputes or rule of law, poor 
government accountability or representation of local concerns, and inadequate service delivery. 
Naturally, these governance and economic issues may warrant primarily diplomatic or economic 
responses. While forceful military approaches such as the strengthening of security and policing 
institutions are often necessary and sometimes even a prerequisite for these less forceful 
responses to occur, they do not directly address the underlying grievances that lead civilians to 
support or join militant groups in conflict.  
 
Figure 10: Categories of Impacts of Foreign Policy Tools 
Addressing Civilian Grievances Addressing Militants and Fighting 
(D) Negotiating disputes between 
communities 
(D) Negotiating agreements between 
militant groups 
(D) Waging information campaigns 
against ideology 
(E) Supporting militants income 
(D) Providing governance benefits for 
militants to pass on  
(E) Cutting off resources to militants 
(E) Increasing the wealth of civilians (M) Attacking militants 
(E) Providing in-kind benefits to 
community leaders 
(M) Punishing support  
(E) Providing in-kind benefits to 
militants to pass on 
(M) Weapons removal 
(E) Providing civilians with conditional 
benefits 
(M) Providing military training & 
assistance  
  (M) Protection from punishment 
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In order to distinguish between strategies that address grievances and those that do not, I divide 
the individual tools into categories as shown above in Figure 10. I denote diplomatic tools with a 
(D), economic with an (E), and military with an (M). It is important to note that while all of the 
tools that address civilian grievances are either diplomatic or economic, those addressing the 
militant level and conflict fighting are not all military tools. Therefore, simply testing the 
differences between the three types would not fully capture the effects of addressing grievances. 
 
3.2 Combined Intervention Strategies 
A foreign intervention does not usually leverage its available tools in isolation. When crafting 
responses to overseas conflicts, multiple agencies, governments, and international organizations 
responsible for the use of different tools may be involved, and they are likely to implement 
several tools in combination to form an overall strategy. Bureaucratic and political factors may 
significantly shape the substance of these strategies. For example, some leaders may be less 
inclined towards military responses, favoring diplomatic solutions (Feaver and Gelpi 2011). By 
contrast, some militaries’ large funding and capabilities may facilitate more forceful responses 
(Adams 2014, Brooks 2017, Schake 2013). Any political reluctance towards a costly, large-scale 
intervention may lead to strategies that leave a smaller footprint, such as financial support of 
proxy actors or reliance on Special Operations (Adams and Murray 2014, Brooks 2017).  
Generally, despite the likelihood of various organizational and coordination challenges, the 
different actors or agencies participating in an intervention may settle on some cohesive strategy 
designed to achieve the overall goals of the intervention. 
In this study, I create five packages of policy tools in order to represent five potential 
strategies that could be implemented during an intervention in a civil war. Their composition is 
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also motivated by my research design; each strategy varies in its use of tools that either do or do 
not address civilian grievances. After testing each tool individually, I will also simulate the 
strategies in the agent-based model by applying changes to multiple rules and parameters, based 
on the tools of which they are comprised. I will use this variation to analyze the effects of 
changes in strategy and the degree of addressing civilian grievances on violence outcomes. 
 
Figure 11: Strategy 1- Completely Non-Forceful, Addressing Civilian Grievances 
Strategy 1 
Completely Non-Forceful, Addressing Civilian Grievances 
Tool Example 
Negotiating disputes between communities Local dialogues, community-level meetings 
and workshops 
Waging information campaigns against 
ideology 
Public affairs programs, cultural exchanges, 
information campaigns 
Providing governance benefits for militants 
to pass on  
Governance and capacity-building meetings, 
workshops 
Increasing the wealth of civilians Economic investments, cash transfer and 
micro-loan programs 
Providing in-kind benefits to community 
leaders 
Development assistance provided to local 
community leaders 
Providing in-kind benefits to militants to 
pass on  
Development assistance provided to 
organization leaders 
Providing civilians with conditional benefits Development assistance provided to civilian 
organizations 
 
In the first strategy, Strategy 1, the intervener only uses diplomatic and economic tools, 
and only those that directly address grievances and governance concerns of local citizens. While 
it does provide some benefits and support to one or more militant groups, who could represent 
either the weak local government or rebel groups, this only includes support meant to be passed 
along to benefit the civilian population. This strategy is designed to demonstrate the effects of 
only addressing a conflict through its most local-level causes, without any attention to addressing 
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fighting at the level of the militants. It is implemented in the model by adjusting civilian 
grievance and allegiance matrices, increasing benefits, and increasing civilian wealth.  
   
Figure 12: Strategy 2- Primarily Non-Forceful, Addressing Civilian Grievances 
Strategy 2 
Primarily Non-Forceful, Addressing Civilian Grievances 
Tool Example 
Negotiating disputes between communities Local dialogues, community-level meetings 
and workshops 
Negotiating agreements between militant 
groups 
Traditional diplomacy meetings and 
negotiations 
Waging information campaigns against 
ideology 
Public affairs programs, cultural exchanges, 
information campaigns 
Providing governance benefits for militants 
to pass on  
Governance and capacity-building meetings, 
workshops 
Increasing the wealth of civilians Economic investments, cash transfer and 
micro-loan programs 
Providing in-kind benefits to community 
leaders 
Development assistance provided to local 
community leaders 
Providing in-kind benefits to militants to 
pass on  
Development assistance provided to 
organization leaders 
Providing civilians with conditional benefits Development assistance provided to civilian 
organizations 
Supporting militants income Government or rebel funding, Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS), weapons transfers 
Cutting off resources to militants Sanctions, interrupting/intercepting supply 
routes 
Providing military training & assistance International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), Special Operations train 
and assist missions 
 
 In Strategy 2, the intervener still uses all of the same tools for tackling civilian 
grievances, but also implements some of those that address fighting between the militants. It 
includes negotiation directly between warring groups, supporting some militants financially, 
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cutting off resources to others, and providing military training or assistance to militant allies. 
Most of these policy instruments are non-forceful, but the use of force is introduced through the 
support and training of local fighters. This strategy is designed to still observe the effects of 
addressing local causes of conflict, with the added support of tools designed to degrade one 
militant’s fighting capacity and boost that of another. It also reflects attention to and investment 
in local securitization. This strategy is modeled through adjustments to the probability of militant 
fighting, their income and support, and militant strength.  
 
Figure 13: Strategy 3- Moderately Forceful, Limited Addressing of Civilian Grievances 
Strategy 3 
Moderately Forceful, Limited Addressing of Civilian Grievances 
Tool Example 
Waging information campaigns against 
ideology 
Public affairs programs, cultural exchanges, 
information campaigns 
Providing governance benefits for militants 
to pass on  
Governance and capacity-building meetings, 
workshops 
Providing in-kind benefits to militants to 
pass on  
Development assistance provided to 
organization leaders 
Providing civilians with conditional benefits Development assistance provided to civilian 
organizations 
Supporting militants income Government or rebel funding, Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS), weapons transfers 
Cutting off resources to militants Sanctions, interrupting/intercepting supply 
routes 
Punishing support  Creation or support of local law 
enforcement, Special Operations attack or 
detainment 
Weapons removal Disarmament programs, Special Operations 
missions 
Providing military training & assistance  International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), Special Operations train 
and assist missions 
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The third strategy, Strategy 3, moves away from local-level tools, dropping the 
implementation of all but the waging of information campaigns, governance assistance, and 
conditional development assistance. It instead implements a more forceful approach, with more 
direct military involvement that includes denying physical access of militants, punishing support 
of militants, and the removal of weapons. In the computational model, adjustments are made to 
militant income, access, and support. This strategy represents a scenario in which more forceful 
and direct action is desired against particular militants, but the military presence is not so strong 
as to also provide sufficient security for community engagement by unarmed diplomatic 
personnel. In this scenario, proxy support of a local militant group may continue, but perhaps 
with greater aerial and Special Operations involvement rather than a full commitment of ground-
level troops. Modeling this strategy demonstrates the result of very limited attention to civilian 
grievances, in exchange for efforts towards direct militant group degradation.   
Strategy 4 completely removes all local-level tools and shifts to an entirely forceful 
approach, utilizing only economic and military instruments. It tackles the militants directly, but 
does not address the local-level interactions that may influence civilian behavior during conflict. 
This strategy represents a full-scale military intervention with the use of ground-level forces to 
both directly attack enemy militants and to support allied groups. It is also consistent with the 
earlier stages of a conflict, when there may not yet be a large enough foreign presence to provide 
development assistance or conduct community outreach. 
Finally, Strategy 5 is a combined approach that leverages all of the available tools during 
an intervention. Such a strategy might be feasible in an environment where a large ground troop 
presence permits widespread access to local communities by development workers and 
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diplomats. It is designed to test how the full combination of both addressing local grievances and 
engaging in forceful intervention at the militant level influences violence outcomes. 
 
Figure 14: Strategy 4- Completely Forceful, No Addressing of Civilian Grievances 
Strategy 4 
Completely Forceful, No Addressing of Civilian Grievances  
Tool Example 
Supporting militants income Government or rebel funding, Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS), weapons transfers 
Cutting off resources to militants Sanctions, interrupting/intercepting supply 
routes 
Attacking militants Direct combat, bombing campaigns 
Punishing support  Creation or support of local law 
enforcement, Special Operations attack or 
detainment 
Weapons removal Disarmament programs, Special Operations 
missions 
Providing military training & assistance  International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), Special Operations train 
and assist missions 












Figure 15: Strategy 5- Combined Forceful and Non-Forceful, Addressing Civilian Grievances 
Strategy 5 
Combined Forceful and Non-Forceful, Addressing Civilian Grievances 
Tool Example 
Negotiating disputes between communities Local dialogues, community-level meetings 
and workshops 
Negotiating agreements between militant 
groups 
Traditional diplomacy meetings and 
negotiations 
Waging information campaigns against 
ideology 
Public affairs programs, cultural exchanges, 
information campaigns 
Providing governance benefits for militants 
to pass on  
Governance and capacity-building meetings, 
workshops 
Increasing the wealth of civilians Economic investments, cash transfer and 
micro-loan programs 
Providing in-kind benefits to community 
leaders 
Development assistance provided to local 
community leaders 
Providing in-kind benefits to militants to 
pass on  
Development assistance provided to 
organization leaders 
Providing civilians with conditional benefits Development assistance provided to civilian 
organizations 
Supporting militants income Government or rebel funding, Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS), weapons transfers 
Cutting off resources to militants Sanctions, interrupting/intercepting supply 
routes 
Attacking militants Direct combat, bombing campaigns 
Punishing support  Creation or support of local law 
enforcement, Special Operations attack or 
detainment 
Weapons removal Disarmament programs, Special Operations 
missions 
Providing military training & assistance  International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), Special Operations train 
and assist missions 
Protection from punishment  Ground patrols, creation or support of local 
law enforcement 
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3.3 Initial Conditions and Simulation Approach 
In order to test the effectiveness of the above intervention tools and strategies, I model a 
hypothetical conflict environment and then simulate each tool in separate simulations. It is 
necessary to create this sample environment in order to set the parameters of the model at a 
certain constant state. The limitation of such an approach is that the results may only be 
interpreted based on these specific conditions. If these conditions are altered in a different 
conflict environment, it is possible that the same results may not hold. The design of this 
experiment attempts to mitigate this problem by modeling an environment that is as similar as 
possible to typical conditions in a number of contemporary civil wars. The intention is that the 
findings will therefore be applicable to as large a number of contemporary real-world cases as 
possible. I will also interpret the results based on findings from Chapter 2, in which I tested the 
model under varying conflict conditions. The code for the simulator will be made available so 
that other researchers may make changes to these conditions and view the effects on results as 
desired. 
 
Setting the Scene 
The hypothetical conflict environment conditions used for the simulations in this chapter are as 
follows. In the conflict country (hereafter referred to as “the Country”), there are three conflict 
actors: the government, or Militant 1, a rebel group, or Militant 2, and a small extremist 
organization, or Militant 3. The government is the internationally-recognized political authority 
in charge of ruling the Country, but its actual governance capacity is relatively weak and it is 
unable to consistently maintain a monopoly over the use of force or the taxation of its civilian 
citizens. These civilians have, among other identities, five different major community groupings 
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or tribes. The largest tribe, Tribe 1, comprising about 36% of the total population, closely backs 
the existing government elite. Its citizens tend to have a disproportionately higher income than 
other civilians, with 10% below the poverty line, 84% about middle income, and 6% wealthy 
earners. Many of the government officials hail from Tribe 1, and tend to favor these citizens with 
service provision. 
 About 18% of the total population is from Tribe 2. Tribe 2 holds numerous grievances 
against Tribe 1 due to a history of marginalization and lack of access to public services. About 
70% of its civilians live below the poverty line, 28% are about average income, and 2% are 
wealthy. Members of Tribe 2 therefore support the rebel group, whose members largely come 
from this community. Tribe 3 comprises only 4% of the total population. Its members are 
actually a collection of even smaller loose sub-tribes with little to no recognition by the state, and 
who have also experienced a history of marginalization and lack of access to public services. 
They live under the same degree of poverty, and hold grievances against all other Tribes besides 
Tribe 2. Over time, some members of Tribe 3 have become increasingly radicalized by extremist 
ideology and the influence of foreign instigators, and therefore they tacitly support the extremist 
organization.  
 Tribe 4, although equally impoverished, is not affiliated with either the government, the 
rebels, or the extremists. It comprises 15% of the total population, and only has a grievance 
against Tribe 5. Tribe 5 is also unaffiliated, but it is a larger, wealthier community that itself 
holds considerable political influence and sometimes experiences tensions with the ruling elite. It 
comprises the remaining 27% of the population. 10% of these civilians are below the poverty 
line, 84% are about middle income, and 6% are wealthy earners. Its civilians have grievances 
against Tribe 1 and the civilians of Tribe 1 have grievances against Tribe 5, but since Tribe 5 
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does not have any affiliated militant group this tension only manifests as occasional local clashes 
between civilians.  
 In this Country, although each of the different Tribes has separate regions or geographic 
areas in which they are primarily concentrated, there is limited restriction of movement by the 
government and all civilians and groups are free to move between all regions of the country. 
There are pockets scattered around the Country where multiple Tribes coexist together, 
particularly around urban city centers. Therefore, for these simulations I represent the whole 
Country as one large region in which all communities exist and all militant groups operate. 
Because of illicit foreign weapons trafficking and a history of violence and conflict throughout 
the region, weapons are generally available to any civilians who can afford them.  
 While sporadic movements have occasionally emerged from within Tribe 2 against the 
incumbent government, which has maintained a hold on power for the past several decades, 
recently a consolidated rebel group decisively emerged as a credible challenge to the 
government’s power. While countries acting as external benefactors have always provided a 
small continuous stream of external assistance to the government, these benefactors limited their 
support due to concerns about political corruption. The rebel group’s rise was partially aided by a 
spike in their own external funding approximately doubling the government’s amount, provided 
by a coalition of opposing foreign governments. Since its emergence, the rebel group has quickly 
managed to control territory, thanks to the backing of its supporters and intimidation of others. 
Meanwhile, the extremist organization has taken advantage of this instability as well as its own 
small amount of foreign backing to discreetly gain strength, engaging in periodic violent attacks 
against civilians to frighten them into providing support. Ultimately, the government wishes to 
maintain its grip on power, the rebel group aims to overthrow the government and establish itself 
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as the new regime, and the extremist organization also wishes to take control of the country and 
implement an extreme rule of law.  
The government, the rebels, and the extremists all engage in some form of taxation or 
extortion of the civilians under their control, amounting to about 10% of their total income. This 
value is justified in the previous chapter, based on the taxation behavior of the example of al-
Shabaab. The tax is levied in numerous ways, whether through the regular conduct of business, 
exchange of goods, erection of road blocks or intimidation by armed members and service 
providers. When civilians choose to provide support, the benefit gained by the recipient group 
also amounts to about 10% of the civilian’s total income. This value is based on the assumptions 
that civilians do not offer any more than they would otherwise be taxed. All groups choose to cut 
off benefits to the populations under their control only if their external support exceeds an 
amount four times what their supporters could provide them. Neither the government nor the 
rebel groups engage in widespread indiscriminate violence, as neither wishes to alienate their 
external benefactors. Only the extremist group inflicts intentional violence against civilians as a 
severe form of what it considers “punishment,” at a rate of 90% that decreases as other groups 
become increasingly strong enough to protect their civilians from these attacks. This value could 
vary from 0%-100%, and therefore 90% is considered quite high. 
In real life examples, it is likely that governments or rebel groups also engage in some 
form of punishment or intentional violence to deter civilians from shifting their support as well. 
As a result, the distinction between the tactics of different conflict actors is not usually as clear as 
in this hypothetical scenario suggests. However, for the modeling, maintaining this strict 
differentiation between the behavior of the three different groups helps simplify interpretation of 
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the results. Future simulations of the model could incorporate greater use of violence by the 
government and the rebels to more accurately capture empirical reality.   
A foreign intervener is considering whether or not to intervene in the conflict unfolding 
in the Country, which has caused widespread violence and civilian deaths. Although the violence 
poses no direct threat, the intervener also maintains some indirect but strategically important 
economic interests in the Country that would be threatened by a rebel takeover. Further, Tribe 2 
and the rebel fighters are influenced ideologically by some of the same core beliefs as the 
extremist organization, and while there is no alliance between the rebels and the extremists, the 
intervener is concerned that there could be in the future. This is complicated by the fact that thus 
far, the intervener has had a very difficult time identifying and isolating members of the small 
extremist group, who have successfully “blended in” amongst other communities and managed 
to hide in the midst of the chaos created by the rebel movement. Therefore, the intervener has not 
been able as of yet to reliably differentiate between the extremists and the rebels. It has therefore 
followed the lead of the incumbent government and chosen to label the rebel group as 
“terrorists” in its own political messaging. The intervener’s goals in the Country are first to 
reestablish the strength superiority of the government, second to bring fighting to an end, third to 
reduce the strength of the extremist group as much as possible, and fourth to limit the degree of 







Figure 16: Country Parameter Values Used for Hypothetical Conflict Scenario 
regions 1 
total population 550 (x10,000) 
number of communities 5 
number of militants 3 
wealth values 20, 100, 500 
wealth distribution community 1 20-168-12 
wealth distribution community 2 70-28-2 
wealth distribution community 3 14-5-1 
wealth distribution community 4 56-23-1 
wealth distribution community 5 15-126-9 
% extortion 10% 
% support 10% 
grievances 
  
0 0 0 0 -1 
-1 0 0 0 0 
-1 0 0 -1 -1 
0 0 0 0 -1 




1  0  0 
0  1  0 
0  0  1 
0  0  0 
0  0  0 
 
  
initial strength militant 1 500 
initial strength militant 2 0 
initial strength militant 3 0 
external income militant 1 1000 
external income militant 2 2000 
external income militant 3 500 
benefits cutoff 4 
weapons TRUE 
terrorism militant 3 only 
 *See Chapter 2 for explanation of possible value ranges and additional justification for wealth and extortion values 
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Figure 16 shows the parameter values used in the computational model to set the conditions for 
the hypothetical conflict as described above. The model is used to simulate the use of each 
intervention option, and then to provide a graph that plots the patterns of violence that result. 
“Time” is loosely defined as a continuation of “time ticks,” or rounds of the model as it cycles 
through the interactions between each civilian and militant group. The model is first run under 
the initial conditions until reaching a point of steady state, where the output no longer deviates 
significantly from average values. For this case, the model reaches steady state after about 120 
rounds. 
 




Graph 1 above shows the equilibrium levels of militant strengths that result in the conflict 
environment prior to any external intervention. The rebel group has become the strongest of the 
militants, outweighing the government’s strength by about 30%. The extremist group has also 
grown to become greater in strength than the government. Although the government remains the 
official leader of the Country, these strength values indicate that the other two groups maintain 
greater autonomy over extortion and use of force in most areas outside of the Country’s capital. 
It may seem counterintuitive that the rebels and the extremists have grown so significantly 
stronger than the incumbent government. However, while the government may maintain control 
over governance institutions in the Country’s major cities, it may have very little influence 
outside of metropolitan areas.  
Such conditions could be explained using the concept of “ungoverned spaces,” a term 
that frequently describes uncontrolled or lawless areas such as those that have existed in Somalia 
over the past decade (Menkhaus 2016). The term is somewhat misleading, as existing research 
and the evidence found throughout this research suggest that ungoverned areas are in fact 
governed by informal or unofficial local entities (Keister 2014, Menkhaus 2016). However, the 
word does capture the reality that official government control in these areas may be contested 
and that security conditions are unstable (Clunan and Harold 2010). The government may not be 
strong enough to ensure its rule of law or to protect local civilians against other militants. Other 
groups may instead challenge authority in these spaces, leading to significantly diminished 
government legitimacy and indicated less overall strength compared to other internal militant 
groups.   
For example, in the case of Somalia, while the central federal government has been 
recognized by the international community as the country’s official executive authority, it has 
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rarely exercised meaningful control outside of the capital city of Mogadishu (EASO 2017, 
Harding 2016). Instead, clan-based informal authorities and militias provide security and 
decisionmaking, while the extremist group al-Shabaab has at times controlled most of the 
country’s central and southern territory. Similar conditions have also existed in Afghanistan with 
the Taliban’s widespread territorial domination, and in Mali with the northern half of the country 
under the control of the extremist groups National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad 
(MNLA) and Ansar Dine (Solomon 2013). 
For the purposes of modeling the relative strengths between the government, rebel group, 
and extremist group in the hypothetical Country, their strengths are interpreted as overall support 
and territorial control as opposed to administration of central governance institutions. Therefore, 
it is reasonable to imagine that the government’s strength may have fallen significantly below 
that of the other two groups. Further, although the extremist group engages in the greatest level 
of violence targeting civilians which induces their support, it remains weaker than the rebel 
group, possibly because it has such a significantly smaller base of affiliated supporters.  
Graph 2 below shows the equilibrium levels of fighting between militants that appear in 
the conflict environment prior to any external intervention. The probability of fighting is fairly 
high between all groups. This probability is determined by how closely the groups are matched 
in strength; if two groups are closely matched, fighting continues as neither is able to defeat the 
other. This assumption is an oversimplification of the variety of reasons that actors may continue 
fighting in reality, as argued by extensive existing conflict research. Disproportionately-sized 
militants may fight one another for an extended period due to competition over key strategic 
resources, they may misjudge their own strength relative to other groups, they may be over-
optimistic about their chances of success, or they may rally around strong ideological causes 
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(Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004, Fey and Ramsay 2007, Bell and Wolford 2015, 
Slantchev and Tarar 2011).  
 
Graph 2: Probability of Fighting Between Militant Groups Pre-Intervention 
 
However, this assumption is a reasonable simplification for the purposes of this model, as 
strong governments and weak rebel groups may engage in comparatively low levels of fighting 
when the smaller group does not pose as significant a threat to the stronger one. For example, the 
Uppsala Battle-Related Deaths Dataset contains 57 intrastate conflict dyads between 
governments and rebel groups for the year 2018 (Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019). Of 
these conflicts, only 12 experienced more than 400 battle-related deaths. The Patani insurgency 
against the government of Thailand resulted in only approximately 36 deaths (Pettersson, 
Högbladh, and Öberg 2019). Conflict between the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
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Rwanda (FDLR) and the Rwandan government resulted in 25 deaths. Battles between the 
government of Colombia and both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
the National Liberation Army (ELN) resulted in a total of approximately 142 deaths. Finally, 
conflict between Pakistan and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) resulted in about 147 deaths 
(Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019). These governments have well-funded militaries and 
exercise almost universal control over their countries’ security. By contrast, the rebel groups are 
fairly weak or have dwindled from previously larger numbers, and rather than controlling 
territory most of them seek refuge in neighboring destabilized countries. Using battle-related 
deaths as a proxy for levels of fighting, it appears that high disproportion between the strength of 
governments and rebels correlates with less fighting. 
Correspondingly, higher levels of fighting are associated with countries which have 
comparatively weaker government militaries, where rebel groups control territory or receive 
substantial external support. The presence of “ungoverned spaces” may indicate government 
weakness and that rebel groups could pose a greater threat, leading to an increased probability of 
fighting. For example, Mali with approximately 517 battle-related deaths in 2018 between the 
government and rebels, and Somalia with 2,207 deaths are examples of cases where significant 
amounts of state territory are commonly considered “ungoverned space” (Lloyd 2016, Menkhaus 
2016). In another example, despite the strength of the Nigerian military in the southern part of 
the country, separatists and insurgents in the northern part of the country enjoy relative 
autonomy and large areas are virtually inaccessible to the Nigerian government. The Uppsala 
dataset approximates 1,171 battle-related deaths between Nigeria and both Boko Haram and 
Islamic State militants (Pettersson, Högbladh, and Öberg 2019). Civil wars in Yemen, Syria, and 
Afghanistan resulted in 4523, 7240, and 25,679 battle-related deaths respectively. In those 
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countries, rebels and insurgents also control large amounts of territory, with significant backing 
from foreign interveners challenging the power and capabilities of already-weak incumbent 
governments. With interveners also providing support on the side of the governments, the more 
balanced playing field correlates with higher levels of fighting. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
make this simplification in the computational model.   
One factor unrepresented in the model is the possibility for militant groups to form 
alliances. Groups commonly choose to cooperate during conflict, particularly if their interests or 
ideologies overlap. Again, in the case of Nigeria in 2018, the two groups Boko Haram and 
Islamic State formed an alliance with one another against the Nigerian government (Blanchard 
and Cavigelli 2018). Given this strategic alignment, it is highly unlikely that the two groups 
engaged in fighting against one another, regardless of their relative strengths. The model does 
not contradict this reality; rather, each militant group represents one “side” or collective 
movement in the conflict. One militant group can be used to represent multiple factions that 
cooperate on the same side. If Nigeria were the country being represented in the hypothetical 
simulation, then Nigeria’s government would represent one militant, and Boko Haram and 
Islamic State would collectively represent another. Unfortunately, this removes any ability to 
account for the possibility of militants changing sides dynamically throughout the conflict. 
Nonetheless, this simplification is necessary at this stage of computational development.  
Returning to the hypothetical modeling scenario, no one group overwhelms any of the 
others strongly enough to suppress fighting. The steady increase in strength of the extremist 
group from its original small size has now resulted in a high likelihood of fighting between it and 
the rebel group. By contrast, the likelihood of fighting between the government and either the 
rebels or the extremists reaches a lower equilibrium level of about 75%, as the government is 
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significantly weaker than the other two groups and is therefore less likely to have the capacity to 
engage them in combat. Or, it may have given up on fighting to some extent.  
 
Simulation of Intervention Tools 
Having established the conflict setting and initial conditions, I introduce interventions as certain 
parameter changes in the model. The exact changes implemented are given below in Figure 17. 
The values of these changes are selected somewhat arbitrarily, based on rough estimates of the 
capabilities of an intervention. For example, I assume that by holding negotiations between 
militant groups, the intervener could reduce the likelihood of fighting between militants 1 & 2 
from 70% to 20%. This is based on the assumption that an intervention might lead to an added or 
subtracted change in probabilities of about 50%. These values may range from any percentage 
from 0% to 100%. In another example, I specify values for added or subtracted strength or 
external income from about 500 to 2000. This is based on proportionality with the initial 
conditions of the simulations; the militants begin with strengths and incomes ranging from 0 to 
2000, varying in increments of about 500. Therefore, proportionate shifts due to intervention also 
occur with values ranging from 0 to 2000, varying in increments of about 500. These values may 
be adjusted in future experimentation with the model as desired by the researcher, and I also 
discuss the weaknesses in interpretation of the results based on these arbitrary parameter 






Figure 17: Parameter Changes Implemented for Each Intervention Tool 
Description Parameter Change 
1. Negotiating disputes between communities reset all grievances to equal zero 
2. Negotiating agreements between militant groups reduce probability of fighting by 50% 
3. Waging information campaigns against ideology reset all affiliations with opposed militant groups 
to zero 
4. Providing governance benefits for militants to pass 
    on 
increase probability of militant benefit provision 
by 50%  
5. Increasing the wealth of civilians increase wealth of all low income civilians to 
medium income 
6. Providing in-kind benefits to community leaders reset all affiliations with opposed militant groups 
to zero 
7. Providing in-kind benefits to militants to pass on add affiliations to supported militant groups 
8. Providing civilians with conditional benefits reduce probability of civilian choosing to 
support opposed militant groups by 150% 
9. Supporting militants income add 1500 external income to supported militant 
groups 
10. Cutting off resources to militants subtract 1000 external income from opposed 
militant groups 
11. Attacking militant subtract 1000 strength from opposed militant 
groups 
12. Punishing support remove civilian support for opposed militant 
groups with 50% probability 
13. Weapons removal set weapons availability equal to FALSE 
14. Providing military training & assistance add 10 to the amount given in civilian support to 
the supported militant group 
15. Protection from punishment reduce probability of punishment by opposed 
militant groups by 50% 
  
I implement changes to model parameters as one-time events, but maintain those changes such 
that at no point are they ever “removed” again from the model. This represents a long-term 
implementation of that tool. I test each tool individually, followed by simulations of the 
combined strategies. Performing this comparison in sequence, from the least forceful tools to 
most forceful tools, and from Strategies 1 to 5, allows for gradual and logical adjustments to the 
level of attention to civilian grievances. I then repeat these simulations at a level of reduced 
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efficiency, and then for a reduced duration in which I remove the effects of the tool from the 
model.  
My primary outcome variables of interest are the strengths of each militant group, the 
probability of fighting between each group, and the numbers of civilians who defend themselves. 
I also observe changes in community support for each group and the notoriety of each group. In 
order to measure the effect of the intervention on these outcomes, I take an Interrupted Time 
Series (ITS) approach, comparing the average values following the intervention to those 
beforehand. I first capture the steady state condition of these variables as an average of results 
from rounds 156 to 182. The intervention is implemented afterwards at round 182. After 
allowing for another 26 rounds to reach a second steady state, I then measure the second steady 
state condition as an average of results from rounds 208 to 234.  
For various reasons, the effects of intervention tools may not be fully felt on the ground 
during a conflict; they may only have a partial effect, or no effect at all. I will specifically model 
this as weaknesses in the implementation of the above tools, in order to observe whether this tool 
“inefficiency” leads to other side effects or outcomes. I define a reduced level of efficiency of 
half of the full intervention implementation, and then simulate each intervention strategy at this 
new 50% level. A description of each of the reduced efficiency implementations is given in 
Figure 18. I then analyze whether any of the interventions still have the same relative effects on 
violence outcomes, or if any strategies have more or less of an impact given an expected 
reduction in policy efficiency.   
 For example, it may be difficult for an intervener to ensure that militant groups abide by 
agreed-upon negotiation terms. This may be due to a principle-agent problem in which the 
intervener cannot fully observe or enforce group behavior. Therefore, the grievances and 
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affiliations matrices may not change despite the use of diplomatic tools. It may also be very 
difficult to sway public opinion through public diplomacy efforts, again leading to no changes in 
the affiliations matrix. In the case of economic assistance provision, giving aid to civilians may 
actually undermine local economies, making citizens more dependent on foreign sources of 
income and lowering civilian income levels from High to Medium and Medium to Low. 
 
Figure 18: Parameter Changes Implemented for Each Intervention Tool at 50% Reduced Efficiency 
Description Parameter change 
1. Negotiating disputes between communities reset all grievances to equal zero during half of 
the simulations 
2. Negotiating agreements between militant groups reduce probability of fighting by 25% 
3. Waging information campaigns against ideology reset all affiliations with opposed militant groups 
to zero during half of the simulations 
4. Providing governance benefits for militants to pass 
    on 
increase probability of militant benefit provision 
by 25%  
5. Increasing the wealth of civilians increase wealth of half of all low income 
civilians to medium income 
6. Providing in-kind benefits to community leaders reset all affiliations with opposed militant groups 
to zero during half of the simulations 
7. Providing in-kind benefits to militants to pass on add affiliations to supported militant groups 
during half of the simulations 
8. Providing civilians with conditional benefits reduce probability of civilian choosing to 
support opposed militant groups by 25% 
9. Supporting militants income add 750 external income to supported militant 
groups 
10. Cutting off resources to militants subtract 500 external income from opposed 
militant groups 
11. Attacking militant subtract 500 strength from opposed militant 
groups 
12. Punishing support remove civilian support for opposed militant 
groups with 25% probability 
13. Weapons removal set weapons availability equal to FALSE during 
half of the simulations 
14. Providing military training & assistance add 5 to the amount given in civilian support to 
the supported militant group 
15. Protection from punishment reduce probability of punishment by opposed 
militant groups by 25% 
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Other tools may only result in changes in behavior for some proportion of civilians or 
their interactions with militants. In order to simulate this inefficiency, I select a reduced 
proportion of changes to occur, effectively setting a percentage efficiency of tool 
implementation. For example, 50% percent of militants or civilians may not change their 
behavior despite conditionality provisions demanded by the intervener in return for economic 
assistance. In this proportion of cases, I will not model any adjustment to the rules of behavior. 
Similarly, military force may only partially erode a militant’s strength, or protection of civilians 
from punishment by militants may still result in some punishment.  
 The effect of a strategy on violence outcomes may also change when used only for a 
short, finite period. This is a more likely approach to be taken by an intervener like the United 
States, which has historically been averse to sustaining long-term engagements (often criticized 
as occupations) in foreign countries. I repeat the same simulations but represent the interventions 
as a finite number of rounds over which the tool or effect is introduced and then removed again, 
rather than sustained indefinitely as in the first set of simulations. For example, an intervener 
could engage in a short bombing campaign against a militant group to send a message, or make a 
series of emergency aid deliveries to a civilian community. I represent this intervention as an 
adjustment to model parameters from rounds 182 to 234, and subsequent rounds will proceed 
with the adjustment removed. In this case I still take the average of outcome values at an initial 
steady state from rounds 156 to 182, but then I compare them to an average after the intervention 





3.4 Simulation Results 
Simulation Results Tables 
Eight simulation results tables display the results of the intervention testing. Table 15 is shown 
below while the remaining Tables 16-23 can be found in Appendix A. Fifteen simulations were 
run to test each of the fifteen intervention tools in the hypothetical conflict environment, 
followed by five simulations testing each of the combined strategies. Figure 19 is a key for 
identifying each tool based on the reference number used in the tables.  
Figure 19: Reference Key for Numbering Intervention Tools 
# Description 
1 Negotiating disputes between communities 
2 Negotiating agreements between militant groups 
3 Waging information campaigns against ideology 
4 Providing governance benefits for militants to pass on 
5 Increasing the wealth of civilians 
6 Providing in-kind benefits to community leaders 
7 Providing in-kind benefits to militants to pass on 
8 Providing civilians with conditional benefits 
9 Supporting militants income 
10 Cutting off resources to militants 
11 Attacking militant 
12 Punishing support 
13 Weapons removal 
14 Providing military training & assistance 
15 Protection from punishment 
Strategy 1 Completely non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances 
Strategy 2 Primarily non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances 
Strategy 3 Moderately forceful, limited addressing of civilian grievances 
Strategy 4 Completely forceful, no addressing of civilian grievances 
Strategy 5 Combined forceful and non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances 
 
The outcome variables of interest, i.e. the strengths of each militant group, their probability of 
fighting, and the instances of civilian defending are shown, along with other variables of interest 
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to include notoriety of the militants and community support for each group. Each table provides 
two columns for each intervention numbers 1-15 and strategies numbers 1-5. The first column is 
the average values at steady state prior to the intervention, and the second column provides the 
average values at steady state following the intervention.   
 
Table 15: Change in Outcome Variables Resulting from Intervention Tools 1 - 3 
 
Based on the results tables, Figures 20-31 provide an overall summary of the outcomes of each 
intervention tool and strategy. Figures 20-23 show their effects at full implementation, Figures 
24-27 show their effects at 50% efficiency, and Figures 28-31 demonstrate finite duration. The 
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percent strength value indicates how much higher or lower militant 1, or the government, is than 
the next highest militant. If the value is positive, then the government is strongest by the given 
percentage. If the value is negative, then the government is weaker than the stronger of the rebel 
group or extremist organization by the given percentage.  
 In the figures providing strength outcomes (Figures 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30), the Success 
column indicates whether or not the strength of the government in relation to the other groups 
improves following the intervention as compared to prior to the intervention. If “successful,” the 
intervention succeeds in raising the government to become the strongest of the three militant 
groups. If positive, then the intervention improves the government’s position, but it is not the 
strongest group. Prior to the intervention, the government is approximately 34% weaker than the 
rebel group. Therefore, in order to show positive improvement, the post-intervention strength 
percentage must be greater than -34%. If negative, then the intervention worsens the 
government’s position to a value less than -34%. The tools that lead to positive changes in 
government strength are highlighted in the applicable figures for clarity.  
In the figures providing fighting and defending outcomes (Figures 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31), 
the Fighting column denotes by what percentage the likelihood of fighting declines from pre-
intervention to afterwards. The more negative the value, the greater the overall decrease in 
fighting between all three groups. Similarly, the Defense column provides the change in 
incidence of civilian defending prior to the intervention to afterwards. A more negative value 
shows a greater decline in communities arming themselves against any of the three militants. A 





Full Implementation Tests 
 
Figure 20 below shows the changes in government strength resulting from full implementation 
of each of the fifteen intervention tools individually. 
Figure 20: Effects of Intervention Tools on Militant 1 Strength at Full Implementation 
# Tool Description % Strength ∆ Success 
1 Negotiating disputes between communities -66% negative 
2 Negotiating agreements between militant groups -34% neutral 
3 Waging information campaigns against ideology -41% negative 
4 Providing governance benefits for militants to pass on -35% neutral 
5 Increasing the wealth of civilians -32% neutral 
6 Providing in-kind benefits to community leaders -41% negative 
7 Providing in-kind benefits to militants to pass on -34% neutral 
8 Providing civilians with conditional benefits 175% successful 
9 Supporting militants income -3% positive 
10 Cutting off resources to militants -26% positive 
11 Attacking militants -25% positive 
12 Punishing support -34% neutral 
13 Weapons removal -41% negative 
14 Providing military training & assistance -5% positive 
15 Protection from punishment -41% negative 
 
Only one tool results in the successful achievement of government superiority: Tool 8, or 
providing civilians with conditional benefits in order to persuade them to cease support of the 
other two militants. In the model, this tool reduces the probability that civilians provide support 
to a particular militant by 50%. It is this reduction in probability that produces the observed 
effect. Tools 9 and 14 also result in a positive change in the government’s relative strength, 
however the government remains weaker than the rebel group following the model 
implementation of these three tools. Tools 10 and 11 lead to a positive change, but the 
government remains weaker than both the rebels and the extremist organization. These four tools 
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do not address local roots of conflict; instead, they directly target the strength and funding of 
fighting groups.  
  
Graph 3: Strength of Militant Groups Pre and Post Tool 8 Implementation  
 
In addition, based on the results shown in Tables 17-19, after the use of Tools 9, 10 and 
11 the strongest militant group becomes the extremist organization.  The remaining tools have 
either neutral effects or worsen the position of the government. The most harmful tool is Tool 1, 
or negotiating disputes between communities, which also results in the extremists becoming the 
strongest militant. 
These results assume that the extremist organization is invisible, and therefore cutting off 
its funds or attacking it militarily are impossible. However, due to advances in intelligence 
gathering and improvements in the effectiveness of targeting terror networks, in most modern 
real-world cases such organizations may be more likely to be visible and attackable. Therefore, I 
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rerun simulations of Tool 10, or cutting off resources to militants, and Tool 11, or attacking 
militants, with the extremist organization militant 3 as a target of these tools. The results, 
compared side-by-side with the results from the simulations in which the extremists are invisible, 
are shown in Table 23 in Appendix A. When resources are also cut off from a visible militant 3, 
the rebel group militant 2 becomes relatively stronger than the extremists and the probability of 
extremists punishing civilians decreases. There is a slight reduction in overall fighting and 
civilian defense, but generally the results are similar. The government remains the weakest of the 
three groups, with a relative strength of -30% less than the rebels that remains a positive 
improvement from without an intervention, but only slightly more so.  When the extremists are 
also attacked alongside the rebels, their strength is less than when they are not. However, 
calculating the percentage difference shows that the government is now -19% weaker than the 
extremist group, which is a significant positive improvement from -31% when they are not 
visible. Fighting and defense remain similar.  
According to Figure 21, all but two tools result in less fighting. Implementation of Tool 8 
results in the greatest average reduction in the probability of fighting between each of the three 
militant groups. Tool 1 results in the second largest fighting reduction. However, both are also 
accompanied by very large increases in civilian defending. Tool 2, or negotiating agreements 
between militant groups, results in a strong 24% reduction in fighting as well as a 31% reduction 
in civilian defending. This strong fighting reduction is expected as the model implements Tool 2 
as a direct reduction in fighting probability. The greatest reductions in civilian defending come 




Figure 21: Effects of Intervention Tools on Fighting at Full Implementation 
# Tool Description Fighting Defense 
1 Negotiating disputes between communities -39% +599% 
2 Negotiating agreements between militant groups -26% -31% 
3 Waging information campaigns against ideology -11% -99% 
4 Providing governance benefits for militants to pass on -4% -29% 
5 Increasing the wealth of civilians 0% +9% 
6 Providing in-kind benefits to community leaders -9% -99% 
7 Providing in-kind benefits to militants to pass on -1% -100% 
8 Providing civilians with conditional benefits -46% +141% 
9 Supporting militants income -11% -3% 
10 Cutting off resources to militants -1% -26% 
11 Attacking militants -6% -30% 
12 Punishing support -2% -19% 
13 Weapons removal -9% -100% 
14 Providing military training & assistance +9% -10% 
15 Protection from punishment -10% -99% 
 
Graph 4: Fighting Between Militant Groups Pre and Post Tool 8 Implementation 
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Figure 22: Effects of Intervention Strategies on Militant 1 Strength at Full Implementation 
  # Strategy Description % Strength ∆ Success 
Strategy 1 Completely non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances +133% successful 
Strategy 2 Primarily non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances +406% successful 
Strategy 3 Moderately forceful, limited addressing of civilian grievances +32% successful 
Strategy 4 Completely forceful, no addressing of civilian grievances +12% successful 
Strategy 5 Combined forceful and non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances +232% successful 
 
Figure 22 shows the results of fully implementing each of the five intervention strategies. In 
every case, the combination of parameter changes implemented in the model succeeds in 
supporting the government to become the strongest militant group. Strategy 2, primarily non-
forceful, and Strategy 5, combined forceful and non-forceful, are the most successful. According 
to Figure 23 below, all strategies also result in a reduction in fighting except for Strategy 4, the 
completely forceful strategy, which causes an average 14% increase in fighting. The greatest 
reduction comes from parameter changes implemented in the combined Strategy 5, with a -69% 
decrease in fighting probability, followed by Strategy 2 with -61%. However, Strategy 5 results 
in a 100% decrease in civilian defending, while Strategy 2 leads to a 990% increase. Strategy 1, 
while providing a sizeable decrease in overall fighting at -21%, also results in a dramatic 1139% 
increase in civilian defending.  
 
Figure 23: Effects of Intervention Strategies on Fighting at Full Implementation 
# Strategy Description Fighting Defense 
Strategy 1 Completely non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -21% +1139% 
Strategy 2 Primarily non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -61% +990% 
Strategy 3 Moderately forceful, limited addressing of civilian grievances -48% -100% 
Strategy 4 Completely forceful, no addressing of civilian grievances +14% -100% 
Strategy 5 Combined forceful and non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -69% -100% 
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Graph 5: Strength of Militant Groups Pre and Post Strategy 2 Implementation 
 











In the special case shown in Table 23 in Appendix A, in which the extremists are visible, only 
Strategy 1 or the least forceful strategy causes the extremist organization to become the weakest 
group. All the other strategies cause the extremists to become stronger than the rebel group. 
 
Reduced Efficiency Tests 
Based on Figure 24 below, a 50% reduction in tool efficiency causes a general overall reduction 
in the effects of those tools, and none of the tools are successful any longer at ensuring that the 
government has the greatest strength. Model implementation of Tools 9 and 14 no longer makes 
the government the second-strongest militant; instead in these simulations it remains the 
weakest. However, the efficiency reduction results in a greater number of tools with a positive 
effect. Tools 9-11 and 14 continue to have a positive effect. Tool 8 still leads to the government 
being stronger than the rebel group, but now it is much weaker than the extremist organization, 
making it the tool with the most negative effect at reduced efficiency. The remaining tools still 
leave the government weaker than both the rebels and the extremists. However, Tools 1, 3, and 
13 have less of a worsening effect when the tools are not as effective. 
The dampened effect of tools implemented at reduced efficiency is also evident in Figure 
25, which shows the fighting results.  Tools 8 and 1 remain the strongest single interventions for 
reducing fighting, with Tool 8 slightly less reductive at 41% where it was 44% at full 
implementation. Tool 1 creates a similar reduction as it did previously, with about -38% less 
fighting where it resulted in -41% previously. They both still have large positive effects on 
civilian defending at +202% and +153%, respectively. At reduced efficiency, Tool 14 still has a 
positive effect on fighting, but this increase is reduced from 8% to 6%.  
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Figure 24: Effects of Intervention Tools on Militant 1 Strength at 50% Efficiency 
# Tool Description % Strength ∆ Success 
1 Negotiating disputes between communities -45%  negative 
2 Negotiating agreements between militant groups -37% negative 
3 Waging information campaigns against ideology -39% negative 
4 Providing governance benefits for militants to pass on -33% neutral 
5 Increasing the wealth of civilians -34% neutral 
6 Providing in-kind benefits to community leaders -41% negative 
7 Providing in-kind benefits to militants to pass on -34% neutral 
8 Providing civilians with conditional benefits -56% negative 
9 Supporting militants income -23% positive 
10 Cutting off resources to militants -30% positive 
11 Attacking militants -26% positive 
12 Punishing support -37% negative 
13 Weapons removal -39% negative 
14 Providing military training & assistance -21% positive 
15 Protection from punishment -41% negative 
 
Figure 25: Effects of Intervention Tools on Fighting at 50% Efficiency 
# Tool Description Fighting Defense 
1 Negotiating disputes between communities -22% +153% 
2 Negotiating agreements between militant groups -15% -26% 
3 Waging information campaigns against ideology -5% -59% 
4 Providing governance benefits for militants to pass on -2% -16% 
5 Increasing the wealth of civilians -1% -3% 
6 Providing in-kind benefits to community leaders -5% -99% 
7 Providing in-kind benefits to militants to pass on -3% -62% 
8 Providing civilians with conditional benefits -38% +202% 
9 Supporting militants income -2% -32% 
10 Cutting off resources to militants 0% -20% 
11 Attacking militants -4% -33% 
12 Punishing support 0% -1% 
13 Weapons removal -6% -72% 
14 Providing military training & assistance +6% -23% 




Figure 26: Effects of Intervention Strategies on Militant 1 Strength at 50% Efficiency 
# Strategy Description % Strength ∆ Success 
Strategy 1 Completely non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -70% positive 
Strategy 2 Primarily non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -53% positive 
Strategy 3 Moderately forceful, limited addressing of civilian grievances -46% positive 
Strategy 4 Completely forceful, no addressing of civilian grievances -11% positive 
Strategy 5 Combined forceful and non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -7% positive 
 
As shown in Figure 26, at 50% efficiency none of the strategies are successful at boosting the 
government to be the strongest militant any longer. Their parameter adjustments implemented in 
the model all result in the government being stronger than the rebels but weaker than the 
extremist organization, which is the strongest militant in all five simulations, except following 
Strategy 4 after which the government is also weaker than the rebel group. All five strategies still 
have an overall positive effect on the government’s relative strength from prior to the 
intervention. Strategy 5 now has the greatest positive effect, followed by moderately forceful 
Strategy 3. The least forceful Strategies 1 and 2 are now less positive. Figure 27 shows that 
Strategy 5 still leads to a similar reduction in overall fighting as it did at full efficiency, and still 
causes the greatest decrease. Strategy 2 still causes the second greatest at -61%, which is the 
same effect than it had at full efficiency. Strategy 1 still causes a large increase in civilian 
defending, although not as dramatic as at full efficiency. Strategy 4 also still leads to a similar 







Figure 27: Effects of Intervention Strategies on Fighting at 50% Efficiency 
# Strategy Description Fighting Defense 
Strategy 1 Completely non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -41% +272% 
Strategy 2 Primarily non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -61% +147% 
Strategy 3 Moderately forceful, limited addressing of civilian grievances -44% +82% 
Strategy 4 Completely forceful, no addressing of civilian grievances +16% -96% 
Strategy 5 Combined forceful and non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -67% +15% 
 
Examining the changes in outcomes that result from reduced intervention efficiency raises the 
question of at what percent efficiency tools become ineffective. This is particularly important in 
that the values chosen to simulate different levels of efficiency are completely dependent on the 
intervention’s context and the choices of the simulator’s user. In the simulations above, the 
efficiency was selected to be 50%. It is therefore useful to examine a gradient in these values to 
observe the impact of varying efficiency percentages. Therefore, I run additional simulations for 
Tool 8, the only tool to be individually successful at achieving government primacy in strength 
over the other two groups at 100% efficiency. I run repeated simulations in which I gradually 
reduce efficiency of Tool 8 in 10% increments. In the model, this equates to incremental 5% 
decreases in the percentage value of probability that is subtracted from a civilian’s likelihood to 
support militant groups 2 and 3 following extraction and benefit interactions. The results of these 
incremental decreases are shown in Table 24 below. 
The relative strength of the government over the other two groups begins to decrease as 
the efficiency decreases from 100%. 80% efficiency is the last level of efficiency in which Tool 
8 is successful by this measure; at 70% efficiency there is still a positive improvement in strength 
but the extremist group is now stronger. Following declines from 60% to 30% efficiency, the 
relative strength of the government is worsened in relation to the rebels and extremists, where -
34% would represent approximately no change from pre-intervention. Thus, at 20% and 10%, 
 125 
the relative strength begins to improve slightly to levels the same or slightly better than no 
intervention at all.  
 
Table 24: Incremental Reduced Efficiency of Tool 8- Providing Civilians with Conditional 
Benefits 
% Efficiency strength m1 fighting defending 
100% +175% -46% +599% 
90% +170% -44% +442% 
80% +87% -34% +488% 
70% -17% -32% +446% 
60% -44% -32% +185% 
50% -56% -38% +202% 
40% -42% -25% +87% 
30% -37% -22% +57% 
20% -32% -9% +25% 
10% -27% -1% -7% 
 
Overall, fighting and defending decrease steadily as efficiency decreases. While this degrades the 
efficiency of Tool 8 for reducing fighting, it is positive for the efficiency of Tool 8 for reducing 
civilian militarization. There is a substantial drop in the increase in defending from +446% at 
70% efficiency to +185% at 60% efficiency. However, only at 10% efficiency does Tool 8 lead 
to a decrease in civilian militarization.    
 
Finite Duration Tests 
Finally, in the case of finite duration, again only Tool 8 successfully boosts the government to 
become the strongest militant as shown in Figure 28. Tool 2 and Tool 11 are the only other 
single interventions with a positive effect on relative strength. Tools 4 and 5 have neutral effects, 
and all the other tools worsen the government’s relative position after the interventions have 
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ceased.  Tool 1 still has the most negative effect, but the reduction is less than that at full and 
50% efficiency and this distinction is also held by Tools 3, 6, 7, 13, and 15. This effect is 
observed implementing parameter changes for tools that are both forceful and non-forceful, and 
address both local grievances and broader conflict causes.  
Figure 28: Effects of Intervention Tools on Militant 1 Strength at Finite Duration 
# Tool Description % Strength ∆ Success 
1 Negotiating disputes between communities -41% negative 
2 Negotiating agreements between militant groups -30% positive 
3 Waging information campaigns against ideology -41% negative 
4 Providing governance benefits for militants to pass on -35% neutral 
5 Increasing the wealth of civilians -35% neutral 
6 Providing in-kind benefits to community leaders -41% negative 
7 Providing in-kind benefits to militants to pass on -41% negative 
8 Providing civilians with conditional benefits +8% successful 
9 Supporting militants income -37% negative 
10 Cutting off resources to militants -36% negative 
11 Attacking militants -27% positive 
12 Punishing support -38% negative 
13 Weapons removal -41% negative 
14 Providing military training & assistance -37% negative 
15 Protection from punishment -41%   negative 
 
According to Figure 29, all of the tools reduce fighting at the end of the finite intervention 
duration. The largest reduction still stems from Tool 8 at -23%, providing civilians with benefits 
conditional on ceasing support of rebels and extremists. Tool 8 is also now the only one that 
results in an increase in civilian defending, at +226%. All other reductions in fighting are 
significant but relatively low, falling at or below -12%. Six of the tools do result in an almost 
complete drop in civilian defending. Four of the six address local grievances.  
Based on the results shown in Figure 30, none of the strategies employed at a short finite 
duration are successful at making the government the strongest militant. Only one, Strategy 5, 
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still has a positive effect, but the government remains the weakest of all three groups. Strategy 4 
has a neutral effect, and the other three worsen the government’s relative strength. Both 
Strategies 4, and 5, while having the best outcomes for relative strength, result in the extremist 
group being the strongest militant.  
 
Figure 29: Effects of Intervention Tools on Fighting at Finite Duration 
# Tool Description Fighting Defense 
1 Negotiating disputes between communities -7% -99% 
2 Negotiating agreements between militant groups -5% -45% 
3 Waging information campaigns against ideology -12% -99% 
4 Providing governance benefits for militants to pass on -6% -41% 
5 Increasing the wealth of civilians -3% -27% 
6 Providing in-kind benefits to community leaders -12% -99% 
7 Providing in-kind benefits to militants to pass on -11% -99% 
8 Providing civilians with conditional benefits -23% +226% 
9 Supporting militants income -6% -50% 
10 Cutting off resources to militants -4% -39% 
11 Attacking militants -4% -45% 
12 Punishing support -4% -45% 
13 Weapons removal -10% -99% 
14 Providing military training & assistance -4% -40% 
15 Protection from punishment -9% -99% 
 
Figure 30: Effects of Intervention Strategies on Militant 1 Strength at Finite Duration 
# Strategy Description Strength Success 
Strategy 1 Completely non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -40% negative 
Strategy 2 Primarily non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -40% negative 
Strategy 3 Moderately forceful, limited addressing of civilian grievances -41% negative 
Strategy 4 Completely forceful, no addressing of civilian grievances -33% neutral 
Strategy 5 Combined forceful and non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -23% positive 
 
Figure 31 shows that all of the strategies still reduce overall fighting, although now to a much 
lesser extent. Strategy 3, the moderately forceful approach, leads to the greatest reduction, 
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although only by a small margin. The first four strategies dramatically reduce civilian defending. 
Modeling the comprehensive Strategy 5 now leads to the smallest reduction in both fighting and 
civilian defense.  
 
Figure 31: Effects of Intervention Strategies on Fighting at Finite Duration 
# Strategy Description Fighting Defense 
Strategy 1 Completely non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -9% -82% 
Strategy 2 Primarily non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -9% -93% 
Strategy 3 Moderately forceful, limited addressing of civilian grievances -11% -99% 
Strategy 4 Completely forceful, no addressing of civilian grievances -6% -99% 
Strategy 5 Combined forceful and non-forceful, addressing civilian grievances -4% -1% 
 
3.5  Discussion  
Analysis of Individual Tools 
At full implementation of the parameter changes associated with each of the intervention tools, 
Tool 8 providing civilians with conditional benefits is the only tool that successfully strengthens 
the government to the point of being stronger than either the rebel group or the extremist 
organization. This tool reduces the likelihood of civilians choosing to support another militant in 
the model. It also leads to the greatest average reduction in the probability of fighting between 
militants, although it coincidingly leads to the highest increase in community militarization, or 
incidence of civilians defending themselves against any of the militant groups. This could be 
because an increase in defending can also lead to a lessening of the strength of groups, as 
civilians are able to defend themselves against punishment and are not pressured to switch sides 
and provide support. This tool is comparable to a “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency strategy 
in which civilians are offered goods and services, often in the form of development or 
reconstruction projects, with the hope that they will choose not to support an opposed militant 
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actor. This approach was introduced by the U.S. Department of Defense on a widespread scale in 
Afghanistan starting around 2007 in order to counter the influence of the Taliban (Egnell 2010, 
SIGAR 2018b).  
 Four other tools result in a positive effect on the relative strength of the government, all 
of which are economic or military approaches that address fighting at the top level of the militant 
groups, but do not address underlying grievances or interactions with civilians. Supporting 
militants’ income and providing military training and assistance have the greatest positive effects 
on strengthening the government, but they still leave the government weaker than either the 
extremist group or the rebel group, respectively. Cutting off resources to militants and attacking 
militants directly are also positive for strengthening the government, but the extremist 
organization still emerges as the strongest actor in the environment. This unexpected result may 
occur because these tools are not enough to erode the strength that the rebels and the extremists 
gain from civilian support, and the combination of shifting strengths may lead to even more 
civilians supporting the extremists. This may be a disincentive to use either of these approaches, 
despite the fact that they lead to small decreases in fighting and moderate reductions in civilians 
defending. Even when extremists are made more visible in the environment and are vulnerable 
themselves to attacks, this does little to shift the balance of strength in the government’s favor. 
Instead, it shifts the balance of civilian support in the extremists’ favor. This effect does not 
consider any changes in perception that may occur due to the use of the above tools, and civilians 
may react negatively to the use of violence or military support by a foreign intervener. Therefore, 
in a real case, not only may civilian support shift towards the extremist organization in response 
to shifting alliances as demonstrated by the model, but this problem may be further exacerbated 
by public animosity.  
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All of the above five tools are commonly used in counterinsurgencies, and none of them 
directly tackle the underlying grievances of the civilian population. The findings from the model 
could support why these particular tools are used so frequently: because they yield positive 
results for strengthening the government. However, their effects on curbing fighting and civilian 
defending are mixed due to unexpected and unpredictable shifts in civilian support. Most of them 
reduce fighting to some degree, but not enough to bring violence significantly closer to a full 
halt. Further, the “hearts and minds” approach may substantially increase the amount of civilian 
defending, which can destabilize local communities. This may be why, in these settings in which 
the use of these tools is the predominant strategy, the government may manage to cling to power 
but a significant level of fighting persists.  
Apart from providing civilians with conditional benefits, which leads to the greatest 
reduction in the probability of fighting, two diplomatic tools have the next greatest effects on 
reducing fighting: negotiating disputes between communities and negotiating agreements 
between militant groups. These findings seem intuitive as they reduce the underlying motivations 
to fight, both at the community and the militant level. With respect to the model’s behavior and 
parameters, negotiating agreements between militant groups is clearly expected to reduce 
fighting as it is defined by a direct reduction in the fighting probability in the model. However, 
negotiating between communities also leads to the greatest worsening of the relative strength of 
the government, and is therefore unlikely to be an optimal intervention choice. It also leads to an 
extremely large increase in civilians defending themselves. Resolving grievances also makes all 
the groups weaker, especially the government and the rebels who are not engaging in terrorizing 
intimidation tactics.  
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Resolving grievances may result in a drop in government support because of the 
uncertainty of grievance and affiliation relationships in a realistic conflict environment. The 
results from Chapter 2 indicate that the effects of removing grievances vary dramatically 
depending on the configuration of affiliations. In a purely non-polarized environment, removing 
grievances may weaken militant groups because civilians have no incentive to provide any 
particular militant with consistent support. By contrast, in a purely polarized environment where 
all civilian communities are aligned with different groups, removing grievances may strengthen 
militants, as civilians no longer have an incentive to switch sides. However, this relationship 
becomes much more unclear in a moderately-polarized environment. In the hypothetical example 
modeled in this chapter, the environment is not sufficiently polarized to for there to be consistent 
civilian support for each militant. There are unaffiliated civilian communities who no longer 
support the government and the rebel group when grievances are removed. Meanwhile, the 
extremist uses high levels of “punishment” to further draw support away from these two groups. 
The extremist organization may therefore become the strongest militant, as unaffiliated civilians 
choose to provide it with support instead.  
This example shows that it may be extremely difficult to anticipate the effect that 
removing grievances may have on the conflict environment, especially if the environment is not 
strictly polarized or non-polarized. An intervener should try to identify the alignments of civilian 
communities with militants, and determine which militant would be benefitted the most, before 
deciding whether or not to negotiate local grievances. This ambiguity is consistent with research 
that has examined the effects of ethnic fractionalization and polarization on conflict outcomes, 
finding that any effects are highly context dependent and influenced by other societal issues 
(Esteban and Ray 2011, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002, Fearon 2006). 
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Other tools, at least as they are represented by the parameter changes that they implement 
in this model, backfire in achieving their objectives for strengthening the government and 
reducing violence. While removing weapons from the reach of civilians completely eliminates 
any defending, in this particular hypothetical case it leads to only a small reduction in overall 
fighting probability and worsens the relative strength of the government. When weapons are 
attainable, civilians can protect themselves from punishment by other groups, but without them 
they may be intimidated into switching sides to support other groups. This finding is supported 
by the results from Chapter 2, which also indicate that civilians with weapons could actually 
assist an intervention by helping them defend themselves against opposed groups. Interveners 
could carefully examine the affiliations of civilian communities and remove weapons only from 
those civilians whose grievances and affiliations turn them against the government. 
Unfortunately, excluding weapons only from specific communities would likely be a challenging 
endeavor, and civilians could still choose to switch sides and use their weapons against the 
government later on in the conflict. 
Similarly, Tools 3, 6 and 7 may also undermine intervention efforts if civilians choose to 
support groups that do not align with the intervener’s best interests.  These tools all work in the 
model by changing the affiliations of civilians with militants. They lead to an almost complete 
drop in civilian defending, successfully lowering the militarization of the conflict environment. 
However, they appear to have only negative or neutral effects on strengthening the government. 
This suggests that if an intervener attempts to influence a community’s affiliation through such 
efforts as information campaigns and providing strategic humanitarian aid, the community may 
well choose another militant to align itself with based on its grievances. Unfortunately, that 
militant may not be the optimal choice for the intervener.  
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In particular, information campaigns as implemented through Tool 3 result in all 
communities strongly supporting the rebel group and the extremist organization in response to 
the removal of affiliations with either group. This may occur because, as previously explained in 
Chapter 2, affiliations no longer restrict shifting support and civilians may choose groups to 
support based on their grievances. This tool was modeled by simply removing the intervener’s 
“undesired” affiliations. It may be more successful in strengthening the government if 
implemented more “actively,” by convincing civilian communities to re-affiliate themselves only 
with the government. This would more closely resemble the results from Tool 7, providing in-
kind benefits to militants to pass on, in which affiliations with the government are also added, 
resulting in neutral effects on the government’s relative strength. Realistically however, altering 
affiliations may not be a feasible goal in practice. If a community’s affiliation with a group is 
based on deeply held cultural or moral values, or is linked to longstanding historical ties or 
identities, breaking those ties as a foreign intervener may be next to impossible. 
The results from Chapter 2 suggest that increasing the wealth of civilians could increase 
the strength of the militant groups that they support. If an intervener wants to bolster the strength 
of the government, it could initiate business activity in government-controlled areas or provide 
development aid to an affiliated community. Unfortunately, civilians with increased wealth may 
again choose to provide support to alternative groups rather than to the government, undermining 
the goals of the intervention. In the results of the implementation of Tool 5 in the hypothetical 
conflict, increasing the wealth of civilians has only neutral effects on relative strength and 
fighting, with an increase in defending as more civilians become able to afford weapons. Even 
though only the civilians in communities affiliated with the government are provided with more 
wealth, all of the groups become stronger. This is because some members of the affiliated 
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community also support other groups due to shifting support in response to punishment and 
based on the arrangement of grievances. The government may also begin punishing more often 
as it grows stronger, alienating unaffiliated civilians. In a real-world setting, in response to 
favored communities growing richer, other communities could also potentially form resentments 
against the government and increase their opposition.  
Some tools only yield mixed or neutral effects that are worth noting. Punishing support, 
which in practice could come in the form of Special Operations Forces targeting rebel 
supporters, results in negligible improvement in government strength relative to the other groups, 
nor reduction in fighting or community militarization. This is consistent with real world 
observations, although for reasons not accounted for in the model. Targeting rebel supporters 
may undermine a group’s strength, but in the case of Afghanistan starting in 2001 it also 
undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan central government and sparked complaints and 
discontent in local communities (Malkasian 2013). This could spur the reverse effect, of added 
support for the rebel group out of sympathy or revenge.  
 
Determining the Optimal Intervention Strategy 
Discussing the policy implications of implementing each tool individually may be useful in the 
context of an extremely local, isolated setting in which a weak intervention occurs over a wide 
geographic area and only one or two tools create an impact. Otherwise, generally foreign 
interveners do not employ only one of these tools at a time, instead opting for combined 
strategies. The results from the model indicate that this is a beneficial approach, as once 
combined, at full implementation of the corresponding parameter changes in the model, all five 
strategies are successful at placing the government at the highest strength of the three militant 
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groups, with a primarily non-forceful Strategy 2 most successful at +406%. However, the ability 
of the strategies to reduce violence and civilian defense is more limited. Strategy 5, the combined 
strategy that makes use of all tools, leads to the greatest decrease at -69% probability of fighting 
and 100% decrease in civilians defending. Strategy 2 leads to a slightly smaller reduction in 
fighting at -61% and a whopping +990% increase in civilian defending. Given these results, 
Strategy 5 would likely be the best option that not only still strengthens the government 
substantially over its rivals but also significantly reduces fighting and brings civilian defending 
to a halt, significantly decreasing overall militarization.  
Strategy 5 is the most comprehensive, and is therefore unfortunately the most costly 
option. Implementing all of these tools at full efficiency would require very high amounts of 
funding, a massive number of people on the ground, and a large and efficient bureaucracy to 
manage cooperation between multiple efforts and implementing agencies. It may therefore be 
more attractive for an intervener to select the primarily non-forceful and likely less costly 
Strategy 2 instead. Simultaneously, it could work with the government to develop a capable 
justice system that can adjudicate disputes on its own, and maintain control over the now highly 
militarized civilian population. The moderately forceful Strategy 3 that is lighter on addressing 
grievances also requires more tolerance of increased civilian militarization. Interestingly, 
Strategy 3 most similarly matches the approach of the United States government and its NATO 
allies in the 2011 intervention in Libya. While it resulted in the swift, successful installation of a 
new government, that government ultimately failed to maintain control due to the splintering of 
highly militarized local communities that culminated in civil war (Quartararo, Rovenolt, and 
White 2012, Kuperman 2013, Wehrey 2017).  
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It is interesting to note that in the model, even at full implementation the completely 
forceful Strategy 4 leads to the lowest increase in government strength and a slight increase in 
fighting. A forceful approach may be an attractive option to policymakers because of the highly 
visible, quantifiable and tangible actions it takes towards eroding the overall strength and 
capabilities of an enemy militant (Adams and Murray 2014, Schake 2013). However, examining 
local interactions and responses to the intervention reveals that this strategy could have the worst 
effect on violence outcomes if militants maintain the ability to benefit from their partnerships 
with civilian communities. Military options do little to erode the underlying reasons that civilians 
continue to provide support. Even with the complete destruction of a militant group through the 
use of force, the influences such as grievances and affiliations that fueled the strength of the 
group in the first place may still exist. In addition, factors such as civilian retaliation against 
intervention violence are not captured in the model, and these may also result in a negative 
response to military force, further worsening these outcomes. 
The results of modeling individual implementation of Tool 8, providing civilians with 
conditional benefits, are better for reducing fighting and increasing the strength of the 
government than the outcomes for the use of the entire non-forceful Strategy 1. Strategy 1 
includes the use of Tool 8. This begs the question of how much worse Strategy 1 outcomes 
would be without providing benefits, as the combination of other diplomatic tools all must 
significantly erode any gains from using Tool 8. It also raises the possibility that an optimal 
strategy could be created that makes use of the most effective individual tools. I therefore run 
three additional simulations of “custom” strategies designed to test these questions. For 
Simulation 1, I run the model with an intervention of Strategy 1, but removing the 
implementation of Tool 8. In Simulation 2, I run the model with a custom intervention strategy 
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combining Tools 8, 9, 10, 11, and 14, which each yielded the most positive outcomes for 
government strength. To review, these tools are providing civilians with conditional benefits if 
they do not support the rebel or the extremists, supporting the government’s income, cutting off 
resources to rebels, attacking the rebels, and providing military training and assistance to the 
government. Finally, in Simulation 3, because Tool 8 also leads to such a high increase in 
civilian defending, I run the model with the same custom intervention strategy as Simulation 2 
but also adding Tool 13, the removal of weapons. The results are shown in Figure 32 below. 
 
Figure 32: Effects of Alternative Strategies on Militant 1 Strength and Fighting at Full 
Implementation 
 strength % fighting defending 
Simulation 1 -28% -1% -100% 
Simulation 2 +570% -89% +555% 
Simulation 3 +42% -58% -100% 
 
Without Tool 8, at full implementation the completely diplomatic strategy addressing civilian 
grievances has little positive improvement on the relative strength of the government and little to 
no improvement in fighting, although it does completely reduce civilian defending. This strategy 
may keep civilians demilitarized, but does not change the dynamics between militants. 
Therefore, despite the low cost of diplomatic tools, the high risk to the physical safety of staff 
needed in the field to implement them does not appear to be worth the outcome. 
 Simulation 2 shows that assembling a strategy containing only the most effective tools 
leads to the strongest positive results of this study. Simulation 2 leads to a larger strengthening of 
the government relative to other groups and a larger reduction in fighting than any other test yet 
performed. It still results in a large increase in civilian defending, but this change is substantially 
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smaller than the change in defense resulting from Strategy 2. Finally, adding the removal of 
weapons to this successful strategy in Simulation 3 causes strengthening of the government to 
+42% stronger than its next strongest competitor, which is the extremist group. It also leads to a 
sizeable reduction in fighting and a complete reduction in civilian militarization.  
Given the fact that the extremist group in this scenario becomes the next strongest 
competitor, potentially posing a unique threat to security due to its violence against civilians, 
policymakers may instead choose to implement the custom strategy modeled in Simulation 2 and 
risk the militarization of civilians. Due to its substantially large strengthening of the government 
and reduction in fighting, the least risky and most effective choice may be to accept the large 
increase in militarization created by this policy option. It implements tools with clearly visible, 
measurable, and immediate results, largely avoids getting bogged down in interference with 
complex grievances and affiliations that are difficult to understand and to change, and there may 
be popular support for military options. With such a large improvement in the government’s 
strength, the country’s justice system institutions and police force could be developed with the 
intervention’s support, helping to mitigate the potential for localized violence and future 
mobilization against the government.  
 All of the tools and strategies in this study were also tested at a reduced level of 
efficiency, and while Tool 8 providing civilians with conditional benefits still demonstrated 
success at 80% efficiency, all other tools and strategies were only tested at a 50% efficiency. If 
policymakers anticipate this low level of efficiency to occur, only a handful of economic and 
military policy tools to include supporting militant’s income, cutting off resources to other 
militants, attacking other militants and providing the government with military training and 
assistance still have a positive effect on strength, and these all have little positive effect on 
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fighting outcomes or civilian defending. None of these tools individually, nor combined 
successfully lead to the government becoming stronger than the other groups, and only the 
costliest and most involved Strategy 5 comes close. Strategy 5 is also still able to reduce fighting 
significantly, however it now also increases defending slightly. The outcomes of the most 
forceful Strategy 4 at reduced efficiency are similarly mixed, with a small increase in fighting 
but an almost complete decrease in defending. Therefore, anticipating a 50% efficient 
intervention, either a completely involved strategy or one using only forceful tools are the best if 
imperfect options. 
When modeling a finite duration, Strategy 5 remains the best option, as it leads to a small 
positive increase in government strength and it maintains a sizeable decrease in fighting. It also 
leads to only a small increase in civilian defending. The parameter changes implemented in the 
model to represent Strategy 4 completely reduce civilian defending, but increase fighting slightly 
and lead to no change in government strength. All other strategies and tools lead to few notable 
positive changes. Therefore, the model indicates that if there is a chance that the intervention will 
be withdrawn after a short finite duration, Strategy 5 may be better than nothing and Strategy 4 
may result in the least damage. However, if this finite duration is already anticipated then none 
of the strategies or tools may be worth the cost due to their limited benefits. If considering an 
intervention, an intervener should commit to a longer-term duration, at least until the government 
can take over functions to replace what was implemented during involvement. Unfortunately, 
political incentives could push interveners to depart too early. Following the U.S. intervention in 
Somalia in 1991, the U.S. insisted that the United Nations take over governance and state-
building roles after the brief U.S. military-led Operation Restore Hope (Howe 1996). The 
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combination of persisting insecurity and weakness of the Somali government was too much for 
the UN mission to manage on its own, and war continued to escalate after U.S. departure. 
 A last, important observation is that none of the intervention tools or strategies examined 
in this study completely removes the strength of opposed militant groups, nor do they completely 
remove fighting. The optimal outcomes result from the custom Simulation 2 that combines the 
most effective tools and results in a government that is 570% stronger than the rebels, but the 
rebels as well as the extremists still exist and still receive support. While the reduction in fighting 
of -89% is strong, this allows for 11% of the fighting from pre-intervention levels to continue. 
Civilian militarization remains very high, creating conditions for community-level violence. 
Further, these results occur at a maximum 100% expected level of efficiency. Therefore, using 
the best of available options, an intervener is likely to still observe continued rebel and extremist 
activity and low but steady levels of conflict. The definition of “success” of intervention should 
therefore be carefully evaluated. If these are the maximum expected positive outcomes that could 
result, then maybe the outcomes of previous interventions have not been so dismal after all. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
There are several caveats to this study’s findings. It is important to reiterate that the model 
results can only be interpreted as the results of specific changes to model parameters, and not to 
the comprehensive implementation of a strategy in a field setting. Although this project assumes 
that those changes to parameters fully capture the effects of the intervention, this is a strong 
assumption. I have noted other potential side effects not captured in the model that may interfere 
with the study findings when appropriate. Another issue is the somewhat arbitrary selection of 
some parameter values used for modeling the efficiency of an intervention. This creates an 
external validity problem, as these results may only be helpful for interpreting the very specific 
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conditions set in these model simulations. However, in the future other researchers can 
experiment themselves by varying model parameters to values that they deem either more 
appropriate or more specific to their case of interest.  
 The introduction of intervention tools to the model does not take into account the 
important effects of timing that occur in a natural empirical setting. In the model, the 
intervention tools are implemented simultaneously and at a single point in time. However, 
empirically different tools and strategies are often implemented sequentially, or at different 
stages of a conflict. This staggering could significantly impact the intervention’s outcome if 
some tools work better in combination, or if one is more effective following the completion of 
another. The model currently does not capture any variation in outcomes that might result from 
staggering the tools. Such staggering could be easily modeled by introducing parameter changes 
after differing numbers of rounds. Further, many countries have often already experienced some 
form of intervention or foreign influence in the past, which could have an impact on the effects 
of the newly introduced intervention. The model attempts to account for any prior use of tools by 
including a weapons presence variable in the environment, as well as including income sources 
and initial strength amongst the militant parameters. However, these parameters cannot capture 
all of the effects on militant and civilian behavior that might linger from prior interventions. 
The success of tools and strategies addressing grievances and civilian support interactions 
are highly dependent on the initial configuration of grievances and affiliations. For example, the 
findings of this study indicate that most of the diplomatic and economic tools that address 
grievances have the worst effects on strength and mixed effects on fighting and defending. 
However, these findings could change completely in an environment with different grievance 
and affiliation configurations. Therefore, the findings only apply to environments similar to the 
 142 
hypothetical test study. Chapter 5 will model the contexts of some contemporary cases with their 
own unique configurations, and the results will be examined for their consistency with historical 
events. This will provide additional information about the performance of certain strategies and 
tools in different conflict contexts.  
An in-depth analysis of different configurations of grievances in a multi-community 
environment could reveal ways that grievances can be used in the intervener’s favor. In practice 
however, detailed information about local communities and their grievances may be difficult to 
obtain. Such information may require ground access over a wide geographic area in unstable or 
hazardous conflict conditions. Civilians may also have incentives to be deceptive about their 
allegiances, and could perceive this high level of foreign presence negatively. Second, 
grievances and affiliations may change frequently and unpredictably. Because civilians switch 
sides and communities shift their allegiances and grievances, it may be difficult to establish a 
consistent pattern. In the future, improvements in data gathering and access could better inform 
the selection of model parameters. 
The model does not account for many negative side effects that undermine the 
effectiveness of different intervention strategies and tools in practice. For example, providing 
external support to militant groups can be ineffective due to a moral hazard problem, in which 
militants may not use the money as intended and engage in corrupt activities or divert money to 
other uses (Rauchhaus 2009, Bapat 2011). In another example, as noted previously, civilians 
could respond to military strikes with anger and animosity, even seeking revenge for the 
accidental killing of civilian bystanders. Collateral deaths may increase the motivation for 
civilian communities to switch sides against the group being supported by the intervener. Some 
of these outcomes may be loosely accounted for when modeling intervention strategies at 
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reduced efficiency. However, future model development could include modifications that 
account for some of these most common inefficiencies.  
Another important factor not included in the model is the importance of governance 
improvements or nationbuilding for ensuring lasting reductions in fighting. Without successful 
service provision and adjudication of disputes, any successful support for a government could 
later collapse. Even if an intervention succeeds in empowering a government with prevailing 
strength, that strength may not translate into governance due to inefficiency, inexperience, and 
corruption. Therefore, adjudication mechanisms and the establishment of a stable system that 
civilians view as legitimate are critical for maintaining long-term order and regime survival. 
Nationbuilding and the various other tasks that are meant to bolster governance functions are not 
modeled as tools in this study, but are also required to achieve stability. These tasks may be 
particularly important for understanding the success of intervention modeled for a finite duration, 
as an intervention is not intended to be a long-term replacement for sovereign governance. With 
effective governance institutions in place, intervention tools may result in lasting success 
following a withdrawal. Future research should develop a way to model the effects of 
nationbuilding activities and improvements to governance. 
Finally, from an ethical perspective, seeking to fully understand, use and even manipulate 
grievances harkens back to the actions of colonial powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
such as the British and the French, who studied and took advantage of local cleavages in order to 
divide and conquer (Mamdani 2018). Using grievances of local groups to a foreign intervener’s 
political advantage may contribute towards stabilization and nation-building, or it could face 
opposition and incite backlash from local groups wishing to determine their own sovereign 
future. The approach may also face domestic opposition; for example the deployment of 
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anthropologists with U.S. military Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan was highly critiqued for 
the role of academics in potentially inflicting harm through their research on local community 
dynamics (Goodman and Heller 2007, Lamb, Orton, Davies, Pikulsky, et al. 2013). If navigating 
grievances and affiliations has a limited likelihood of success, the costs, ethical controversy and 







CHAPTER 4: EXPLORATION OF CONFLICT INTERVENTION CASES 
 
 
The Agent-Based Model (ABM) developed in the previous chapters demonstrates how local 
grievances and civilian-militant interactions can cause variation in broader conflict outcomes 
between militants. It also shows how different intervention strategies can affect these local 
dynamics, and how this in turn impacts conflict violence. I now explore empirical examples of 
foreign interventions in civil wars, in order to examine the impact of grievances on intervention 
success in these cases. I research the sources of contention and historical events that led to the 
militarization of local disputes, and explore how these factors ultimately contributed to the 
overall conflict. I describe whether foreign interveners attempted to address these disputes, and 
to what extent specific programs were successful. Finally, I evaluate the overall effectiveness of 
foreign interventions in confronting local grievances, and draw some initial conclusions about 
policies that may produce improved outcomes.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Two existing case analyses also assess the effectiveness of foreign intervention in addressing 
local grievances. Autesserre (2010) shows that humanitarian intervention by the international 
community during the 2003-2006 civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) failed 
because of its inability to address the underlying drivers of conflict. She identifies various 
grassroots rivalries over land, resources, and political power as the motivating causes of the war 
and argues that bottom-up fueling of violence continued because these issues were never tackled 
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by the international community (Autesserre 2010). Instead, interveners focused on national and 
regional-level tensions, which proved to be ineffective.  
Likewise, Carter Malkasian in War Comes to Garmser (2013) recounts the evolution of 
power and conflict in the Garmser district in southern Afghanistan since before the Russian 
occupation in 1979. Malkasian identifies a number of local factors, from land rights issues to 
tensions between religious and tribal elites, as the underlying motivators for violence. Despite 
major shifts in control between the Russians, former mujahideen warlords, the Taliban regime, 
U.S. occupying forces, and Hamid Karzai’s central government in Kabul, these tensions were 
never resolved and violence caused by these grievances endured (Malkasian 2013). While these 
two studies recognize that a lack of attention to local grievances was an important cause of 
intervention failure, they give little assessment of possible attempts that were made and why they 
may not have been successful. In this chapter I evaluate any attempts, however limited, and 
suggest improvements based on observations about how local disputes contributed to violence in 
each particular case. 
My analysis explores foreign interventions in Somalia in 1992, Afghanistan in 2001, and 
Libya in 2011. These represent cases in which the United States was a prominent, if not the 
primary leader of the intervention. I select these examples because they are contemporary 
conflicts in which current U.S. policymakers may have actively participated, constituting 
experiences that they are most likely to draw upon when making future decisions. They are 
compelling because they represent failures of the international community to effectively resolve 
conflict, despite significant investment of time and resources. Civil war violence in these 
countries continued to escalate even as the interventions drew to a close. Numerous government 
assessments, after-action reports, and “lessons learned” have already been written to determine 
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the causes of failure, but this chapter differs in that it focuses its full attention on a localized, 
societal perspective that is less common in existing analyses. There is ample evidence to suggest 
that divisions between local civilian communities were a significant cause of failure in all three 
conflicts. 
Because these cases were selected based on their recency and relevance to current 
policymakers, this chapter cannot test any generalized theory about the effects of grievances on 
intervention success. However, it does yield some interesting observations and implications 
based on recent American foreign policy and military operations. I use these cases to identify 
common patterns in how grievances shaped conflict outcomes. These patterns can be tested for 
their generalizability in future research. 
 
Approach 
My exploration of each intervention and its effectiveness in addressing civilian grievances 
proceeds as follows. For each country, I first provide background information about the societal 
environment, identifying sources of divisions and causes of disputes between communities. I 
discuss the context of ensuing conflict in order to trace the roots of fighting at the militant level. 
Next, I assess to what extent local disputes became militarized as the conflict unfolded, and I 
determine whether and how such disputes contributed to violence. I specifically identify any 
factors that led to militarization.  
 Then, I describe the international intervention that occurred during the civil war. I 
recount the tools used by the interveners and whether or not the intervention was successful in 
achieving its overall goals. Thereafter, I elaborate on whether or not foreign interveners 
recognized grievances as a source of fighting, and examine the effectiveness of any efforts that 
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they made to tackle or resolve these local disputes. I draw some initial conclusions about why the 
interventions may have been unsuccessful at reducing violence, and identify possible 
opportunities that may have existed for improvements to policy in that particular case. 
 After examining each of the three conflict cases, I identify some patterns and helpful 
factors for understanding how local grievances may have become militarized and why they 
contributed to intervention failure. I discuss how these indicators could be used by policymakers 
in future intervention planning, first for anticipating how grievances might shape violence 
outcomes, and second for determining what policy approaches might be required to successfully 
reduce fighting. Finally, I make observations across the three cases about the effectiveness of 
policies meant to address grievances, discuss hindrances and challenges to their implementation, 
and suggest alternative approaches that could improve outcomes in the future.  
 The information which informs my analysis is drawn from open-source materials, 
including books, academic journal articles, government and international organization reports, 
news publications, and other online sources. I use a systematic approach for compiling these 
resources to ensure that the data is comprehensive, factual, and legitimate. First, I place emphasis 
on a few of the most trusted, complete, and well-informed sources for each of the conflict cases. 
For Somalia, this includes books published by the U.S. military such as “The Effort to Save 
Somalia: August 1992 – March 1994,” authored by Walter S. Poole (2005) and published by the 
Joint History Office of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I also rely on “My 
Clan Against the World: US and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992-1994,” authored by 
Baumann, Yates, and Washington (2004) and published by the Combat Studies Institute Press. 
For the Afghanistan case, the most comprehensive and well-informed sources include six 
“Lessons Learned” reports about U.S. intervention efforts published by the Special Investigator 
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General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). I also cite substantially from Seth Jones, one 
of the premier experts in the United States on Afghanistan, in his book “In the Graveyard of 
Empires: America's War in Afghanistan” (2010). For Libya, the most informative and complete 
source is “The Burning Shores: Inside the Battle for the New Libya” (2018) by expert Frederic 
Wehrey. 
 Second, after reviewing information from these most informative resources, I then 
narrow my search to academic articles by subject matter experts and reports from international 
organizations, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations, such as the U.S. 
Institute of Peace, the United Nations, Amnesty International, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). I also include accounts from former officials and military personnel with first-
hand experience. Finally, I broaden my search to other reputable books, news media, and online 
content. I perform extensive internet searches to collect evidence until it begins to “converge,” or 
any new information continues to provide similar findings and nothing more is found to 
contradict them.  I also carefully assess any conflicting information, taking into account the 
legitimacy of the publications and their authors.  
Through this approach, I ensure that the analysis in this chapter is informed with as 
complete and reputable information as possible. Some evidence poses more of a challenge to 
find; for example, information about intervention policies implemented in Somalia in 1992 is 
more sparsely available online than for Afghanistan. Information about civilian community 
interactions in Libya is limited, possibly as a result of the closed nature of Qaddafi’s regime prior 
to his overthrow. However, overall the analysis conducted in this case exploration is supported 
by a data-gathering effort that is both broad and in-depth. Appendix B provides a list of all of the 
sources used in each of the different conflict cases.  
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Somalia’s population is unique on the African continent in its relatively uniform demographic 
makeup, comprised of primarily one Somali ethnic group that almost universally speaks the same 
language (CIA 1992). However, the country has historically been highly divided along clan lines 
and remains so today. Somali society is made up of six major clan families that are each divided 
further into highly complex webs of sub-clans (CIA 1992, Makinda 1991, Unruh 1995). While 
such diversity and division is not an uncommon characteristic of many countries, researchers 
observe that, in Somalia, these identities are highly salient and influential in everyday life. 
According to anthropologist Catherine Besteman, Somalis have an oral tradition that emphasizes 
family history and clan identification, and children have often been taught from a young age to 
recite their family clan histories back to multiple generations (Besteman 1993). Political scientist 
Ken Menkhaus notes that communities in Somalia are organized around clan affiliations, and 
clan leaders primarily have political and decisionmaking authority in villages (Menkhaus 2000). 
Therefore, the clan is a clear politicized identity that determines important decisions and social 
behavior of groups. Further, land conflict expert Jon Unruh argues that “perceived transgressions 
are seen as the responsibility of all the perpetrator's kin, who are guilty by reason of blood 
connection. Revenge or compensation are therefore sought from any member of the lineage” 
(Unruh 1995). As a result, disputes between clans or sub-clans can quickly escalate into broader 
conflicts. 
Somalia is primarily pastorialist; families rely heavily on the production and trade in 
livestock for income. Therefore, access to land for grazing and water use is very important to 
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communities. Land access has typically been managed through friendly relationships between 
clans rather than based on permanent geographical boundaries (Unruh 1995). However, in cases 
of scarcity and competition, clans have often fought over depleted resources. This was 
particularly a problem during famines in the 1970s and 1980s, when drought conditions and 
persistent conflict created mass internal displacement of civilian populations (Unruh 1995). 
Fighting between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as fighting between rebel groups and the regime 
of Said Barre created significant insecurity and uprooted millions of people. This severely 
disrupted the traditional pastorialist lifestyle, further increasing clan competition (Unruh 1995).  
Divisions have also become a fixture of Somali society due to long histories of 
marginalization of some clan and ethnic groups. For example, some ethnic identities such as the 
Bantu or the Gosha had been traditionally discriminated against or enslaved during Somalia’s 
early history (Besteman 1993, Menkhaus 2003). This created long-standing mistrust between 
these communities and other groups. Many different clans and sub-clans in Somalia also mistrust 
one another due to histories of disputes and seeking revenge. 
 
Context of the Conflict 
 
Somalia experienced severe violence and societal upheaval as a result of civil war prior to 
international intervention in 1991. According to a report published by the Office of the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs, discontent towards the country’s leader General Mohammed Said Barre 
began to grow following his failed attempt to invade neighboring Ethiopia and capture the 
ethnic-Somali Ogaden region in 1977 (Poole 2005). While this nationalistic maneuver 
temporarily unified Somalis, its ultimate failure resulted in disappointment and blame-placing 
amongst the population (Makinda 1991). In this atmosphere, Barre maintained his grip on power 
by manipulating clan rivalries. He pitted rivals against one another, suppressed his critics, and 
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bought out the support of opposition groups (Ingiriis 2018, Makinda 1991). While this strategy 
reduced tensions, it also further politicized clan identities. This led to greater polarization of 
society and galvanized his enemies, who began forming guerrilla movements. According to 
expert on Somali armed movements Mohamed Ingiriis, the main groups that emerged were the 
United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Movement (SNM), and the Somali 
Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which began launching attacks from sanctuaries in Ethiopia 
(Ingiriis 2018). By 1988, opposition to Barre’s rule had blossomed into an open rebellion against 
his regime, with civil war spreading across the country (Ingiriis 2018, Poole 2005).  
 Barre retaliated by rounding up and executing civilians and ordering aerial bombing, 
killing tens of thousands and displacing millions more (Amnesty 1992, Poole 2005, Walls 2009). 
However, this only strengthened the resolve of his opponents (Walls 2009). His campaigns 
against the strong and influential Majeerteen and Isaaq clans, as well as reduced support from 
within his own networks, all contributed towards further collapse (Baumann, Yates, and 
Washington 2004). The SNM formed the breakaway region of Somaliland in the north of the 
country, and other groups began gaining territory in the south near the capital city of Mogadishu 
(Amnesty 1992, Ingiriis 2018, Poole 2005). Barre finally fled in 1991, and the USC led by 
General Mohammed Farah Aideed took control of the capital (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 
2004).  
Following Barre’s ouster, the country collapsed further into anarchy, as none of the 
opposition groups was strong enough or universally accepted enough to form a new state 
(Ingiriis 2018). The Somali National Front (SNF) containing remnants of Barre’s forces directed 
attacks against non-Darod clans and other supporters of the USC, with the USC retaliating in 
kind (Amnesty 1992). As violence continued, these groups splintered into factions and new ones 
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formed, primarily along clan and sub-clan divides (Ingiriis 2018, Makinda 1991). The goal of 
each group was to obtain a favorable distribution of power and resources for its own supporters, 
but none of them succeeded in consolidating power, leading to prolonged fighting and 
displacement of civilians (Ingiriis 2018, Makinda 1991).  
  
 
Militarization of Civilian Grievances 
 
The emergence of prolonged conflict between militant groups further polarized communities and 
resulted in greater militarization of informal society along clan lines. Competition over grazing 
areas and water had previously contributed to armed conflicts between clans, or even between 
segments of the same clan families. These conflicts and rivalries had long been a considered a 
“feature of Somali politics” (Makinda 1991). Competition for resources during famines in the 
70s and 80s, and displacement of populations during fighting, further exacerbated animosity. 
Clans feared that in this atmosphere of scarcity, an enemy clan might dominate over the others 
and restrict the sharing of limited resources (Mohamoud and Mohamoud 2006). This mistrust 
was easily manipulated by fighting groups and reinforced through political mobilization based on 
identities (Menkhaus 1998).  
The government’s favoritism towards particular groups had also contributed to divisions 
between clans. Siad Barre's trusted advisers came only from the Marehan, Ogadeni and 
Dolbahante clans, leading opponents to disparagingly label his government the “MOD” (Ingiriis 
2018, Makinda 1991). Barre’s use of rewards and punishments won the loyalty of these clans, 
but unified others against his rule. Barre would also posture his allied clans against one another 
such that none would become too powerful, sowing divisions between them and further 
encouraging the splintering of factions into various fighting groups. As a result, following his 
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regime’s collapse, fighting occurred along clan lines as communities supported the militant 
groups that best represented their interests (Baumann, Yates, and Washington 2004).  
After Barre’s ouster, many actors stood to gain from the anarchy, to include:  
 
“warlord political leaders whose power base rested on conquest, clan 
mobilization, and fear; merchants profiting from illicit commercial activities and 
mafia-like arrangements in Somalia’s economy of plunder; unschooled, armed 
young men known as mooryaan, whose status and wealth would be eliminated in 
a peacetime economy, and entire clans that benefitted from the conquest of new 
and valuable real estate they were uninterested in returning to the original 
owners” (Menkhaus 1998, 221).  
 
Both civilians and militant groups had incentives to undermine or to spoil any reconciliation or 
peacemaking efforts, as they did not want any other group to gain control and therefore put their 
own power and resources at risk. Traditional clan leaders, even those enlisted to try to encourage 
peace, would use their status to try to advance the position of their own clans during negotiations 
(Menkhaus 2000). Power within clans began to shift towards gun-wielding youngsters who were 
able to leverage force instead of using traditional systems of authority (Menkhaus 2000). 
The absence of a central government ultimately exacerbated the militarization of Somali 
society, leading to the proliferation of armed militias at the community level (Ingiriis 2017). The 
creation of these militias became a means to win spoils and to advance clan interests through 
their support of broader conflict actors. Lack of centralized control also facilitated the 
procurement of weapons (Poole 2005). According to the CIA in 1992, “the various clan-based 
armies fighting throughout Somalia are well-supplied with arms and ammunition… some reports 
also describe a flourishing arms market” (CIA 1992). As civilians armed themselves for 
protection, “confrontation became more frequent in the search for adequate resources, as 
insecurity became the dominant context within which pastoralist decisions were made” (Unruh 
1995, 16). Militarization had quickly become the norm in this environment of extreme insecurity, 
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and violence became a normal tool for obtaining resources. The widespread presence of firearms 
made consolidation of power extremely difficult in a society so divided by clan rivalries, forming 
an obstacle to any one group exerting control (Ingiriis 2017).  
Ultimately, local clan rivalries and the willingness of civilians to resort to violence, either 
themselves or through the hiring of militias, significantly contributed to broader-scale conflict. 
This is consistent with literature citing clan disputes and divisions as an important root of the 
civil war, making little to no distinction between the aims of clan and the goals of the militant 
groups (Ingiriis 2018, Makinda 1991, Menkhaus 2000, Walls 2009). A report published by 
Human Rights Watch in 1993 confirms that the different groups drew their support from 
different clans or sub-clans (HRW 1993). Understanding the underlying grievances of the 
population and sources of tensions between communities should have therefore been a priority 
for foreign powers preparing to intervene in the Somalia in 1992. 
 
International Intervention in 1992 
 
As a result of the uprising against Barre, the collapse of his regime, and the escalation of militant 
group fighting, Somalia was on the brink of a humanitarian disaster. The initial response came 
from countries such as Italy, Eritrea and Djibouti who attempted to intervene by holding 
negotiations between warring factions, but these were unsuccessful (CIA 1992). Then, in late 
1991, a drought made the human security situation even more precarious, with more than 4.5 
million people at risk of death from starvation (Africa Watch 1992). The international 
community responded by donating relief aid in the form of food and medicine deliveries. 
However, international organizations including the United Nations (UN) and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) quickly observed that distributing the supplies posed a 
 156 
serious challenge. Armed groups seized or restricted access to the aid, and violence prevented aid 
agencies from safely making deliveries to at-risk populations (Poole 2005). A more expansive 
intervention effort would be required in order to prevent mass starvation.  
 The UN began its first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM) I mission in 
April 1992. Its goals included humanitarian and refugee assistance, political initiatives such as 
helping promote national reconciliation, supporting the creation of national and regional 
governance institutions, the re-establishment of police forces, and the creation of civil society 
groups (UN Security Council 1993). However, the complete lack of security in the country 
necessitated a much stronger troop presence than the UN could provide on its own. In order to 
boost securitization efforts, the United States launched the United Task Force (UNITAF) mission 
in December 1992, which deployed an additional 24,500 personnel in support of the 
multinational effort already underway (Poole 2005). The primary goal of UNITAF was to 
provide the security necessary to safely deliver relief supplies to inaccessible areas. Troops were 
initially unopposed by militant groups as they first secured the Mogadishu port and airfield, and 
subsequently occupied areas near key cities and highways throughout the country. According to 
U.S. Army observers and the UN Special Representative for Somalia Admiral Jonathan Howe, 
this effort quickly halted the worst violence and allowed aid delivery to continue (Howe 1996, 
Poole 2005). It specifically avoided involvement in political engagement with conflict actors, 
focusing primarily on establishing security to facilitate aid delivery (Howe 1996, Poole 2005). 
By March of 1993, Somalia had achieved a relative calm, and the United States began 
implementing plans to cede control to the UN’s second mission, UNISOM II (Howe 1996, UN 
Security Council 1993). UNISOM II sought to resolve disputes between the different fighting 
factions and ease competition by holding negotiations between group leaders. UN negotiators 
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brokered a ceasefire between fifteen different fighting groups and worked to create a new 
transitional political authority (Poole 2005, USIP 2002). However, violence slowly began to 
resume as political reconstruction efforts threatened the interests of some factions. Despite 
participating in negotiations, the leaders of warring factions often used them simply as a forum to 
gain legitimacy and posture for greater influence (Poole 2005). The SNA in particular, led by 
General Mohamed Farah Aideed, began launching direct attacks against UN personnel. 
Following a devastating ambush that killed 26 Pakistani peacekeepers, the U.S. and UN began 
directing their own military operations against the SNA. The combat escalated until troops were 
engaging in almost daily street battles with Aideed’s fighters (Howe 1996, Poole 2005). 
 In August 1993, the U.S. officially initiated a campaign to capture Aideed, and Army 
Rangers began conducting raids to target the General and his key lieutenants (Poole 2005). 
Opposition to U.S. involvement amongst the American public began to mount as the operations 
yielded few results and the public grew increasingly opposed to activities that they perceived as 
nationbuilding. Research has shown that the U.S. public is generally averse to nationbuilding, 
and in the case of Somalia they were concerned about “getting bogged down in an unwinnable 
war” (Johnson and Tierney 2007, 61). Consequently, the U.S. increasingly pressured the UN to 
take over more securitization tasks. In the midst of this transition, two U.S. Army Ranger 
helicopters were shot down during a failed daytime raid dubbed the “Battle of Mogadishu,” in 
which 18 Americans were killed. Images of a smoldering helicopter and American bodies being 
dragged through the streets were broadcasted on international television (Howe 1996). The 
United States promptly began its withdrawal without having managed to find Aideed, while 
security in Mogadishu and throughout Somalia continued to deteriorate. The UN was ultimately 
unable to maintain the security necessary to protect its peacekeepers or continue with political 
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reconstruction activities, and concluded the UNISOM II mission in March 1995 (UN Security 
Council 1995) .  
 While the intervention successfully managed to curb the initial humanitarian crisis and 
deliver enough food to prevent mass starvation, it failed to resolve conflict between militant 
groups. Despite multiple negotiation attempts, the interveners were unable to resolve the 
underlying reasons that the Somali groups continued to fight one another. This may have been 
because the cost of making concessions to a rival was too high as compared to the relatively low 
cost of fighting. 
 The low cost of fighting was partially due to the high availability of weapons. During the 
Cold War, weapons had flowed into the country for decades, supplied by the West and the Soviet 
Union during conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia (Lewis 1993). At the outset of intervention 
in 1992, the UN and the U.S. disagreed about the extent to which disarmament should take place 
in the country (Howe 1996, Poole 2005). The UN wanted to immediately disarm all the militant 
groups and remove their access to small arms, while the U.S. thought this goal was unrealistic 
and antagonistic, and agreed only on the removal of large surface-to-air weapons (Howe 1996, 
Poole 2005). Somalis were allowed to hold onto their guns, with a perception emerging among 
UNOSOM personnel that “every Somali carried one weapon and had two or three more in his 
house” (Poole 2005, 50). Meanwhile, arms trading from Kenya and Ethiopia that was partially 
funded by misappropriated foreign aid continued to flourish (Lewis 1993). With the means of 
violence so accessible, Somali militant groups and their supporters found it easy to resort to 
fighting. 
 Further, the large flows of humanitarian aid that suddenly found their way into the 
country perpetuated a predatory partnership between militant groups and business elites. Food 
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aid delivery was highly lucrative, and businessmen began making large fortunes off 
humanitarian aid contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars (Ahmad 2012). This fed the 
militants’ reasons to continue fighting in order to extract rents from the spoils. The business class 
partnered with the militants in order to strong-arm or even fight for contracts, and the groups 
taxed the businesses or charged tolls for access to roads and highways (Ahmad 2012). Food aid 
also contributed towards the bankrupting of local farmers who could not compete with the low 
price of goods, creating a greater economic dependence on the business-militant alliances 
(Ahmad 2012). 
 As a result, the intervention may have merely increased the incentives of militants to 
fight. Twelve separate national reconciliation conferences were held with faction leaders, but the 
leaders consistently failed to honor their commitments (Netabay 2007). As groups continued to 
fight, and as Aideed ramped up his attacks against the UN, the international response was to 
attempt to capture the General. Successfully doing so could have potentially resolved the 
conflict, as defeating the SNA could have possibly removed a major obstacle to meaningful 
negotiations (CIA 1993). It could have removed one of the major spoilers of peace, and other 
groups might have come to the negotiating table in good faith if they perceived a greater risk or 
cost to themselves by fighting. However, capturing Aideed ultimately failed and the conflict 
went unresolved.   
 
Intervention Attention to Grievances 
The intervention failed to install a stable Somali government and failed to reduce fighting or 
civilian militarization. Instead, it focused its attention on bringing the leaders of the various 
militant groups to the negotiating table, who ultimately did not uphold any of the peace 
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agreements that they signed. Therefore, the intervention did not resolve the broader sources of 
conflict, nor address underlying Somali clan rivalries. Further, the few attempts to tackle local-
level reconciliation did not receive the required attention, resources, or personnel to be effective. 
This was despite early recognition of the importance of these rivalries. 
UNISOM’s Special Representative Ambassador Mohammed Sahnoun demonstrated a 
unique interest in actively pursuing engagement with clan leaders, in an effort to support 
traditional Somali negotiation and governance institutions (Hansen 2003). At the time, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recognized the merit of these efforts, noting that “a piecemeal 
approach that concentrates on regional and subclan reconciliation first, such as that currently 
being pursued by UN Special Representative Mohamed Sahnoun, appears to have the best 
chance for being inclusive while avoiding the potential for unwieldiness” (CIA 1992, 4). 
Sahnoun organized the Seychelles Consultation of October 1992, in which Somali intellectuals 
met with the Somali Committee for Peace and Reconciliation. The group concluded that a forum 
of Somali intellectuals should be empowered in Mogadishu, envisioning a “bottom-up” approach 
to reconciliation (Mukhtar 2003, 197). With Sahnoun’s support, the Life and Peace Institute 
based in Sweden formed a Somalia Reference Group that pursued a role for Somali elders and 
civil society in reconciliation efforts (Clarke 2018). 
Unfortunately, despite his ability to build rapport amongst local leaders early in the 
intervention, Sahnoun was highly critical of UN bureaucracy, and his confrontations with UN 
headquarters ultimately led to his resignation in October 1992 (Lewis 1993). Following his 
departure, the UN only gave lip service to this form of local mediation, and efforts to promote 
reconciliation amongst clan leaders lapsed. In March 1993, a new UN Special Representative for 
Somalia Admiral Jonathan Howe tried to pursue similar efforts more resolutely. Howe himself 
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reports that, despite shortages in staff, the UN began consultations with Somali leaders in order 
to help local communities select council representatives. In partnership with the Life and Peace 
Institute, “more than fifty district councils were established and week-long training programs 
held” for new councilors appointed in local governance programs (Howe 1996, 172). 
Unfortunately, these efforts slowed as violence mounted in the country, and U.S. and UN 
attention became much more concentrated on confronting the leaders of the various rebel 
factions. The political wing of the UN mission continually suffered from severe underfunding 
and a lack of resources (Howe 1996, Lewis 1993).  
 The intervention did initially succeed in delivering humanitarian aid to those who had 
been sealed off from assistance due to fighting. Further, the international community attempted 
to use aid delivery to empower local leaders and civil society in order to promote governance and 
reconciliation. The UN delivered aid through “regional relief committees” comprised of local 
leaders. These efforts were successful in some isolated cases, however in areas with militant 
activity, relief committees became dominated by allies of the fighting faction (Human Rights 
Watch 1993). There were numerous accounts of NGOs refusing to work with committees due to 
their use of violent intimidation tactics, reporting that ‘thugs’ who had used their weapons to 
control distribution efforts were now coordinating relief services (Human Rights Watch 1993). 
The attempts at local empowerment through aid delivery only further strengthened the patronage 
networks of militants and increased the spoils over which they could compete. This also led to 
negative perceptions and resentment towards the humanitarian efforts. According to Aisha 
Ahmad, expert on political economy in foreign conflict, in some areas “UN protection of aid 
resources actively empowered Mahdi’s faction, which had won the lion’s share of aid 
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distribution contracts. This led to a perceived politicization of the aid mission as supporting the 
Abgal sub-clan against the Habr Gidir” (Ahmad 2012, 321).  
Unfortunately, the manipulation of aid delivery by armed militants restricted UN efforts 
to empower local leaders with benefits to provide their communities, dampening attempts to 
encourage better governance. In addition, the perception of bias as interveners inadvertently 
partnered with militants in aid distribution further polarized society. These militants profited 
through their distribution contracts and channeled food and supplies to their own supporters, 
worsening interclan rivalries. Overall, this limited attempt by the intervention to tackle violence 
at the local level was ineffective and may have even exacerbated conflict. 
 If community-level grievances had been successfully addressed during the intervention, it 
may have reduced the negative influence of clan rivalries that continuously destabilized 
peacebuilding efforts between militant factions (CIA 1992). Arguments made by some 
international observers support this finding, recognizing that clan reconciliation at the local level 
offered the most promising path to peace (CIA 1992, Clarke 2018, Hansen 2003, Howe 1996, 
Netabay 2007). This finding is also strongly supported by evidence from the autonomous 
northern region of Somaliland, which declared itself independent from the rest of Somalia in 
1991 (Autesserre 2010, 248, Ibrahim and Terlinden 2010, Ibrahim 2018, Walls 2009). 
Immediately after the fall of Said Barre, despite also experiencing a surge in armed militias and 
violent clashes between clan-based groups, the newly formed government in Somaliland 
organized teams of clan elders to serve as mediators (Walls 2009). As conflicts occurred over 
resources and strategic locations such as ports, traditional leaders negotiated compromises that 
were upheld based on social norms (such as trust, moral authority, and forgiveness) and 
customary law (Ibrahim 2018, Walls 2009). According to a report published by Conciliation 
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Resources, at least 38 conferences and meetings were held between 1990 and 1997, successfully 
bringing all parties to the negotiating table to agree on principles that would avoid future conflict 
(Ibrahim and Terlinden 2010). Evidence suggests that mediation succeeded in part because 
mediators were members of the conflict-affected areas, and therefore were respected and trusted 
due to their stake in ending fighting in the long-term (Autesserre 2010, 248, Ibrahim 2018). 
Further, clan leaders tackled fundamental issues at the root of conflict such as competition for 
power, property ownership, and criminal justice (Ibrahim 2018, Walls 2009). Somaliland has 
successfully maintained a level of relative peace and stability until present-day. 
Unfortunately, apart from isolated cases, no such grassroots conflict resolution occurred 
in southern Somalia. The incentives for prolonged fighting persisted and international 
community involvement may have instead exacerbated the problem. Competition between clans 
remained unresolved, and the low cost of fighting due to weapons availability and spoils from 
aid delivery disincentivized any meaningful commitment to peace agreements. 
 
Assessment of Somalia Intervention 
Although Somalia’s “warlords” were often driven by selfish, self-interested motives, their 
success in waging conflict was primarily driven by the grievances of a civilian population highly 
divided based on clan. By the time of the intervention, these grievances had escalated into an 
extreme level of competition over power and resources. This created a close and reciprocal 
relationship between local populations and warring militants. Civilians feared control by an 
opposing clan-led militant group, and therefore provided support to militants of their own clan. 
In turn, militants distributed spoils to allied clan members and defended the interests of their 
most wealthy benefactors. With high availability of weapons, civilians were also able to arm 
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themselves, resulting in fractionalization of the conflict through the creation of new militias at 
sub-clan levels.  
 Unfortunately, the intervention did not resolve civilian grievances, and it did not succeed 
in bringing Somalia’s civil war to an end. Internationally-brokered negotiations between 
militants could not overcome the high degree of competition or the self-interests of faction 
leaders. Localized negotiation efforts between clan elders were short-lived and not widespread, 
and there were no attempts to address land or water competition issues. Instead, the provision of 
massive amounts of humanitarian aid exacerbated the conflict, as rival groups profited from its 
dissemination. This increased the spoils over which different clans could compete.  
 An expansion of UNISOM Ambassador Sahnoun’s local mediation efforts may have held 
the greatest promise for peacefully resolving local clan competition. The successful dispute 
resolution in neighboring Somaliland demonstrates that a traditional grassroots approach was 
feasible. Although fighting groups in southern Somalia stood to gain from “spoiling the peace,” 
and widespread availability of weapons made fighting an easily accessible option, these 
conditions also existed in Somaliland. For example, Walls (2009) describes rifts from 1991-1992 
that occurred due to the “large number of young, armed militia members with little to occupy 
their time,” causing “squabbles to break out” that escalated into broader fighting (381). These 
militias were remnants from the movement to overthrow the government of Said Barre, and they 
were heavily armed thanks to decades of support from Ethiopia. Similar armed militias 
succeeded in destabilizing Mogadishu in the south in the aftermath of Barre’s ousting. However, 
in Somaliland three delegations of respected elders convened and successfully mediated the 
conflict before it escalated out of control. Later, more protracted fighting occurred due to clan 
competition over the port in the northern coastal city of Berbera and its revenues. Again, tribal 
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mediators managed to negotiate an agreement that specified how transportation infrastructure 
would be governed (Walls 2009). In southern Somalia around the same timeframe, if Sahnoun 
had been fully supported by the UN in his efforts to improve relationships between clans, 
perhaps his approach could have similarly led to reconciliation at both the local and national 
level.  
Unfortunately, these efforts were cut short with his departure. The original goal of 
humanitarian aid delivery also simultaneously undermined peacebuilding. Finally, mediation in 
Somaliland was successful at least in part due to the respect and trust bestowed on the mediators, 
who were members of the conflict communities themselves. Although Sahnoun demonstrated 
particular skill in working with Somali clans, it is unclear whether or not his efforts could have 
ever earned meaningful buy-in from such deeply-divided communities. Therefore, with the 
added infeasibility of confiscating weapons and low troop presence, a continuation of the conflict 







Afghanistan is a highly diverse country comprised of multiple ethnic groups, languages, and 
tribes. Around 2001, the largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns, represented 38% of the population, 
Tajiks represented 25%, and Hazaras represented 19% (Rubin 2002). Other groups such as 
Aimaks, Turkmen, Baluchs, and Uzbeks comprised the rest. These ethnicities contain hundreds 
of tribe and subtribe affiliations, which are further divided into multiple clans and sub-clans 
(Ruttig 2010). Such affiliations are not fixed, but can vary over time and between geographic 
areas. Sub-clans or quams sometimes have their own influential leaders such as khans, who have 
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their own economic resources and a large following of elders (Coburn 2011a, Giustozzi and 
Ullah 2006). They could also be loosely organized around a less influential malik or local elder, 
who acts as an intermediary in the event of local conflicts (Coburn 2011a, Giustozzi and Ullah 
2006). In addition to ethnic and clan organization, complex relationships between landed tribes, 
immigrants, former commanders of militias, and religious leaders or mullahs create complexity 
in local politics (Coburn 2011a, Malkasian 2013). For example, warlords might adopt a role 
similar to that of a khan in order to be legitimized by local tribes (Giustozzi and Ullah 2006). 
  Land and water are the greatest sources of disputes in rural Afghanistan. According to a 
report published by Oxfam International, conflict disrupts claims to land ownership due to high 
regime changeover and refugee displacement (Waldman 2008). This has been a problem since 
the 1970s, especially as land granted to immigrants by the then-communist government was 
reclaimed by landed tribes, and as weapons were provided by foreign patrons to competing 
mujahideen warlords (Malkasian 2013). Water conflicts also arose from these disruptions as 
fighting contributed to shifts in demand and supply (Waldman 2008). Other sources of local 
disputes between communities are the trafficking of opium and family disagreements. Poverty, 
natural disasters, refugee flows, corruption, and poor governance significantly exacerbate these 
issues (Waldman 2008, 8). 
The traditional method of handling disputes at the community level in Afghanistan is 
convening a shura or jirga; a group of respected tribal leaders tasked with negotiating a 
resolution (Gaston and Dang 2015, Malkasian 2013, Waldman 2008). These leaders also rely on 
customary laws such as the Pashtun pushtunwali or strict Islamic sharia law, contributing to the 
legitimacy of their decisionmaking (Waldman 2008). While these local shuras are generally the 
most trusted and favored approach to dispute resolution, they also lack agreed upon processes 
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and rules, and “in some cases their composition alone can aggravate socio-cultural tensions” 
(Waldman 2008, 14).  
 
Context of the Conflict 
In 1978, Russia had launched a military intervention in Afghanistan in an effort to support the 
incumbent communist government of Mohammad Najibullah against domestic opposition 
groups. Backed by the United States, Pakistan, and other supporters, the anti-Soviet mujahideen 
fighters managed to force the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 (Jones 2010). However, 
according to Afghanistan expert Seth Jones, “rival ethnic and political interests splintered the 
anti-Soviet mujahideen coalition into competing factions, and fighting soon broke out” (Jones 
2010, 43). Kabul quickly lost control over rural areas, and Najibullah was ultimately overthrown 
in 1992 by ethnic Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani, who hailed from the north of the country (Jones 
2010). This prompted the mujahideen Hezb-i-Islami group, led by ethnic Pashtun Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar, to begin attacking Kabul from the south. Civil war ensued, with fighting occurring 
primarily between northern groups such as Ahmed Shah Massoud’s Jamiat-e-Islami comprised 
of Uzbeks and Tajiks against southern Pashtuns and Hezb-i-Islami. In some provinces such as 
Kandahar in the south, fighting amongst different mujahideen groups destroyed local power and 
leadership structures. In others, tribes gained power and authority as they created militias to 
protect themselves against outside groups, further deepening ethnic divisions (Malkasian 2013).  
 The Taliban movement emerged in Kandahar in 1994. Many Afghan refugees and 
religious scholars had been returning from abroad in Pakistan where they had studied in 
conservative Saudi-funded madrassas, or Islamic schools. Their goal was to implement a pure 
Islamic system in Afghanistan based on the implementation of sharia or Islamic law (Jones 
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2010). They quickly recruited fighters and swept through Afghanistan throughout 1995, 
capturing Kabul in 1996 and capturing the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif in 1998 (Jones 2010). 
Only a small sliver of land in the northeast, held by former mujahideen fighter Ahmed Shah 
Massoud who now led a collection of groups called the Northern Alliance, remained outside of 
Taliban control.  
In some cases, the Taliban’s success resulted from an ability to appeal to local tribal and 
religious leaders through claims of religious purity and promises to provide aid and restore 
Pashtun rule to Kabul (Jones 2010). When communities chose not to comply, they often engaged 
in targeted assassinations of leaders in order to coerce them into submission. In other cases, 
Taliban success stemmed from a lack of unity. For example, tribal leaders in Helmand province 
were simply too divided to oppose their rule (Malkasian 2013). With the Taliban’s arrival, power 
in communities shifted towards those in the traditional “out-group” such as immigrants, 
minorities, and the poor, as well as to religious mullahs. The Taliban promoted the mullahs as 
“the key political leaders in the society and state they [sought] to create” (Dorronsoro 2009). 
They actively manipulated rivalries in order to ensure communities remained divided (Waldman 
2008). Simultaneously, Taliban leadership managed to centralize authority in the country due to 
their emphasis on Islam, stressing oneness and unity in order to overcome tribal divisions 
(Malkasian 2013). Although they enforced very strict and oppressive Islamic rules, they were 
able to provide a level of stability after several years of disruptive conflict.  
The Taliban had been providing a safe haven to Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda. 
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan and 
overthrew the Taliban when they refused to surrender him. Over the next four years, the U.S. and 
its international allies attempted to drive al-Qaeda out of its Afghan enclaves and worked to 
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consolidate power behind a new central government led by Hamid Karzai. Unfortunately, lack of 
security undermined local support for the new government, as the understaffed police forces and 
national army failed to protect civilians against growing insurgent attacks (Jones 2010, 181). 
Insurgent groups included the now-exiled Taliban and supportive militias, Arab foreign fighters 
such as al-Qaeda, and Hezb-i-Islami. They sought to overthrow Karzai and reestablish rule 
through an extreme version of Sunni Islam (Jones 2010, 161). By 2005 insurgents had become 
increasingly violent and coordinated in their attacks, and the government did not have the 
strength to counterattack or to protect the civilian population.  
In 2009, the U.S. initiated a strong surge in troop levels that was intended to bring an end 
to the powerful insurgency. Despite reclaiming some territory and increasing the capacity of 
Afghan security forces, conflict continued and the underlying weaknesses of the central 
government remained (Chandrasekaran 2014). In June 2011, President Obama announced the 
commencement of a drawdown in troops, and the U.S.-led coalition officially ended its combat 
mission in December 2014 (Landler and Cooper 2011, Thompson 2014). Unfortunately, 
continued violence and a steady creep of the Taliban back into previously-held areas has 
extended the presence of international troops. Presently, on-going negotiations with Taliban 
leaders indicate a resignation of the international community to the Taliban’s persistent 
influence.  
 
Militarization of Civilian Grievances 
Amid the waves of political upheaval, traditional relationships between landed tribes, 
immigrants, and religious leaders started to break down (Bhatia and Sedra 2008, Malkasian 
2013). Thomas Ruttig of the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) notes that younger 
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generations began to question the authority of their elders, reducing intra-tribal cohesion (Ruttig 
2010). This undermined traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. The degree of this 
breakdown and its contribution to militarization varied between geographic areas. In some cases, 
traditional mechanisms became fractured and less effective in resolving disputes, increasing the 
incidence of violence over highly contested issues such as land rights (Schetter and Glassner 
2011). In other areas, traditional mechanisms endured and remained strong and independent. 
Finally, in some cases traditional leaders turned increasingly to conflict actors like the Taliban, 
enlisting their authority to create peace (Schetter and Glassner 2011). 
The United Nations and the International Crisis Group (ICG) reported that land disputes 
in particular “regularly” led to violence (Gaston and Dang 2015, Waldman 2008). Land rights 
that had been granted to immigrants and minorities under Najibullah’s communist regime were 
no longer recognized by tribal authorities after his overthrow. Civilians who had fled during 
conflict returned to find their former property reclaimed by more powerful tribes. When the 
Taliban came to power, they recognized these former land rights, elevating the status of members 
from marginalized groups (Malkasian 2013).  However, following the Taliban’s overthrow, their 
property claims were once again dismissed. Thus, disputes arose that led to local fighting in 
some areas (Bhatia and Sedra 2008, Gaston and Dang 2015, Waldman 2008). An increase in 
armed former mujahideen commanders and insurgents exacerbated the use of violence, as 
newcomers with weapons were able to ignore the more traditionally-accepted shura or jirga 
council decisions (Coburn 2011a, Ruttig 2010).  
 Some areas managed to maintain enough stability of their traditional governance 
structures that they had more to lose than to gain through violence. Noah Coburn in Bazaar 
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Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town describes one such example, where 
political actors in the town of Istalif managed to avoid local militarization: 
“Istalif’s political structures prevented violence, not through direct competition in 
a public forum, but through the tacit agreement to avoid public confrontation and 
the understanding that an outbreak of violence threatened the well-being of the 
entire community. …Such a system created a high level of tension, but it was 
generally in everyone’s best interest to suppress competition that could have led 
to violence” (Coburn 2011a, 217). 
 
By maintaining traditional dispute mechanisms that were important to the town’s economic 
livelihood, Istalif managed to avoid either community in-fighting or Taliban insurgency. Other 
regions of Afghanistan suffered too much destruction of their local power structures to do the 
same. 
Rather than taking up arms themselves, communities would also sometimes turn to 
conflict combatants in order to address local grievances. They could coopt certain individuals 
within government leadership through connections or bribes, furthering their own goals and 
exacerbating corruption (Malkasian 2013). Landless returnees would often support or join the 
Taliban insurgency, and previously powerless mullahs also stood to gain personal power from 
Taliban control (Malkasian 2013). The Taliban tried to remain disconnected from local tribal 
issues, promoting a more broadly unifying Islamism and encouraging support in both Pashtun 
and non-Pashtun areas (Ruttig 2010). They exercised a justice system that was considered fair 
and legitimate by a broad segment of the population (Jackson and Weigand 2019). However, 
much of their control depended on support from members motivated by local grievances. 
Recruitment, operations and succession patterns tended to follow tribal lines, and members might 
join or provide support in order to “settle scores” locally (Malkasian 2013, Ruttig 2010). By 
2006 their appeal to marginalized groups, their ability to wield violence, and frustrations towards 
a corrupt and ineffectual government often led to tacit support (Jones 2010). 
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The potential for Afghans to militarize at the civilian and community level also varied 
over time. Following the departure of the Soviets, militarization was very high as mujahideen 
groups splintered along tribal lines and fought one another (Jones 2010). This was exacerbated 
by a high amount of weapons aid provided by the United States, Pakistan, and other outside 
actors (Bhatia and Sedra 2008, Jones 2010). The influx of arms enabled the increased dominance 
of commanders and militias in local and national politics, as they were able to advance their own 
interests in disputes through the use of force (Bhatia and Sedra 2008). Once in power, the 
Taliban was able to limit local militarization by bringing commanders under their control and 
incorporating them into their own armies. This quickly reduced local militarization and 
effectively disarmed the population (Jones 2010). 
However, following the overthrow of the Taliban as I will describe in the ensuing section, 
the intervention forces and the new Afghan government failed to effectively incorporate former 
militias and other militarized actors into the military or police force (Derksen 2015). As weapons 
inflows resumed from Pakistan in support of the insurgency, civilian communities once again 
gained the ability to arm themselves, join militias, and switch sides between the Taliban and the 
government to benefit their local aims. As the insurgency grew in strength, local groups began 
buying large numbers of weapons to defend themselves (Dorronsoro 2009, 18). To some degree, 
the agency of civilians was limited in Taliban strongholds, where people were often intimidated 
into accepting their authority in the interest of improving their chances of survival (Gopal 2014, 
Jackson 2018, Malkasian 2013). However, even in Taliban-held areas some elders would make 
subtle threats or engage in active bargaining with the group, threating to oppose them in order to 
permit aid-funded development projects (Jackson 2018). On the whole, there was no longer any 
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centralized authority in the country that could strictly enforce a monopoly on violence (Ruttig 
2010).  
Grievances between local communities therefore contributed to fighting between the 
Taliban and the internationally-backed Afghan government, as different communities of civilians 
began directly or tacitly supporting opposing sides. The nature of this contribution varied 
between different geographic areas. For example, in Kandahar province, local leadership had 
become severely weakened following civil war between mujahideen groups. This set the 
conditions for a high level of support for the Taliban as a replacement adjudication authority in 
the region, where the group shares ideological and kinship ties with the conservative Pashtun 
population (Malkasian 2013, Schetter and Glassner 2011). By contrast, in Kunduz province local 
militias proliferated as grievances escalated into local violence. The overall destabilization also 
facilitated control by the Taliban, who took advantage of the divided society and the frustration 
of civilians (Dirkx 2017). The overall escalation of disputes and failure to peacefully resolve 
them led to increased violence through local clashes and facilitation of the Taliban insurgency.  
 
International Intervention in 2001 
After the 1989 withdrawal of the Soviet Union, the United States had ceased its support of 
mujahideen militants, staying uninvolved in Afghanistan’s ensuing instability and conflict. 
However, in 2001 when the Taliban refused to surrender Osama bin Laden following the 
September 11 attacks, the U.S. launched Operation Enduring Freedom with the goal of 
overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying al-Qaeda’s enclaves (Jones 2010, 92). 
Coincidingly, on September 12, 2001 NATO invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history, 
authorizing the use of NATO forces in response (SIGAR 2019). The U.S. and NATO partnered 
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with Northern Alliance forces opposed to the Taliban and began funding other local militias to 
assist in targeting al-Qaeda (SIGAR 2017b). They successfully destroyed the terrorist 
organization’s safe havens and swiftly overthrew the Taliban, capturing Kabul only two months 
later. 
In December, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1386 creating the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was tasked with “providing security to the 
interim Afghan government in and around Kabul” (SIGAR 2019, 116). The UN held a 
conference in Bonn, Germany establishing transitional government institutions, leading to the 
swearing-in of Hamid Karzai as the Chairman of the Interim Administration (Jones 2010, UN 
2002b). In addition to the military and political responses, international aid organizations also 
mobilized. The World Food Programme (WFP) prevented widespread famine and displacement 
by delivering more than 115,000 tons of food in December, with food distributions in the remote 
Central Highlands as well as in Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif (UN 2002b). 
 On March 28, 2002, UN Security Council Resolution 1401 created the UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (UN 2002a). Its core mandate was to fulfill the tasks 
established in the Bonn Agreement, to promote national reconciliation, and to manage all UN 
humanitarian relief, recovery, and reconstruction activities (UN 2002b). Both the U.S. and the 
UN endorsed a “light footprint” that emphasized a low level of assistance and no heavy security 
presence (Jones 2010, SIGAR 2018a, UN 2002b). The intent was to avoid the mistakes made by 
the Soviets and to rely on Afghans to rebuild their own country.  
The U.S. was initially focused on counterterrorism and sought to avoid any involvement 
in nationbuilding or peacekeeping activities (SIGAR 2019). It opposed including its own forces 
in ISAF and wanted to limit ISAF’s activities from expanding beyond Kabul. In 2002, the U.S. 
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had deployed only 8,000 troops, while ISAF was comprised of 4,000 troops (Jones 2010). The 
U.S. sought to quickly build local combat forces, creating the Office of Military Cooperation-
Afghanistan to oversee development of a Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Afghan National 
Army (ANA) (SIGAR 2019). Additional countries focused on other sectors; Britain led counter-
narcotics efforts, Germany worked with the Afghan National Police (ANP), and Japan focused 
on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) (Jones 2010). 
 However, conditions throughout Afghanistan remained impoverished and unstable. 
Afghan police development from 2002-2003 fell far short of its targets, and criminal activity, 
government corruption, and attacks by Taliban insurgents became increasingly commonplace 
(Jones 2010). The new government was unable to provide sufficient security or protection, 
leading to tacit support for the Taliban by communities who feared for their own safety if they 
were to oppose the group (Jones 2010). In October 2003, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1510 expanding ISAF’s mandate from providing security in and around Kabul to 
providing security throughout the rest of the country (SIGAR 2019). 20,000 more Americans 
were deployed to help secure south and east Afghanistan, along with 10,000 additional NATO 
troops (SIGAR 2019). The United States began fielding Embedded Training Teams (ETTs), 
which provided the ANA with training, mentoring, and support in the form of “close air support, 
medical and casualty evacuation, and intelligence” (SIGAR 2019, 9). By the end of 2005, the 
U.S. had also taken over primary responsibility for training Afghan police. 
The U.S. and the international community also began to recognize the need for stronger 
governance and expanded their range of nationbuilding activities. The Afghan Stabilization 
Program was created to extend the reach of the central government through the construction of 
infrastructure and police support (Jones 2010). Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), or 
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interagency teams comprised of military, civil affairs, U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and diplomatic personnel, were formed with the goal to “extend and 
legitimize central government’s presence in the provinces by improving security and facilitating 
reconstruction and development” (SIGAR 2017b). The Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program (CERP) was introduced in 2004 to provide funding for quick-impact development 
projects, which were used by PRT teams to promote goodwill amongst local communities 
(SIGAR 2018a, b).  
 Overall however, the international presence remained fairly low, and the Taliban took 
advantage of the opportunity to regroup in Pakistan (Jones 2010, Malkasian 2013). They were 
aided by support from the Pakistani government, particularly members of the Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI), and to a lesser degree from Iran and wealthy Saudi donors (Jones 2010). The 
insurgency began steadily strengthening in 2006, with spikes in the numbers of attacks and 
bombings in 2007 and 2008 (Jones 2010). Taliban propaganda cited “the widely perceived 
corruption of the Afghan government, the lack of basic services for the people, and the historical 
narrative of the fight against infidel invaders” in order to recruit more fighters (Dorronsoro 2009, 
12). Civilian casualties worsened this problem. Increased military operations led to rising civilian 
deaths from air strikes, ground combat, and night raids, generating anger and resentment towards 
the intervention (UN 2011b). ISAF troops became increasingly engaged in fighting, with 40,000 
extra troops deployed to new fronts in the north, east, and south (Jones 2010, NATO). In 2009, 
U.S. President Barack Obama announced a military and civilian surge “aimed at reversing the 
Taliban’s momentum and building the capacity of the Afghan government” (SIGAR 2019). This 
resulted in peak levels of approximately 100,000 U.S. troops in the country by the end of 2010, 
with additional numbers of civilian staff (Kurtzleben 2016).  
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The increase in personnel improved security, expanded existing development programs, 
and enabled the introduction of new initiatives. For example, Marine presence in the Nawa 
District of Helmand Province led to a 90% decrease in attacks, creating enough stability for 
government officials to meet with constituents about their grievances and for civilians to report 
on insurgent activity (SIGAR 2018b, 29). Counterinsurgency replaced counterterrorism as the 
greatest strategic priority, emphasizing development activities that would increase the central 
government’s legitimacy (Jones 2010, SIGAR 2018b, 37). U.S. agencies continued to use CERP 
funds for short-term quick-impact projects, and contracted with local businesses to keep donated 
funds within Afghanistan through the Afghan First initiative (SIGAR 2018a). U.S. military 
trainers provided large supplies of weapons, vehicles, and equipment, and improved their own 
training in language, culture, and communication in order to build a better rapport with their 
Afghan counterparts (SIGAR 2019, 17). The Department of Defense created the Ministry of 
Defense Advisors (MoDA) program, which provided a network of advisors to improve Afghan 
defense institutions (SIGAR 2019). A new Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) also 
created a standing cadre of civilians who could mobilize to fulfill advising roles.  
Despite these efforts, U.S. and other international forces consistently failed to hold 
territory that they had captured (Jones 2010). They prioritized their counterinsurgency activities 
in the least secure districts that were the most threatened by insurgents. This strategy led to 
continual struggles for control in areas where development projects were least likely to be 
successful, at a time when examples of success were sorely needed in order to demonstrate 
government legitimacy (Jones 2010, SIGAR 2017b). Further, insurgents could simply wait for 
troop presence to diminish before swiftly returning. Despite the persistent instability, President 
Obama announced a drawdown of troops in 2011, and NATO began transitioning responsibility 
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for security to Afghan forces (SIGAR 2019). Taliban insurgents kept up their attacks; the 
average monthly number of violent incidents during the summer of 2011 was 39% higher as 
compared to the same period in 2010 (UN 2011b). Targeted assassinations of government 
officials continued in urban centers, including Kabul. Civilian deaths were 15% higher in the 
first half of 2011 than in the first half of 2010, and civilian displacement increased by 64% (UN 
2011b). Nevertheless, the U.S. officially concluded its original Operation Enduring Freedom in 
December of 2014. 
The Taliban continued making steady territorial gains throughout rural Afghanistan. By 
2015, the Taliban controlled 7% of the country with a further 21% of territory contested 
(Kennedy 2019). This was more territory than they had controlled at any time since 2001 
(Mcleary, De Luce, and Hickey 2016). The government continued to lose ground; by October 
2018, the Taliban controlled 12% of territory, with 34% contested (Kennedy 2019). However, 
the international community proceeded with its troop withdrawal. By 2019, only 14,000 U.S. 
troops and 17,000 from NATO and other countries remained in-country, in a non-combative 
capacity (Al-Jazeera 2019) . On-going peace talks between the U.S. and the Taliban indicate an 
acknowledgment by the international community that despite more than 18 years of war, the 
Taliban remain a highly influential fixture of Afghan politics and control. 
Ultimately, rather than resolving conflict in Afghanistan, the international intervention 
may have only worsened it. The Taliban had achieved a relative peace prior to their overthrow in 
2001. International forces failed to install a new government that was militarily strong enough or 
legitimate enough to do the same. As a result, competition for power reignited. This is consistent 
with the perceptions of many Afghan civilians. Interviews conducted by the U.S. Institute of 
Peace (USIP) with noncombatants from 2018-2019 found that “nearly all civilians saw the 
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presence of US forces as responsible for creating and perpetuating the conflict… others blamed 
the United States for deposing the Taliban regime in 2001, and saw the Taliban insurgency as a 
justified act of vengeance” (Jackson 2019, 8). Although the study was conducted in areas under 
Taliban control or influence, where these views are more likely to be prevalent, it demonstrates 
that perceptions of the intervention as a cause rather than a resolution of violence are 
commonplace. 
  
Intervention Attention to Grievances 
By 2004, the international community had recognized that it needed to address the local concerns 
of the Afghan population in order to establish legitimacy for the new central government. It had 
become clear that stronger policing, humanitarian assistance, and infrastructure development was 
necessary in the overall counterinsurgency effort. In 2005 the Department of Defense published a 
directive stipulating that stability operations include greater citizen-driven and bottom-up 
development activities (SIGAR 2017b, 17). USIP recommended that “rigorous analysis of the 
local political dynamics” be conducted in order to effectively tackle issues such as land reform 
(Gaston, Sarwari, and Strand 2013, 3). The World Bank also argued in favor of preserving the 
advantages of local, informal, community-based mechanisms for resolving disputes (Medvedev 
2005). At first, confronting grievances in this manner received little attention and resources. This 
is unsurprising, given the contradiction between these objectives and the intervention’s initial 
“light footprint.” Meanwhile, the insurgency began to grow as a formidable threat to the new 
political order.  
In 2009, USAID began using a tool called the District Stabilization Framework (DSF), in 
order to target “grievances the Taliban could exploit to make their presence in the community 
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more valuable and desirable” (SIGAR 2018b, 44). First tested in Somalia in 2006, this 
framework was used to identify local ‘sources of instability’ (SOIs) based on community 
concerns, and to design programs to address them (Osburg et al. 2014, White 2017). U.S. 
personnel and coalition members worked to form stability working groups, identify SOIs, locate 
strong local institutions such as respected shuras, and connect these institutions to the 
government using development projects (SIGAR 2018b). Such projects became a central part of 
U.S. counterinsurgency strategy throughout the surge period to “win hearts and minds,” despite 
difficulties in evaluating the effectiveness of the framework (White 2017). 
 Around the same time, military commanders began making efforts to understand local 
grievances and social dynamics for their tactical value. They increased their efforts to gather and 
utilize this information by deploying Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) in their areas of operations. 
These teams made efforts to better understand local communities, culture, and demographics in 
order to prevent insurgent violence. They were designed to provide combat forces with 
“sociocultural knowledge,” advising commanders on how to win popular support and isolate 
enemy combatants (Lamb, Orton, Davies, and Pikulsky 2013). Rapid expansion of the program 
began in 2009, after first being tested in Khost province in 2007. Trained and vetted social 
scientists performed assessments of social connections in peaceful communities, using them to 
provide insight into changing demographics in areas of conflict and displacement (Price 2017). 
The teams ultimately faced criticism, due to ethical concerns from the American Anthropological 
Association for putting social scientists and the human subjects of their research in harm’s way 
(AAA). Although they were successful at reducing violence in certain specific cases (Autesserre 
2010, 250), the program failed to make a broader-scale impact on overall tensions (Lamb, Orton, 
Davies, and Pikulsky 2013). 
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 Humanitarian aid had previously been delivered by a wide variety of separate coalition 
members, international relief organizations, and non-profit organizations (NGOs), with limited 
collective oversight. After recognizing the importance of winning over the local population, 
these aid efforts became more unified, better-funded, and more strategically targeted. In 2009, 
military commanders were encouraged to use CERP’s quick-impact development funds for 
projects that could be transferred to the Afghan government to increase its legitimacy, and 
program spending peaked at $500.70 million (SIGAR 2018b). This effort became more focused 
on shifting civilian attitudes away from the Taliban, in the hopes that this would undermine their 
support. The CERP funds became viewed as an “excellent enabler of winning hearts and minds” 
by military commanders who used them “to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility” (SIGAR 2018a, 148). In 2010, 
USAID started the Stabilization Unit (Stab-U) that prioritized the following five aid initiatives: 
(1) training both formal and informal local government officials, (2) funding more development 
and infrastructure projects, (3) providing cash-for-work programs to employ jobless Afghans 
who might otherwise fight for the Taliban, (4) providing financial compensation for civilians 
who had been killed, injured, or suffered property damage, and (5) supporting the leadership of 
local shura councils (SIGAR 2018b). These measures were all designed to address grievances 
towards the Afghan government and win favor.  
 Unfortunately, these efforts to address local grievances were ineffective for several 
reasons. First, such programs tended to undermine the government’s capacity rather than directly 
increase it. A report published by The Brookings Institution found that they created parallel 
institutions that were unsustainable to maintain following troop withdrawal, and which sabotaged 
long term economic growth by undercutting local markets and microcredit programs (Felbab-
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Brown 2012, 176). Further, civilians rarely linked any benefits that did result back to the central 
government. Local power-seekers would actively position themselves in order to insinuate 
connections to international troops and the funding that they provided (Coburn 2011a, Waldman 
2008). The frequency of such posturing behavior obscured the fact that the money was coming 
through official government channels (Coburn 2011a). 
 Second, assistance meant for empowering official leadership tended to disregard the 
important role of informal or traditional leadership, which in many cases was more effective in 
resolving local grievances and disputes. Therefore, aid meant to bolster the standing of formal 
leaders did little to provide them with the capability of resolving disputes that might lead to 
fighting (Jones 2010, SIGAR 2013). Thus, any positive attitudes created towards the Afghan 
government may not have directly addressed the underlying grievances that pushed civilians to 
support the Taliban in the first place. Although empowering formal governance could have 
potentially replaced informal leadership if it had clearly presented itself as an effective 
adjudication alternative, its capacity remained too weak and civilians did not trust it due to high 
levels of corruption (SIGAR 2016). The U.S. later realized the important role of informal 
governance actors and created a few programs to reach out to traditional leaders, such as 
USAID’s Stability in Key Areas (SIKA) program and the Village Stability Operations (VSO) 
program. These initiatives each worked to build local governance capacity and help villagers to 
provide their own security (SIGAR 2013). However, they were not put into practice until the end 
of 2011 to 2012, and Karzai’s government was concerned that they might result in 
decentralization and undermine his authority (SIGAR 2013). 
Third, the effectiveness of aid meant to “win hearts and minds” was difficult to evaluate, 
and the large amounts of funds dedicated to this goal were challenging to administer and 
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monitor. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense struggled to develop measures of 
effectiveness for the impact of its CERP projects, leading to a greater focus on simply the 
amount of money that commanders disbursed (SIGAR 2018b). Although coordination had 
improved since early on in the intervention, too much aid provided by too many separate 
organizations with little accountability continued to sow discontent and tensions between 
communities (Dorronsoro 2009). These aid dollars fueled corruption, contributed to the creation 
of a rentier state, and undermined overall stability (Dennys 2009, Dorronsoro 2009, Jones 2010, 
SIGAR 2018a). While some projects may have generated goodwill in isolated cases, in others it 
may have “consolidated existing power imbalances, favoured one community or part of a 
community over another, [was] used to extract bribes, or [was] diverted for criminal or 
subversive purposes” (Waldman 2008, 11). In some instances, international aid may have even 
funded the Taliban, possibly due to poor monitoring of local contracting practices or through 
extortion (Dorronsoro 2009, SIGAR 2018a). 
 There is also evidence that the provision of aid and development assistance creates 
targets for insurgent violence, placing civilians at a greater risk of attacks. For example, one 
study conducted in 2011 found that pro-counterinsurgent attitudes significantly improved the 
accuracy of predicting the location of insurgent attacks (Hirose, Imai, and Lyall 2017). By 
surveying the attitudes of Afghans, the study determined that overall, winning the hearts and 
minds of a population can threaten their physical safely, as the Taliban may seek to punish 
civilians for supporting the government. Another study in 2016 supported these findings, 
demonstrating that aid in contested districts may significantly increase the risk of violence as 
insurgents attempt to sabotage the goodwill earned through development and humanitarian 
projects (Sexton 2016). New infrastructure such as roads and schools may also become a 
 184 
symbolic target for violence, undermining their positive effects on public perception and 
destroying the products of aid spending. 
 Fourth, persistent insecurity and the inability of the international coalition to remove the 
threat of insurgent attacks crippled attempts to “win hearts and minds.” The on-going violence 
discouraged Afghans from placing their trust in the government and international coalition 
forces. Insecurity and violence fueled popular discontentment, and the additional threat of 
punishment from the Taliban dissuaded pro-government and pro-coalition support. The 
instability of the conflict environment increased the pressure on the U.S. and its allies to 
prioritize securitization efforts over local outreach and mediation activities. Therefore, 
confronting grievances of the population, particularly in more peaceful districts where they were 
most likely to work, was not pursued in a meaningful way (Jones 2010). Although the examples 
above describe numerous attempts by the U.S. to confront local conflict drivers, these programs 
were not prioritized or provided with the support necessary to make a widespread difference. 
Instead, securitization consistently monopolized the available resources and manpower. 
(Malkasian 2013). 
 Finally, the attention that the international community did provide to local dynamics and 
grievances neglected some of the most frequently-cited causes of disputes for Afghans, such as 
land disputes, conflicts over water access, and social or religious issues. For example, while there 
were several PRT projects that provided improved irrigation infrastructure and access to clean 
drinking water and sanitation, these projects provided temporary economic relief rather than 
directly confronting tensions resulting from improper resource management in the longer term 
(USAID 2004). Similarly, U.S. policy almost entirely lacked formal programs for religious 
outreach, land reform, or engagement with informal leaders (Malkasian 2013). There were some 
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exceptions in the area of land reform as its role in local tensions became increasingly evident, 
however these efforts were isolated, poorly funded, and weakened by imbalanced authority 
between formal and informal powerholders.  
The World Bank in 2005 published a report recognizing the importance of addressing 
property rights in Kabul and provided recommendations for addressing them (Medvedev 2005). 
They advised that “formal titling will not on its own resolve or eliminate property disputes” and 
that instead, “community-based mechanisms” and “customary norms” should be leveraged in 
order to address conflicts (Medvedev 2005, 3). They recommended that interveners upgrade both 
formal and informal institutions, while avoiding making a distinction between the two.  
 Despite these recommendations, U.S. attempts at land reform focused overwhelmingly on 
formalization. The USAID Land Titling and Economic Restructuring in Afghanistan 
(LTERA) project from 2004 to 2009 concentrated on formalization of land titling and 
registration, as well as privatization (OIG 2009, LandLinks). Its goal, rather than addressing 
local disputes, was to facilitate the establishment of private businesses and to encourage the use 
of land as collateral for credit (OIG 2009). In 2011, USAID also initiated the Land Reform in 
Afghanistan (LARA) program, which aimed to formalize informal settlements by mapping plots 
of land, establish legal frameworks for managing land issues, and build the capacity of formal 
land ministries (SIGAR 2017a). While it successfully created maps, records, training, and 
assessments, these efforts were mostly limited to areas around Jalalabad. Further, there was no 
assessment performed as to whether or not these efforts helped uphold the legitimacy of land 
rights or resolve disputes (LandLinks , SIGAR 2017a).  
 The only land reform initiative that addressed informal mechanisms for land rights and 
dispute resolution was a series of pilot projects performed by USIP in several provinces in 2009 
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(Gaston, Sarwari, and Strand 2013). The projects sought to link informal justice systems to the 
formal institutions of the government, which would enable these systems to be integrated and 
legitimized. This would also allow the legal accountability of the government to benefit from the 
accessibility and functionality of the informal sector (Gaston, Sarwari, and Strand 2013). The 
functions of adjudicating land disputes were divided between formal and informal leaders, and 
informal leaders were encouraged to register their conflict resolution decisions with the formal 
government. Unfortunately, subsequent reviews of the program found that communities often 
resisted officially referring and registering informal land rights decisions, because “formal 
government participation or records were perceived to offer few tangible enforcement benefits 
and relatively high social, economic and security consequences” (Gaston, Sarwari, and Strand 
2013, 3). Communities were concerned about government involvement in private family matters, 
and wanted to avoid either penal consequences for criminal cases or land grabbing, bribes, and 
taxes on previously unregistered land (Gaston, Sarwari, and Strand 2013, Gaston and Dang 
2015). Consistent with the warnings of the World Bank, none of the USIP, LTERA, or LARA 
programs demonstrated a notable success in resolving widespread land disputes, possibly due to 
strong mistrust of formal institutions and international involvement.  
Efforts at addressing land reform were isolated and not held in high priority by the 
international community. Despite recognizing the central role of land grievances in the conflict, 
the U.S. “explicitly shunned any attempt at it,” and “refused to do anything official or pressure 
the Afghan government,” which resisted U.S. involvement due to concerns about local 
sovereignty (Malkasian 2013, 268). Some Afghans even viewed outside involvement in this 
issue as tantamount to colonialism.  
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Empowering informal and traditional leaders could have better facilitated international 
support for tackling sensitive local grievances. Instead, the U.S. relied overwhelmingly on formal 
officials who often lacked the authority or legitimacy to implement effective policies. Formal 
institutions and powerholders lacked the trust of the population needed to engage meaningfully 
on local issues. Power meanwhile remained concentrated in the hands of informal leaders with 
whom the coalition failed to meaningfully engage, or worse, in the hands of militia leaders with 
the ability to exercise force.  
 Ultimately, grievances fueled the overall conflict as they continually contributed to 
conflict fighting. Although fighting was not directly motivated by underlying grievances, the 
grievances led communities to provide combatants with support, for example choosing to harbor 
Taliban fighters in their homes or alternatively reporting their presence to U.S. troops (Jackson 
and Weigand 2019, Jones 2010, Malkasian 2013, Ruttig 2010, Schetter and Glassner 2011). 
Civilians sometimes provided this support to gain leverage in resolving their disputes, to “settle 
scores,” or to seize land (Jackson 2019, Jones 2010, Malkasian 2013). Combatants from both 
sides clearly benefitted from the tensions between communities, translating them into battlefield 
gains. Taliban insurgents went so far as to intentionally exacerbate local rivalries in order to 
further their agenda (Waldman 2008). Aided by a deep understanding of local problems, they 
specifically targeted tribes that had been previously marginalized by the provincial government 
and international community, encouraging these groups to join the insurgency (Coburn 2011a, 
Jackson and Weigand 2019). The existence of community grievances may have continuously 
encouraged fighting to such an extent that ending the conflict was unlikely without also 
providing alternative mechanisms for the resolution of those grievances. 
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Assessment of Afghanistan Intervention 
The persistence of grievances and a lack of mechanisms for resolving disputes played a 
significant role in fueling conflict in Afghanistan. Then, as fighting wore on, it further 
exacerbated these underlying grievances. Displacement of civilians worsened conflicts over land 
rights, poverty and corruption created resentment towards elites, and shifting power dynamics 
towards militiamen and religious leaders sidelined traditional leadership institutions. The Taliban 
took advantage of these grievances in order to benefit their fighting capabilities, and civilians 
often supported them in order to seek revenge for inflicted violence (Jackson 2019, Malkasian 
2013). Thus, the relationship between local grievances and overall fighting was cyclical in 
nature, with each continually worsening the other. Ending this cycle would require resolving 
conflict at both the national and the local levels.  
Early on in the conflict, the United States enjoyed substantial success in defeating al-
Qaeda and destroying its safe havens, while creating the opportunity to deliver much-needed 
humanitarian assistance to the long-suffering civilian population. However, while the U.S. and 
the international coalition in Afghanistan eventually recognized the need to address civilian 
grievances, they did not seriously prioritize these efforts or tackle them at their local roots. 
Because of persistent insecurity and difficulty in suppressing violence in the country, primary 
focus was placed on the tactical military counterinsurgency. As the conflict escalated, the 
intervention itself exacerbated existing divisions, creating new sources of resentment over aid 
distribution, government corruption, and civilian casualties. This led to further strengthening and 
support for the Taliban. The U.S. and the international coalition became overburdened by combat 
operations and did not have the resources or manpower to spare towards simultaneously tackling 
grievances in an effective way.   
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Between 2001 and 2005, during the early stages of the intervention, there may have been 
a window of opportunity to address underlying civilian grievances more effectively. The 
insurgency had not yet coalesced to a degree that it could launch widespread attacks. Therefore, 
coalition forces could have dedicated more of their attention to supporting local conflict 
resolution programs rather than fighting insurgents. This could have potentially resolved some of 
the underlying issues that led civilians to support to join the Taliban later on. Deployment of 
Human Terrain Teams (HTTs), funding for poverty reduction programs, land reform projects, 
and support for local governance capacity may have yielded better results before the government 
began losing legitimacy in the eyes of the civilian population.  
Unfortunately, during these early years there was also a substantial deficiency in police 
capacity, which led to a surge in local instability and crime. Foreign interveners would have 
needed to also dedicate more attention to building police forces. Early efforts in this area were 
unsuccessful due to few personnel and slow recruitment. The desire to maintain a “light 
footprint” served as a political obstacle to greater spending and deployment of personnel, 
especially with the start of the 2003 Iraq War and before the Taliban insurgency that justified 
additional troops later on. The early goal of the intervention was simply to rid the country of 
terrorist safe havens, and it did not anticipate the intensity of conflict that would later ensue. 
Therefore, local instability might have still undermined efforts to address grievances. 
In addition, the international community did not yet recognize how significantly 
grievances between communities and towards the government would ultimately strengthen the 
Taliban. These lessons were not learned until later in the conflict, once foreign agencies had been 
operating in the country for several years. Information gathered and experience gained over time 
helped inform attempts to resolve grievances later, but even these efforts were plagued by 
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misunderstandings of the local environment. It is therefore unlikely that interveners could have 





On the surface, Libya appears to have a fairly simple societal makeup, with no deep sectarian or 
ethnic fault lines and with a primarily Sunni Muslim and Arabic-speaking population (Wehrey 
2018). However, local societal dynamics in Libya vary widely between different geographic 
areas and are shaped by tribal identities, religious beliefs, and fluctuating relationships with 
political regimes. Since the 10th century, tribal affiliations formed the basis of social and political 
life (Cole and Mangan 2016a). Throughout the region’s early history and during subsequent 
occupations by the Ottomans and Italians, groups maintained their tribal identities and used them 
to establish trade and security relationships (Ahmida 2009). Some tribes asserted control over 
Mediterranean merchant activity along the coast, while others set up trade routes in the south. 
Competition over control of these flows of resources have contributed to the divided nature of 
Libyan society. According to a report published by USIP, the state has historically been 
obligated to co-opt powerful tribal leaders and families in order to persuade them to accept its 
presence and create unity (Cole and Mangan 2016a).  
Libya is comprised of three main regions, Tripolitania in the west, Cyrenaica in the east, 
and Fezzan to the south. Colonization by Italy from 1911 to 1947 led to growth in capitalism in 
Tripolitania and Cyrenaica along Libya’s coast that empowered the wealthy merchants, whereas 
in southern and rural areas collectivism was much more common (Ahmida 2009). Armed tribes 
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in Fezzan were largely self-sufficient, making alliances for self-defense and earning wealth 
through the operation and protection of trans-Saharan trade routes. Most tribes in Libya are 
based on shared bloodlines or traditions, but in many cases they evolved over time around small 
networks of political actors or notables (Cole and Mangan 2016a). As a result, there is no single 
manner in which these tribes exercise control or decisionmaking; generally, respected leaders 
with social status and inherited leadership make decisions and resolve disputes using customary 
law (Cole and Mangan 2016a, Elmangoush 2015). 
Tribal influence has increasingly competed with the rise of other local and political 
forces, such as centralized political authority, urbanization, globalization, and regional political 
and religious movements (Cole and Mangan 2016a). In 1969, Muammar Qaddafi overthrew the 
pre-existing monarchy of King Idris I and became the ruler of Libya. According to Libya 
historian Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, Qaddafi unified the country through a counter-western, 
nationalist ideology that also appealed to the role of Islam in daily life (Ahmida 2009). During 
his reign, some tribes were granted a stronger political position than they had once held in the 
past (Elmangoush 2015). While neighboring North African countries experienced a diminishing 
role for tribal elites during their transitions to consolidated statehood, the opposite occurred in 
Libya (Tabib 2014). Qaddafi empowered those elites who he could rely on to monitor and 
maintain control, calling for “direct democracy” and “people’s committees” to resolve disputes 
independently at the local level (Ahmida 2009, Qaddafi and Christman 1988, Tabib 2014). He 
also marginalized those tribes and local leaders who he viewed as a threat to his authority (Cole 
and Mangan 2016a). Informal trade networks helped to cement tribal power, allowing them to 
govern through the distribution of resources. Overall, Qaddafi’s reliance on decentralized 
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relationships led to a lack of development of alternative political institutions, and there was little 
to no creation of compromise mechanisms between groups (Tabib 2014). 
Particularly in the south of the country, Qaddafi pitted tribes against one another and 
manipulated their citizenship status in order to secure loyalties (Wehrey 2017). For example, 
according to Libya expert Frederic Wehrey, the mostly illiterate Tabu tribe had a tradition of 
passing down lineage history through oral customs, and by creating new laws requiring written 
family records, he effectively barred them from obtaining rights of citizenship (Wehrey 2017). 
He manipulated their loyalty to gain support during a border conflict with neighboring Chad, but 
ultimately disenfranchised them again by denying access to jobs, travel, and social services 
(Wehrey 2017, Wehrey 2018). He also marginalized the southern Tuareg tribe, investing in little 
infrastructure development in the regions that they inhabited despite the discovery of oil 
resources nearby (Wehrey 2017). 
Qaddafi embraced political conservatism and encouraged the practice of Sharia law, or 
the strict legal adherence to the Qur’an. However, he banned religious organizations like the 
Muslim Brotherhood who later formed political wings and party activism from positions in exile. 
Nonetheless, religious forces still played a role in mobilizing society, and local religious councils 
or shuras still existed in many communities. Some radical jihadi movements were created during 
the 1970’s, and many Libyan fighters left for Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union 
during the 1980’s (CGRS 2014). This led to tensions with the regime upon their return, as 
extremists began to turn their movements against Qaddafi’s rule. Therefore, a tradition of tension 




Context of the Conflict 
Over the course of Qaddafi’s 42-year reign, economic conditions in the country vastly improved 
for everyday Libyans and the country remained secure. He was initially a popular leader whose 
economic reforms were well-received and improved the standard of living for the average citizen 
(Ahmida 2009). However, his regime suppressed all opposition and political competition, 
limiting any semblance of civic organization (Tabib 2014). While he espoused a populist 
message that promoted direct democracy “of the people,” his regime was nothing short of a 
totalitarian authority that maintained complete oversight over political affairs, with no room for 
opposition incorporated into the existing system (Qaddafi and Christman 1988). Though he 
endowed tribal leaders with the autonomy to make informal local decisions, there was no formal 
institutionalized responsibility authorized outside of his own control. In many cases, this led to 
resentment against his rule.  
 Despite some of these internal tensions, Libya remained largely stable and peaceful. Oil 
wealth led Libya to have one of the largest per capita incomes in Africa, and Qaddafi used some 
of it to pacify local leaders and provide social services (Barbour et al. 2020). However, this 
income was often disproportionately distributed. Cities in the east and in the south were 
neglected and received fewer social services than in the northwest. Corruption and high 
unemployment rates created further animosity (Wehrey 2018). Qaddafi used some of this wealth 
to fund rebel movements throughout Africa and around the world, drawing the ire of the 
international community. He provided arms to rebels in Nicaragua, sent troops to fight alongside 
militants in Sudan and Chad, and was linked to attacks by the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland 
(Ogunbadejo 1986, Wehrey 2018). 
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 In December of 2010, a street vendor in Tunis, Tunisia set himself on fire in response to 
perceived injustice from local police. His death in January 2011 sparked widespread protests 
against the government, ultimately resulting in its overthrow. A wave of similar protests swept 
across the Middle East and North Africa in response, including in Libya. On February 16th in the 
eastern city of Benghazi, crowds of protestors demonstrated against human rights abuses 
committed by the regime (Wehrey 2018). Qaddafi responded swiftly and violently, cracking 
down on the protests using military force. These actions only served to further galvanize the 
population, and protestors began to organize in greater numbers. Qaddafi continued to attack 
them, but soon local security officials began to defect in support of the protests. Ultimately the 
regime completely lost control of the city (Wehrey 2018). 
 By March, a full-blown opposition movement had coalesced, engaging in daily battles 
with Gaddafi’s forces. It was comprised of a broad cross-section of different groups from 
throughout Libyan society; civilian protestors, human rights activists, defected security forces, 
Islamist leaders, and newly formed tribal militias (Wehrey 2018). Finally, as the swell of 
resistance in major cities showed little sign of abatement, Qaddafi began mobilizing troops to 
attack Benghazi in full force to reclaim the city. He amassed columns of troops, tanks, artillery 
and rocket launchers in preparation for a full siege (Wehrey 2018). This prompted the U.S. and 
NATO to intervene militarily, establishing a no-fly zone over Libyan airspace. The intervention 
effectively restricted the regime’s military power and protected anti-Qaddafi forces battling on 
the ground. The move was swift and successful; in late August the opposition captured Tripoli, 
and in October Qaddafi was killed by rebel fighters (Wehrey 2018). The war to overthrow his 
regime had successfully concluded.  
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The initial months following Qaddafi’s ousting were largely peaceful. A National 
Transitional Council (NTC) was created to oversee the political transition, and the UN began 
assisting with planning an election. Unfortunately, fractionalization amongst the anti-regime 
opposition groups quickly led to discord. Various tribal-based and Islamist militias emerged, 
jockeying to advance their own interests (Tabib 2014). Despite peaceful and widely-supported 
elections of the new Government of National Authority (GNA), over the next year sporadic 
violence and competition over Libya’s resources began to destabilize the country. The failure of 
the new state to provide protection and suppress violence led to increased tribal militia activity, 
and the GNA quickly lost the confidence of Libyans.  
By 2014, lawlessness and insecurity were rampant. This prompted General Khalifa 
Haftar, a former commander from Qaddafi’s regime, to return from exile and seize control of 
strategic areas in the east of the country. He declared the newly-elected House of Representatives 
(HoR) to be the legitimate central government, sparking a full-blown civil war between those 
factions backing the HoR and others who remained loyal to the GNA (Tabib 2014, Wehrey 
2018). With financial assistance flowing in from neighboring Egypt, he earned local support by 
capitalizing on grievances such as disenchantment with the new government, resentment at the 
exclusion of former Qaddafi officials, anti-Islamist sentiment, and feelings of exclusion in the 
east (Wehrey 2018, 173). 
Since Haftar’s emergence until present-day, the civil war has dragged on. As a result, 
jihadist groups to include the Islamic State (IS), also known as Daesh, have proliferated 
alongside criminal militias (Chivvis 2016). This environment threatens stability throughout the 
Sahel and the national security interests of Europe and the United States. The proliferation of 
weapons to nearby conflicts in Mali, Niger, and Chad, as well as increased trafficking of persons 
 196 
has created humanitarian crises and contributed to continued conflict violence in the region 
(Lounnas 2018, Patrick and Bennett 2013).  
 
Militarization of Civilian Grievances 
Throughout the early history of Libya, due to weak or nonexistent overarching control, tribal 
identities served at the cleavages along which competition took place. Different tribes fought 
against their rivals in order to earn themselves resources and power (Ahmida 2009, Tabib 2014). 
In the south along the Sahara desert, the Tuareg and the Tebu tribes fought for years over control 
of caravan routes, pastures, and later oil fields and trade from Algeria, Mali, and Sudan (Wehrey 
2017). Over time, the signing of treaties, the rise and fall of political regimes, and finally the 42-
year reign of Qaddafi managed to suppress such rivalries and achieve relative peace between 
groups. The strength of Qaddafi’s power and his monopoly on violence limited disputes between 
communities and facilitated their fairly peaceful resolution through traditional mechanisms. 
However, the preexisting cleavages were not completely eliminated. Qaddafi’s style of 
leadership preserved and cemented these divisions as he balanced different groups against one 
another during his reign (Tabib 2014). He formed privileged groups of civilians who he used to 
spy and inform on dissidents, and recruited impoverished people who he provided with wealth 
and power in exchange for loyalty (Elmangoush 2015).  
As the government fell in 2011, societal cleavages began to reemerge, escalating into 
violence between those who Qaddafi had granted positions of political power and those he had 
not, and between tribes that Qaddafi had favored and those he had not (Tabib 2014). In the south, 
Qaddafi had favored the Tuaregs while denying the Tebu access to trade. Therefore, as the 
revolution commenced, the Tebu revolted against the regime and began clashing with the 
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Tuaregs (Wehrey 2018). In the west, Qaddafi had provided free public housing and jobs to the 
inhabitants of Tawerga, a suburb on the outskirts of the western city of Misrata. During the 
revolution they came to his defense, attacking and pillaging the homes of Misratan 
revolutionaries (Wehrey 2018). This in turn led to Misratans attacking Tawerga in revenge.  
Qaddafi had also sowed seeds of discord in the east. Libya’s second-largest city of 
Benghazi had once been a wealthy and culturally rich urban center, but the leader had shifted 
attention and resources west to Tripoli, allowing it to fall into disrepair (Wehrey 2018). Derna, 
another prominent and independent coastal city, was also neglected and denied resources by the 
regime. Many residents of Derna had left to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during 
the 1980s, and upon their return they joined the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a small 
insurgency that took place in the mid-1990s (Wehrey 2018, 116). Qaddafi had retaliated against 
the entire city by abolishing social services and programs. Consequently, during the revolution 
both Benghazi and Derna became hubs for Islamist groups that rallied against his regime. After 
Qaddafi’s fall, tensions over power, and to some degree ideology, arose between Islamist groups 
and other eastern militias, escalating into frequent violence (Wehrey 2018, 116). 
Ultimately, the divisions that Qaddafi had carefully preserved during his reign formed the 
basis of grievances and intergroup competition after his removal. Although groups temporarily 
united during the revolution, its success left behind a society not only still divided by these 
identities, but without strong state institutions to resolve their disputes. Qaddafi had exerted 
power through informal and personalized organizations that were “hollow” and did not outlast 
his tenure (Romanet Perroux 2019). Therefore, there were no systems in place to manage the 
erupting competition. The new transitional government was not strong enough to consolidate 
power or achieve a monopoly on the use of force. The various groups with decades of mistrust 
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and rivalry between them had become further militarized by the revolutionary struggle. Violence 
erupted over the future direction of the country and division of spoils.  
In this atmosphere of insecurity, Libyan civilians began to take up arms themselves. 
Thousands of militia groups formed from splintered opposition groups that had fought during the 
revolution, groups of former police and military members, and opportunists who leveraged the 
use of force to exploit economic opportunities (Pack 2019). They often grouped themselves 
based on common neighborhoods, villages, or tribal identities, providing their own security in 
the vacuum of power and fighting on behalf of their community interests (Pack 2019). Young 
men with few employment prospects were more likely to join. A “security dilemma” resulted, in 
which no group was willing to stop fighting and risk ceding power and security to a competitor 
(Wehrey 2018). This became a major contributing factor to violence in the country. Militia 
groups divided Tripoli and Benghazi into small fiefdoms and regularly engaged in clashes.  
Militias were able to proliferate so quickly because of easy access to weapons. Qaddafi 
had pursued a massive weapons buildup during the 1970s and 1980s, assisted by the Soviet 
Union and income from oil wealth (Lutterbeck 2009). He purchased large numbers of surface-to-
air missiles, tanks, and mortars, as well as small arms such as Kalashnikovs. Most of these 
weapons were stored in stockpiles scattered throughout the country, so that in the event of a 
foreign invasion, citizens could arms themselves and assist the army (Lutterbeck 2009, Marsh 
2017). Prior to 2011, firearms in civilian possession were fairly rare, with little evidence of 
communities using weapons to escalate local disputes (Marsh 2017, 80). There were some 
attempts to assassinate Qaddafi orchestrated by former mujahideen LIFG fighters, but incidents 
of groups obtaining weapons and engaging in organized violence were also rare (Vandewalle 
2016).  
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However, following the regime’s collapse, militia groups raided the weapons stockpiles 
that were largely abandoned and unsecured (Hauslohner 2011). While the U.S. managed to 
destroy Man-Portable-Air-Defense-Systems (MANPADS) and chemical weapons sites, militias 
seized thousands of small arms, selling some of them to regional traders and militants, to include 
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Hauslohner 2011). Significant numbers of police and 
military who had defected to the opposition also contributed equipment from military depots 
(Wehrey 2018). As militias grew in strength, they received more weapons and funding from 
foreign backers such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (Risen, Mazzetti, and Schmidt 2012, 
Wehrey 2018)  
The new government was unable to control the explosion in weapons flows and the 
proliferation of militias. Without the expert balancing and suppression capabilities of the old 
regime, local groups were now free to arm themselves and pursue their own interests. The 
government claimed that some of the militias fell under their control, and attempted to coopt 
them by providing them with funding in order to provide security on the government’s behalf 
(Pack 2019). However, these groups usually behaved independently and demonstrated little 
willingness to carry out government orders (Wehrey 2018). For example, Zintani militias in 
Tripoli were supposedly subordinate to the new Ministry of Defense, but they continued to seek 
outside funding and weapons from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Wehrey 2018, 94). 
Throughout the country, communities had the agency to militarize independently, taking 
responsibility for their own protection and using force to gain benefits.  
In summary, local grievances did not result in fighting during Qaddafi’s reign, but they 
did contribute once the revolution began, culminating in an escalation to civil war in 2014. While 
the different factions were united in their goal of overthrowing the regime during the uprising’s 
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initial months, they maintained the underlying grievances that motivated them to fight. 
Therefore, following a short period of peace during which a new government was successfully 
established, violence quickly resumed as those grievances resurfaced. While some of this conflict 
could have been caused by lingering disagreement over the remnants of Qaddafi’s power, 
namely the role of former Qaddafi loyalists in the new government, it was mostly caused by 
insecurity and competition between communities as well as contention between different identity 
groups, who took the opportunity to reclaim access to resources or to seek revenge.  This 
significantly undermined the legitimacy of the new government and weakened its ability to 
exercise authority, resulting in the militias’ free reign. 
 
International Intervention 
In February 2011 when Qaddafi began mobilizing his troops against civilian protestors, the 
international community was quick to respond. The United States raised “strong objections to the 
use of lethal force against peaceful demonstrators,” and the UN and the Arab League also issued 
statements condemning the violence (U.S. Department of State 2011a, U.S. Department of State 
2011b). However, Qaddafi continued his violent crackdown, raising allegations of shootings, 
arrests and torture. The U.S. began revoking visas of Libyan senior officials and freezing billions 
of dollars in government assets (Cooper and Landler 2011). It also held meetings with the UN 
and the European Union (EU) in order to coordinate a response. On February 25, 2011, the UN 
Human Rights Council passed a resolution condemning the human rights violations and initiating 
an independent commission of inquiry (U.S. Department of State 2011b) . 
 By March, with the opposition movement engaged in open battles with Qaddafi’s forces, 
European countries such as France and Italy grew increasingly disturbed by the deteriorating 
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situation. They were concerned about the growing threat of a refugee crisis as well as their 
economic interests, with global oil markets peaking at record high prices. Officials in the Obama 
administration also raised concerns about a humanitarian crisis if Qaddafi were to attack 
Benghazi. After meeting with the newly formed National Transitional Council (NTC) and 
consulting with its allies, the United States began to call for intervention. On March 17, the UN 
Security Council voted in favor of Resolution 1973 proposing a no-fly zone over Libya to defend 
Libyan civilians with “all necessary measures” (Clinton 2014, 372). NATO launched Operation 
Odyssey Dawn two days later, with the U.S. taking the lead coordinating role. The goal was to 
protect civilians while leaving as light a “footprint” as possible, with the U.S. stating that it 
would not place American “boots on the ground” (Clinton 2014, 304). 
 The United States launched cruise missiles from ships in the Mediterranean in order to 
disable Qaddafi’s anti-aircraft system, while French planes targeted Libyan ground forces from 
the air (U.S. Department of Defense 2011). The no-fly zone was first established over major 
cities and air bases, but soon expanded to include the entire Libyan coastline. The coalition 
rendered Qaddafi’s air defenses ineffective and grounded his air force. Despite claims that the 
intervention was not meant to overthrow Qaddafi, the operations also provided air cover to 
Libyan opposition forces. With the foreign air coverage, the opposition was able to fight back the 
army and capture major cities. Limited numbers of Special Operations forces on the ground from 
France and the UK also helped the rebels push the army out of Misrata by calling in precision air 
strikes (Wehrey 2018, 55). In addition, the U.S. targeted stockpiles of chemical weapons, and 
launched a task force to secure Man-Portable-Air-Defense-Systems (MANPADS). 
 On March 31, NATO assumed command of coalition forces, commencing Operation 
Unified Protector. Despite continuing to reiterate that the goal of the intervention was not to 
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remove Qaddafi, operations continued to support the opposition on the ground. The U.S. and UN 
engaged in meetings with the NTC and provided humanitarian aid to the rebel fighters. While the 
U.S. was skeptical of directly arming the opposition due to concern about their potential 
affiliations with terror organizations, they tacitly permitted the UAE to provide arms instead 
(Bumiller and Shanker 2011, Wehrey 2018, 58). Qatar meanwhile provided weapons and support 
to Islamist militias.8 With continued NATO support from the air, in August the rebels 
successfully captured Tripoli. 
 The U.S. began increasing its engagement with the NTC and publically acknowledged 
that it no longer recognized Qaddafi as having legitimate governing authority (States News 
Service 2011). A Libya Contact Group comprised of allied international partners was created, 
meeting once a month with Libyan and UN officials to plan a political transition. The U.S. and 
its partners worked with the Libyans in order to advise and assist on governance areas such as 
energy, justice, and security (Chollet 2016). They also worked with the NTC’s “Tripoli Task 
Force,” which developed plans for restoration of services, security and governance in the capital 
city (Wehrey 2018, 57). The U.S. took great care to emphasize that its work would be in 
cooperation with international partners, through joint forums such as the Contact Group (Stevens 
2011). By the end of October, Libyan forces captured and killed Qaddafi, and the NATO 
operation concluded on October 31. 
 All of the political groups and stakeholders in Libya agreed that they did not want 
international troops on Libyan soil, and were concerned about the possibility of foreign invasion 
(Wehrey 2018, 71). Therefore, the U.S., its European allies and the UN continued to maintain a 
minimal footprint. The Europeans took responsibility for organizing post-conflict recovery, 
                                                
8 A lack of coordination between the different recipients helped sow the seeds for division that developed later on 
(Wehrey 2018). 
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while also pushing for a central role for the UN in these efforts (Chollet 2016). The UN Support 
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was created with the fairly limited goal of providing technical and 
logistical advising for the organization of elections in July 2012 (UN 2012).  The UN also 
provided comments on newly drafted laws, conducted coordination meetings on security needs, 
supported the transfer of foreign bank account holdings, held workshops on social services and 
civil society, and conducted inspections of weapons storage sites (UN 2012). U.S. civilian 
technical specialists also inspected weapons sites, securing about 5,000 MANPADS by early 
2012 (Shapiro 2012). The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided 
humanitarian aid and assistance to internally displaced persons and refugees, and the World 
Bank and the IMF advised the new government on public expenditure and finance (UN 2012). 
Unfortunately, with clashes erupting between militias throughout Libya, the security 
situation rapidly deteriorated. The UN provided increased guidance and resources to Libyan 
military institutions, but these efforts yielded few results. Libyans continued to resist outside 
military help and the militias continued to grow in power (Wehrey 2018, 100). The central 
government never succeeded in disarming them or incorporating them into the military 
(Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015). In September 2012, armed men stormed a U.S. Consulate 
building in Benghazi and set it on fire, killing U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens. In the 
aftermath of the attack, the Obama administration attempted to train a new Libyan army in 
collaboration with the British, Italians, and the Turks, but these efforts were doomed from the 
start with such a low number of personnel on the ground and no stable military institutions to 
start with (Wehrey 2018, 154). Ultimately, as the conflict escalated into civil war in 2014, the 
international community was ineffective in preventing the violence.  The U.S. evacuated its 
Embassy and the UN abandoned its UNSMIL headquarters, both relocating their operations from 
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Tripoli to Tunis, Tunisia (Londono and Gearan 2014). While engagement and mediation with the 
official GNA government continued, these efforts failed to curb the violence that continues to 
present day.  
 The intervention did effectively resolve the original, broad goals of the conflict. The 
civilian uprising had called for the expulsion of Qaddafi and the creation of a new democratic 
government. U.S. and NATO military support successfully enabled opposition forces to gain 
territory and ultimately to defeat Qaddafi’s army militarily. They also supported the transitional 
NTC and the newly formed GNA once it was elected to power.  
However, deep divisions between groups within Libyan society led to destabilization of 
the peace over time. There remained significant tensions between opposition groups over the 
extent to which the new government should be purged of officials from the previous regime. This 
key debate over the dismantling of the political status quo contributed to the escalation of civil 
war (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015). In 2013, a Political Isolation Law was passed that 
prohibited anyone formally tied to the Qaddafi regime from holding positions in the new 
government, including those who had defected to the opposition during the revolution. This law 
faced significant backlash from many former leaders, who cited it as a reason to take up arms.  
Nonetheless, this contention was mostly motivated by competition for power between 
different tribal and regional groups, rather than ideology. For example, the Zintanis of Arab 
descent frequently engaged in violent clashes over territory with the Misratans of Berber descent 
(Gartenstein-Ross 2019, Pack 2014). The Zintanis had previously been allied with Qaddafi’s 
tribe before the revolution, and were viewed as powerful and relatively non-revolutionary 
(Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016). The Misratans, in an effort to compete 
politically, became aggressive proponents for the Political Isolation Law (Gartenstein-Ross 2019, 
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164, Knecht 2013). This contention emerged primarily due to competition over power and spoils, 
not political ideology. Therefore, unresolved disagreement over the remnants of Qaddafi’s 
regime does not represent a failure of the international community to address the original reasons 
for fighting in Libya. Instead, it represents another symptom of the divisions that existed in 
Libyan society beforehand and which led to a resumption of conflict later on. 
 
Intervention Attention to Grievances 
While the intervention successfully helped to overthrow Qaddafi and resulted in the peaceful 
election of a new democratic government, it did almost nothing to address the underlying 
grievances that contributed to civil war later on. The United States conducted very little planning 
concerning local governance or resolving internal divisions. Obama later stated that “the degree 
of tribal division in Libya was greater than our analysts had expected. And our ability to have 
any kind of structure there that we could interact with and start training and start providing 
resources broke down very quickly” (Goldberg 2016). Derek Chollet, a senior official in 
Obama’s policy planning staff, also claimed that “we did not fully understand Libya and only 
slowly perceived its endemic dysfunction,” and that “because of years of diplomatic 
isolation…there were few experts on Libya either in or out of the government. We had not 
grasped how weak its institutions were or appreciated the internal disunity” (Chollet 2016, 110). 
However, a few months following the commencement of Operation Odyssey Dawn, the 
Council on Foreign Relations published a contingency planning document reviewing possible 
outcomes of the conflict, options for preventing future violence, and recommendations that 
considered post-Qaddafi instability and political change (Serwer 2011). During the same period, 
the UN drafted a pre-assessment for Libya planning that gave thorough background on political 
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divisions in the country, the risks of a power vacuum, tribal and military force weaknesses, and 
the importance of political commitment and trust (UN 2011a). Despite the availability of these 
assessments, the international community did not take them seriously when planning and 
executing operations, and did not engage on local issues outside of senior-level diplomatic 
meetings. During the first phase of the UNSMIL mission beginning with the fall of Qaddafi until 
elections, the only attention given to local conflicts was through a few telephone discussions 
with Libyan officials (Vericat and Hobrara 2018). 
It is likely that Libyan opposition to foreign interference in its internal affairs prevented 
any such engagement. For example, Chollet argues that due to “Libyan sensitivities about 
interference in their internal affairs,” the U.S. could not compel them to disarm local militias, 
and “being more assertive could have backfired to the point where we lost our influence 
completely” (Chollet 2016, 112). Instead, the U.S. continued taking a “light footprint” approach 
and only provided guidance and limited support as requested by the new government. This was 
despite increasing evidence that local rivalries were fueling violence.  
The Libyans themselves did attempt to address some of the grievances that were causing 
militia fighting on their own. They mobilized “short-term mediation teams” that included “local 
notables and tribal leadership” to hold talks between different militias and communities (Vericat 
and Hobrara 2018, 9). However, despite successfully brokering some ceasefires, these efforts did 
not address the underlying causes of clashes. There were few existing traditional institutions or 
mechanisms in the country that garnered enough widespread trust or legitimacy to effectively 
negotiate disputes between the many disparate Libyan communities.  
The negative impact of local rivalries grew increasingly apparent to the international 
community; Ambassador Stevens issued a diplomatic cable in 2012 describing intensifying tribal 
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rivalries, power plays and ideological extremism (Wehrey 2018, 111). Following Stevens’ death, 
U.S. involvement in Libya also became highly politicized in the United States, with partisan 
political attacks gaining traction in Congress. This resulted in very little appetite for risk-taking, 
and it cemented the U.S. stance on limited involvement in Libyan reconstruction (Wehrey 2018). 
Efforts to train an army and police force, as well as to express opposition to the Political 
Isolation Law barring former officials from the new government, were weak and ineffective.  
With the onset of war in 2014, UNSMIL began to recognize the importance of addressing 
local grievances and tried to engage more directly with conflict actors. However, they still faced 
pushback from Libyans opposed to outside involvement in internal affairs (Vericat and Hobrara 
2018). Their engagement was limited to providing encouragement and technical advice to local 
stakeholders, as well as encouraging their contacts to support the GNA. Isolated attempts at 
direct negotiation between militias and the main conflict actors only began much later in 2016 
and 2017, and yielded little success (Vericat and Hobrara 2018). 
 The persistence of underlying grievances that went unaddressed by the international 
community or by the Libyans themselves proved to be influential in disrupting the gains made 
following the revolution, and the subsequent violence and escalation to civil war. For example, 
Mistratan revolutionaries advocated for the purge of former government officials in order to 
undermine the rival power of status quo elites. This elicited widespread discontent from tribes 
who benefited financially from ties to the former regime such as the Zintanis, the Warfalla, and 
Qadhadhfa (Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015). Haftar was therefore able to win the allegiance of 
these tribes in 2014, and they engaged in intense fighting with government-backed militias in 
Tripoli.  
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In another example, Islamist groups occupying eastern cities took up arms against Haftar 
because of his anti-Islamist ideology and his calls for a secular government. He had expressed 
strong disagreement with Islamists and used the international campaign for action against jihadi 
extremists as a free pass to attack any Islamist movement indiscriminately (Gartenstein-Ross and 
Barr 2015). As a result, they created the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) that 
included violent groups such as Ansar al-Sharia (ASL) and the 17 February Martyrs Brigade 
(Gartenstein-Ross and Barr 2015). Despite Haftar’s strongholds in the eastern parts of the 
country, these groups engaged him in heavy fighting around Benghazi, and no side was able to 
consolidate control. 
 
Assessment of Libya Intervention 
The militarization of opposing groups was an important cause of violence in the year following 
the uprising. This destabilized any peace created after Qaddafi’s successful overthrow. Even 
though the international community swiftly and successfully achieved its aims of preventing an 
imminent humanitarian crisis and ultimately supporting a new government, it did not account for 
the underlying divisions in Libyan society, and it did not establish institutions that could have 
managed them. These divisions were viewed both by the interveners and the Libyans themselves 
as purely domestic problems. Underlying tensions persisted and ultimately the country once 
again erupted in violence, sparking a new humanitarian crisis.  
A particular challenge for Libyan officials facing the problem on the ground and for 
international observers lending support from abroad was the high degree of complexity and 
uncertainty throughout a continuously fluctuating situation. While tribes, ideologies, and 
political stances loosely represented the cleavages along which groups held grievances, such 
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definitions were often fluid or not clear-cut. For example, many tribes were actually comprised 
of a complex array of subtribes, and Libyans themselves did not know to which they belonged or 
did not feel represented by them (Vericat and Hobrara 2018, 18). Even when disputes were 
mediated between them, frequent changes in tribal leadership would require entirely new 
agreements to be created. These complex cleavages directly contributed to civil war. General 
Haftar mobilized many of the competing militias when initiating hostilities against the new 
government.  
Resolving grievances, or developing institutions that could manage them, might have 
been a possible option for preventing violence. There were some Libyan communities that 
managed to provide their own security, justice, and economic systems in isolated “islands of 
stability” (Vericat and Hobrara 2018). They used local mediation initiatives to resolve conflicts, 
demonstrating that the destabilization of peace could have been avoided. Unfortunately, the new 
Libyan government was too weak to support such efforts on a broad scale and the international 
community did not plan for or conduct the necessary activities. Even if the intervention had 
expressed interest in confronting these issues, the complexity of Libya’s internal divisions would 
have necessitated a significant information-gathering effort. The U.S. and its European allies 
would have been challenged to do so, given concerns about personnel security alongside the 
desire to maintain a light footprint. There were too few people on the ground to meaningfully 
engage with local communities in major cities, much less across the country. Finally, logistics 
aside, Libyan hostility towards external meddling in its internal affairs would have prohibited 






4.3 Militarization of Civilian Grievances and Their Relevance to Intervention 
 
The three conflict cases examined above each demonstrate the significance of local grievances as 
sources of conflict violence. However, foreign interveners did not sufficiently tackle grievances 
to prevent violence from occurring. A common problem cited in all three interventions was the 
complexity of local divisions and the lack of information or understanding of how those 
divisions would impact intervention operations. Based on patterns observed in the above 
examples, I discuss some key indicators for anticipating how grievances might affect 
intervention outcomes. These indicators could be used in the future to assist policymakers in 
planning an intervention strategy.  
 If a country experiences an internal conflict, it should be assumed that internal divisions 
and grievances exist between communities. Strong divisions existed at the community level in 
Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya. However, the ability of civilians to militarize around those 
grievances, either by taking up arms themselves or supporting an existing militant group, 
depended on two key factors: the ability of the government to control its population, and the 
availability of weapons. While relatively controlling governments such as the Taliban regime 
prior to 2001 and the Qaddafi regime prior to 2011 had the capacity to keep internal divisions 
from escalating into armed conflict, lack of any central government in Somalia in 1991 and weak 
transitional governments following interventions in Afghanistan and Libya were unable to exert 
sufficient control. Further, long histories of foreign arms assistance in Somalia and Afghanistan 
made weapons readily available to civilians and militant actors in those countries, while in Libya 
the raiding of Qaddafi’s weapons depots and the influx of foreign support created a spike in 
weapons availability.  
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 Government capacity and weapons availability have significant impacts on the agency of 
civilians to militarize their disputes. In the three study cases, when government capacity was 
relatively strong, civilian agency to militarize was low regardless of the availability of weapons. 
In Afghanistan, weapons had been easily obtainable since the war against Soviet Union forces as 
the Soviets provided aid to the government of Najibullah and the United States armed the 
mujahideen resistance. However, the military strength and divisive tactics of the Taliban limited 
conflict over internal rivalries. Following the Taliban’s overthrow, the new transitional 
government was unable to establish security and did not have the legitimacy to maintain control, 
leading to a dramatic increase in the militarization of disputes.  
 Similarly, in Libya, Qaddafi’s regime was able to limit internal violence through military 
and policing capability, as well as his divisive tactics and strict control over political affairs. He 
also maintained a monopoly over the use of weapons, which were not generally available to non-
state actors. However, following his overthrow, the strength of the central government quickly 
declined, as the transitional government did not have the same legitimacy or leverage to manage 
or suppress any opposition. Further, weapons had proliferated throughout the country during the 
revolution. Therefore, militarization of civilian disputes significantly increased. Finally, in 
Somalia, a high degree of dispute militarization already existed when the intervention began. 
There was no functional central government to speak of, and weapons had long been readily 
available due to a history of conflict and foreign backing of militants in the country.   
 Foreign interveners may be able to anticipate the level of civilian dispute militarization 
by assessing government strength and weapons availability in advance of an intervention. They 
may even take steps to strengthen governments and remove weapons in order to reduce or 
prevent violence. For example, foreign interveners could have secured small arms depots 
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throughout Libya as they did with MANPADs and chemical weapons sites. They could have also 
placed much more pressure on the transitional government to prioritize a disarmament program 
and to formally incorporate anti-Qaddafi opposition militias into unified military and police 
forces. While these would have been difficult tasks, their monumental importance for 
maintaining peace during a time of very weak governance should have outweighed the 
challenges and costs upfront. In the cases of Afghanistan and Somalia, disarmament of the 
civilian population was unlikely to be achievable. Therefore, the foreign interveners could have 
anticipated a high likelihood of militarization of disputes when initiating their involvement. This 
should have led them to prioritize efforts to address grievances from the outset, as they were 
highly likely to motivate violence.  
 Other conflict regions besides the three cases examined above also exhibit these 
dynamics. In the Sahel region of Africa, for example, weak central governance has long been a 
persistent problem, and countries such as Mali, Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso have few sources 
of income and low government presence in rural, sparsely populated areas. These countries have 
also generally been devoid of weapons. However, the destabilization of Libya after 2011 led to a 
rise in cross-border weapons trafficking and the movement of armed militias further south in the 
region (Lounnas 2018). As this has occurred, the world has witnessed a rise in armed conflict 
and violent attacks by groups in the Sahel who have long felt marginalized by poverty and 
competition over land and water resources. The French military intervened in Mali in 2013, and 
the United States is currently engaged in security cooperation efforts in Niger. However, in order 
to alleviate the violence at its source, these interveners would need to either remove the presence 
of weapons, significantly bolster the strength of the government in these countries, and work 
extensively with local communities to address underlying sources of competition and discontent.  
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 Foreign interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya varied in their success at 
ending conflict between militants. In Somalia, the U.S. and the UN held negotiations between 
fighting groups and attempted to defeat General Aideed’s SNA, but neither of these efforts 
resolved the conflict. In Afghanistan, the U.S.-led coalition was unable to defeat the Taliban 
insurgency, despite initially succeeding in driving them into exile in neighboring Pakistan. By 
contrast, in Libya, NATO operations were successful in assisting the anti-Qaddafi opposition in 
overthrowing Qaddafi’s regime. The influence of local grievances varied in all three of these 
cases. In Somalia, the numerous groups fought directly on behalf of the interests of local 
communities, so the failure to resolve conflict between militants also equated to a failure to 
negotiate those interests. In Afghanistan, the Taliban generally distanced themselves from 
involvement in local disputes, but civilians often still supported the insurgency against the 
internationally-backed government because of local-level advantages such as land rights that the 
Taliban leadership could provide. Finally, in Libya the intervention successfully resolved the 
conflict over Qaddafi’s power, but there were numerous community-level divisions that went 
unresolved and ultimately destabilized the peace. 
The strategic importance of interveners addressing local grievances is therefore 
dependent on two factors: the alignment of local grievances with militant-level goals, and on the 
intervention’s success in resolving conflict between militants. If civilian and militant grievances 
are aligned, then a successful intervention at the militant level may simultaneously address the 
corresponding civilian grievances. Hence, a separate effort to tackle local tensions may not be 
important. However, if the intervener fails to resolve militant conflict, then the civilian 
population’s corresponding grievances persist. The intervention may have failed to completely 
defeat one of the militants, or while it may have temporarily achieved a ceasefire, the source of 
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the contention was not resolved. Civilians whose grievances also remain unresolved may 
continue to provide support to their aligned militant group, leading to a continuous fueling of the 
conflict. Therefore, when civilian grievances align with militant-level goals, addressing these 
underlying grievances is important to prevent them from continuously fueling violence if the 
intervention cannot successfully resolve militant conflict. 
When civilian and militant grievances do not align, civilians may still form alliances with 
militant groups in order to strategically advance their own interests. If the intervener does not 
resolve militant fighting, civilians may continue to fuel the conflict, or support different groups 
strategically in order to advance their own interests. However, even if the intervener does 
successfully resolve the conflict between militants, unaligned civilian grievances remain 
unresolved. A condition of unstable peace may therefore result, in which civilians engage in their 
own local clashes or channel their support towards the creation of a new militant group, leading 
to a collapse into more violence. In this case, separately addressing the underlying grievances of 
civilians is important for preventing new conflicts.  
In Somalia, both faction leaders and civilian populations sought greater power and 
distribution of resources for themselves and their respective communities. Deep mistrust and 
suspicion made Somalis opposed to centralized control by another clan. Therefore, the 
grievances of civilians aligned with the reasons for fighting between militants. Additionally, 
intervention by the international community did not resolve the conflict between militants. 
Twelve separate peace negotiations did not disincentivize the leaders’ grabs for power, and the 
limited use of direct military force was not enough to defeat any militants or suppress their 
fighting. Therefore, the grievances of the civilian population were an important factor in fueling 
fighting. Tensions between civilians of different clans fostered a competitive atmosphere that 
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effectively endorsed competition at the militant level. Without working with local communities 
to peacefully resolve sources of animosity, negotiations between warlords were unlikely to be 
successful.  
In Afghanistan, many communities held grievances against one another over problems 
such as land rights and social issues. An atmosphere of insecurity, corruption, and competition 
over resources worsened tensions over time. Although these local problems often motivated 
civilians to either favor or oppose the Afghan government, they were not aligned with the 
broader reasons for fighting. The Taliban fought against the internationally-backed government 
for political and territorial control over the country, and this conflict over central authority was 
largely separate from the concerns of everyday Afghans. Ultimately, the intervention failed to 
resolve the overall conflict. Even despite a dramatic increase in troop levels during the 2009 
surge, Taliban influence and control continued to increase to present-day. Therefore, addressing 
civilian grievances was necessary to prevent them from fueling fighting. Although the Taliban 
promoted messaging that transcended local issues, they also offered a preferred resolution to 
property rights and other disputes for thousands of disenfranchised citizens, thus winning both 
tacit and overt backing. Because the intervention did not address the roots of these disputes, the 
Taliban maintained access to its base of local support, fueling its push for power. 
In Libya, during the revolution against Qaddafi, different groups set aside their 
grievances in order to collectively overthrow his regime. However, tribal and ideological 
divisions persisted. There had been longstanding competition over resources, resentment 
between previously “favored” and “un-favored” communities, differences in views on the role 
for Islam in politics, and widespread mistrust. The intervention succeeded in resolving the 
conflict by helping the opposition defeat Qaddafi and supporting the election of a democratic 
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government. However, underlying grievances did not align with the overall conflict goals. Deep 
divisions remained, and the new government did not develop the institutions necessary to resolve 
them. Tribal groups, Islamists and secularists, and political organizations that had been unified 
during the uprising splintered and formed armed militias. Violence and insecurity steadily 
increased, until the ultimate collapse into civil war in 2014. Resolving local grievances was 
necessary in order to prevent them from destabilizing the fragile peace achieved after Qaddafi’s 
overthrow.  
These three case examples suggest that the alignment of civilian grievances and the 
resolution of militant conflict are two important indicators that interveners can use to anticipate 
how militarized grievances may impact conflict outcomes. If addressing grievances will be 
important for ending fighting, then interveners should develop a plan to tackle them in order to 
maximize their chances of success. However, one potential challenge in assessing these 
indicators is that the success of resolving conflict may take a long period of time to determine. In 
Afghanistan, the insurgency gained in strength very slowly, and it was only about five years after 
the initial intervention that the international community began to recognize the magnitude of the 
threat that the Taliban posed to security. In the meantime, grievances had continued to fester and 
grow until entire communities of civilians were embittered by the government’s widespread 
corruption and poor security provision. It may be difficult in such a scenario for an intervention 
to admit that it is failing to resolve conflict between militants, and then to make the necessary 
tactical changes to adjust. In addition, in a case where local grievances continually fuel militant 
conflict, then the mutually-reinforcing nature of the relationship between militant fighting and 
militarized local disputes would make it difficult to effectively interrupt the cycle of escalation. 
In order to avoid these challenges, it may be advisable to implement a strategy for addressing 
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civilian grievances from the start, in the event that initial military operations extend longer than 
originally planned. 
This discussion sharpens the focus on what information is useful for planning and 
executing a successful intervention. It also highlights the importance of three challenging tasks 
for foreign interveners: disarming a population, strengthening the capacity of a government, and 
resolving the sources of disputes between communities. These dynamics should be further 
explored in future research to determine if patterns hold across a wider variety of conflict 
interventions, and if the successful completion of any of these tasks reduces the militarization of 
disputes or their contribution to violence. Such a study would strengthen the argument for the use 
of this information in policy decisionmaking. 
 
 
4.4 Policy Analysis and Implications 
 
Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya all faced significant internal societal divisions that contributed 
to a failure of international interventions to prevent further civil war violence. Grievances or 
disputes between local communities exacerbated violence in all three cases, whether through 
civilian posturing and support for conflict actors, or the formation of armed community militias. 
In the absence of security or consolidated control, communities used violence to resolve their 
disputes or advance their interests. This was particularly common when traditional dispute 
mechanisms such as shura councils were either broken down or non-existent.  
In Somalia and Afghanistan, community violence continuously fueled the overall 
conflict. Civilian communities stood to gain from supporting one group or another, which 
contributed towards their warfighting capabilities. In Somalia, conflict actors often fought 
directly on behalf of the interests of the clan communities that they represented, receiving 
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extorted income in return. In Afghanistan, civilians frequently provided tangible support or 
tacitly permitted the presence of Taliban fighters, even though the insurgents avoided 
entrenching themselves in local politics. In this way, issues such as land rights, access to 
resources, and social disputes contributed towards the national-level conflicts. In Libya, 
community violence destabilized peace achieved after the successful overthrow of Qaddafi, 
eventually plunging the country into a new civil war. Civilians took up arms themselves and 
formed militias, fighting directly on behalf of their local interests.  
Overall, local level disputes that remained unresolved significantly impeded the success 
of intervention. In all three cases, interveners were unable to prevent widespread fighting. They 
did not meaningfully tackle local grievances, often purposely choosing not to do so. This was 
due either to a desire to expend as few resources as possible, or because of local sovereignty 
concerns.  
In Afghanistan, intervention forces eventually tried to resolve some grievances, once they 
recognized how significantly these issues contributed to Taliban support. However, their efforts 
failed to prevent the fueling of conflict. These attempts may have been too little, too late, or their 
benefits may have been undermined by the persistent lack of security. In Somalia, Ambassador 
Mohammed Sahnoun did make early attempts at grassroots mediation and negotiation of disputes 
between traditional leaders. However, UN bureaucracy impeded this endeavor and such local 
engagement largely ceased following his departure. No local resolution of grievances took place 
at all in Libya, where the intervention made every effort to keep a light footprint and cede as 
much responsibility as possible to the Libyans themselves.  
These failed attempts still included some small-scale successes, indicating approaches 
that could potentially be effective in the future. First, gathering detailed information by working 
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closely with local communities as Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) did in Afghanistan 
demonstrated that greater knowledge and exposure could significantly improve policies by 
tailoring them more closely to the local context. By identifying the specific concerns of 
communities and their most trusted local authority figures, interveners could approach these 
power players and offer support for addressing underlying issues. Second, working through 
informal institutions rather than formal ones was more effective for addressing land reform in 
Afghanistan and negotiating disputes in Somalia. Sahnoun mediated between traditional leaders 
who had a complete understanding of the local context, greatly increasing the likelihood that 
they could broker agreements or adjudicate on issues that divided communities. Third, fostering 
economic growth through employment programs and support for local businesses in Afghanistan 
provided many civilians with the means to improve their living conditions and avoid turning to 
combatants for help. Economic revitalization that works from the bottom-up could provide 
much-needed employment opportunities while avoiding the corruption that accompanies large 
influxes of outside funds. Significantly more investment and broader implementation of these 
three types of approaches might lead to more effective resolution of local grievances. I expand 
on the ways that foreign interveners can do so in the Recommendations section of Chapter 6.  
Unfortunately, expanding these efforts may be unrealistic due to three major challenges. 
First, other simultaneous intervention efforts being waged at the militant level may undermine 
attempts to resolve grievances by exacerbating tensions. In all three study cases, supplying 
weapons to supported militants also made it easier for opposed militants as well as civilians to 
obtain equipment on the black market. In addition, distributing large amounts of aid, while 
necessary from a humanitarian perspective, created informal economies that were exploited by 
both militants and civilians. Communities may have become more motivated to compete with 
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one another for access to aid, and middlemen who “skimmed off” funds or supplies acquired an 
incentive to “spoil” peace. Additionally, interveners often struggled to ensure safety and security. 
Their response, to execute air strikes and armed raids, increased civilian casualties and angered 
communities even further, increasing their motivation to militarize. With these effects occurring 
concurrently, interveners may struggle to address grievances effectively. 
Second, several political and bureaucratic factors may restrict efforts to tackle conflict at 
its more local roots. The general public in the United States, for example, has a longstanding 
history of aversion to entrenching the country in overseas disputes, despite repeated U.S. 
interventions in foreign conflicts (Fukuyama 2006). Even with the initial success of humanitarian 
efforts in Somalia, the American public was largely averse to U.S. involvement in what they 
perceived as intractable local rivalries. Public opposition to nation-building activities mounted 
until the public outcry following the October 3 downing of the Army Ranger helicopter, 
prompting immediate U.S. troop withdrawal (Johnson and Tierney 2007). The views of U.S. 
policymakers appear to be consistent with this aversion. In a 2001 memo to Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith argued that in Afghanistan, the 
U.S. was most concerned about ousting the Taliban, stating that “nation-building is not our key 
strategic goal” (Tierney 2016). In Libya, the Obama administration actively avoided any attempt 
at nation-building (Nossel 2014, Tierney 2016). Therefore, it is unlikely that U.S. policymakers 
or the American public would support the kinds of large upfront investments of money and 
troops needed to effectively embark on dispute resolution on a massive scale. 
In addition, the bureaucratic obstacles to addressing local grievances are daunting. As 
consistently observed across all the intervention cases, measuring the effectiveness of these 
activities poses a significant challenge. This restricts the ability of government agencies to report 
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their successes and justify continued funding. Complexity of information in an ever-changing 
environment is another problem. Without significant resources already on the ground, 
interveners may have a difficult time gathering the information needed to engage in the 
necessary planning. Even if civilian researchers and specialists are deployed to gather more 
information, these efforts would take a substantial amount of time, during which instability could 
continue to mount. The likelihood of rapid changes in conditions would also pose a challenge to 
even the most skilled researchers, who may not have the finely-tuned cultural knowledge to keep 
up with evolving circumstances. There is also a possibility that, if fighting at the militant level is 
not sufficiently resolved, then as in the case of Afghanistan, warfighting and securitization 
efforts could quickly overshadow dispute resolution, skimming off critical resources. 
Third, respect for local and national sovereignty may constrain foreign involvement in 
contentious internal issues. From a moral standpoint, such intervention may be unethical out of 
respect for the independent decision making of local people concerning their own domestic 
affairs. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter specifically recognizes the right of states to their 
territorial integrity, political independence, and freedom from UN intervention in “matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (UN 2020).While both theorists and 
practitioners argue that foreign intervention for the purpose of humanitarian assistance is morally 
justified to protect people from violence and tyrannical leadership, they also admit that 
acceptance of the intervention from internal parties is an important precondition (Chesterman 
2011, Tesón 2006, Williams and Bellamy 2012). During the interventions in Afghanistan and 
Libya, local stakeholders rejected international involvement in domestic issues such as land 
reform and political decisionmaking, even when interveners were already heavily involved in 
simultaneous military and aid delivery operations (Jones 2010, Chollet 2016, Malkasian 2013). 
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In practice, this rejection has posed a major obstacle to international efforts at addressing civilian 
grievances, particularly in Libya. Although the Obama administration and its NATO partners 
intended to leave governing to the Libyans from the start, even as the security situation began to 
deteriorate, capacity building and police assistance efforts were blocked by mistrusting local 
officials.  
All of these obstacles to addressing local grievances make the challenge appear 
insurmountable. However, due to the unpredictability of future involvement in foreign conflicts, 
the United States and its international allies may well find themselves in another situation in 
which intervention is the most preferable of their available policy options. In such a case, 
policymakers should gather more information about the conflict environment. They should 
anticipate that local factors may heavily influence conflict violence, and formulate plans and 
strategies to address them to the greatest extent possible.  
One approach supported by the historical evidence in this case study is to preserve and 
support traditional dispute resolution institutions. Relying on actors who are already trusted in 
their communities to adjudicate on contentious issues would ensure that decisions are adapted to 
local cultural and societal contexts, and would avoid debates about local ownership and 
sovereignty. If such efforts were pursued from the very start of the initial planning stages of 
intervention, they could potentially reduce the incidence of fighting in the future, before other 
negative or undermining effects of intervention have an opportunity to take hold.  
Evidence from the three cases indicates that healing divisions between communities 
could have substantially reduced conflict later on. In Somalia, without the high degree of inter-
clan competition, militants may not have had as much internal financial support or motivation to 
fight. In Afghanistan, communities may have reported the Taliban’s presence much more 
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frequently to international coalition forces if they were not divided and disenfranchised. In 
Libya, without the persistent insecurity and the cooptation of militias, General Haftar may not 
have been able to launch his offensive against the weak official government. These hypothetical 
scenarios are impossible to prove definitively. However, in each of the three cases there were 
counterfactual examples of areas that managed to remain relatively free of fighting. In these 
areas, resolving local disputes through traditional, informal methods enabled communities to 
resist the influence of militants and maintain security without resorting to violence. The evidence 
suggests that avoiding participation in the civil war was possible due to the ability to remain 
unified and to resolve grievances peacefully through trusted leaders. In this way, the region of 
Somaliland in Somalia, the town of Istalif in Afghanistan, and some isolated parts of Libya 
remained relatively free of conflict. Notably, intervention did not play a significant role, if any, 
in these areas. Instead, local communities deterred violence themselves by confronting potential 
obstacles to peace from the bottom-up.  
There is ample research spanning a variety of academic disciplines that supports the 
argument that traditional dispute resolution techniques could be the most effective path towards 
resolving local conflict, and that doing so could also diffuse broader civil wars (Blattman, 
Hartman, and Blair 2014, Buscaglia and Stephan 2005, Coburn and Dempsey 2010, Day 2001, 
Hartman, Blair, and Blattman 2018, Kariuki 2015, Tenaw 2016). The literature on effective 
approaches to nationbuilding also builds on the importance of including respected local 
stakeholders in the peacebuilding process (Davis et al. 2011, Dobbins et al. 2013, Fukuyama 
2006, Lake 2016, Lister 2009). The findings of this study are consistent with those of Severine 
Autesserre’s case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in which she recommends 
that interveners “work through local actors whenever possible,” and that “the bottom-up conflict-
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resolution strategy should become a central element of state-building efforts” (Autesserre 2010, 
264-269). It also supports Carter Malkasian’s assessment of U.S. failures in Helmand province, 
Afghanistan, where he concludes that “more could have been achieved if the strategy had 
focused on building a government able to bond Afghanistan’s disparate groups together and 
mend their various fractures” (Malkasian 2013).  However, more research and advocacy is 
necessary to motivate intervening countries to prioritize this approach. Additional research that 
exposes the importance of resolving underlying grievances relative to taking conventional 
approaches, and which communicates its findings in a way that is accessible to policymakers, 
could be helpful.  
Relying on traditional dispute resolution actors to resolve grievances during a conflict 
does not come without its own weaknesses. For example, these actors may have their own biases 
that result in unfair practices, or their views may contradict the international community’s more 
progressive human rights and equality goals. Empowering local leaders may also threaten the 
authority of more centralized government actors. I will discuss the positive and negative 
implications of this approach in greater detail in Chapter 6: Recommendations and Conclusion.  
Certain obstacles pose challenges to the analysis in this case study. First, information and 
evidence concerning the motivations of civilians during conflicts is difficult to obtain. 
Researchers and practitioners in earlier examples such as Somalia may have been less likely to 
gather this type of information, and in all cases dangerous conditions on the ground may have 
restricted researchers from doing so. More data, possibly from government intelligence sources, 
would be useful in improving the robustness of all of the cases. 
Stemming from the limited availability of information, it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish between instances in which civilians support conflict actors because they agree with 
 225 
their overall goals, or because they wish to advance their own local interests. In the three cases 
examined in this study, civilians varied in their level of understanding of the broader conflict 
agenda, which was also influenced by militant rhetoric and propaganda. This was particularly 
true in Afghanistan, making it difficult to isolate grievances as a clear cause of militarization. 
Further, the creation of new grievances by the interventions themselves, combined with long 
histories of foreign involvement in Somalia and Afghanistan, makes it difficult to clearly 
establish a causal timeline. This is particularly complicated in the Afghanistan case, in which 
widespread hostilities began after the intervention. Therefore, examining the influence of local 
factors on intervention outcomes may be difficult when they are so closely intermingled with the 
broader motivations for conflict.  
As a result, it is important to devote special attention to investigating the roots of civilian 
grievances. National-level issues such as differences in ideological visions for the country could 
trickle down and become sources of division between communities that take opposing views, 
such as between Islamists and secularists in Libya. By contrast, local issues could rise to the 
national level and become direct causes of militant fighting, as in Somalia with clan competition. 
The distinction between “civilians” and “militants” is also blurred in the context of war. For 
example, militias could be considered groups of civilians taking up arms, or they could be 
considered non-civilian combatants. Some discretion is required to make this distinction in each 
context, based on whether militia formation occurs through the protection of community interests 
or through the fracturing of broader conflict actors. Both situations took place in all three of the 
cases in this study, particularly in Somalia and Libya, further emphasizing the need for additional 
information. 
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Finally, future research should perform similar explorations of conflict interventions 
across a broader sample of cases. The interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya were 
selected for this study because of their relevance to U.S. policymakers and the particularly 
interesting and prominent role that local grievances may have played. However, in order to more 
firmly identify the conditions in which intervention policies are or are not effective, it is 
necessary to examine conflict examples in which local disputes were not as significant. For 
example, it would be informative to examine the role of grievances during relatively successful 
interventions by NATO in Bosnia in 1992 and the UN in Sierra Leone in 1999. Future work 
could generate greater insight into how foreign policymakers could more quickly and effectively 















In Chapter 3, I demonstrated the use of a computational agent-based model for examining the 
theoretical impacts of foreign intervention tools on local causes of violence. In Chapter 4, I 
performed case analyses of past interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya, finding that 
during these conflicts, local-level factors did contribute significantly to violence. Now, I examine 
the use of the computational model for simulating these same three historical cases, in order to 
determine whether or not the results reflect the real-life outcomes of the interventions. 
 The model is designed to simulate only a small portion of the interactions taking place 
between conflict actors during a civil war. There are many additional important factors which it 
does not take into account, such as tactical advantages between militants. This significantly 
limits the model’s ability to accurately “predict” the outcomes of complex real-life events. In 
addition, quantitative values such as militant extortion rates or populations of community groups 
that the model requires as initial conditions are difficult to obtain. These types of values may not 
be available, or may change over time. Therefore, I estimate many of these initial values, further 
reducing the likelihood of historically accurate results. 
 However, simulating these historical cases still provides insight into how informative and 
representative the model can be. I can compare the model results to the conflict outcomes that 
occurred in the past, and determine to what extent the model is able to represent those events. 
Such analysis helps to reveal the model’s limitations, while also providing an indication of the 
relative importance of local factors in different situations. I expect that the simulations will be 
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able to produce results that generally mirror those of actual events, but that these results will also 
reveal weaknesses in the model that need improvement. The analysis may also suggest other 
conflict factors that are important to consider alongside the local ones. 
 In this chapter, I model the same three interventions from the previous case study: 
Somalia in 1992, Afghanistan in 2001, and Libya in 2011. For each conflict, I first state some 
assumptions made in each case and the values that are used in the model. Then I present the 
model results and compare to actual historical events. I also discuss any computational 
weaknesses revealed by that particular case. Finally, after evaluating each of the three 
simulations, I present my conclusions about the overall use of the model for real-life simulation.  
 




Table 25: Militants and Their Attributes As Modeled in the Somalia Simulation 
Militants Region Initial Strength External Income Benefits Threshold Terrorism 
1 SNM Somaliland 1000 500 4 no 
2 SSNM/ SNA southern Somalia 0 0 4 no 
3 SSNM/SSA southern Somalia 0 0 4 no 
4 USF Somaliland 0 0 4 no 
5 SDA Somaliland 0 0 4 no 
6 SDM/SNA southern Somalia 0 0 4 no 
7 SDM/SSA southern Somalia 0 0 4 no 
8 SNU/SNA southern Somalia 0 0 4 no 
9 SNU/SSA southern Somalia 0 0 4 no 
10 SAMO/SNA southern Somalia 0 0 4 no 
11 SAMO/SSA southern Somalia 0 0 4 no 
12 Other SSA both 0 0 4 no 
13 SPM southern Somalia 1000 0 4 no 
14 USC/SSA southern Somalia 1000 500 4 no 
15 USC/SNA southern Somalia 1000 500 4 no 
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Table 26: Communities and Their Attributes As Modeled in the Somalia Simulation 
Communities Region Population % 
1 Isaaq clan Somaliland 22% 
2 Dir clan Issa subclan Somaliland 2% 
3 Dir clan Gadabursi subclan  Somaliland 2% 
4 Darod clan Dulbahante subclan  Somaliland 4% 
5 Dir clan Bimaal subclan  southern Somalia 2% 
6 Rahanweyn clan  southern Somalia 17% 
7 Banaadiri & Bravanese clans southern Somalia 3% 
8 Jareer/Bantu ethnicity southern Somalia 3% 
9 Darod clan Marehan subclan  southern Somalia 4% 
10 Darod clan Leelkase subclan  southern Somalia 4% 
11 Darod clan Majerteen subclan  southern Somalia 4% 
12 Darod clan Ogaden/Aulihan subclan  southern Somalia 4% 
13 Hawiye clan Marusade & Abgal subclan  southern Somalia 8% 
14 Hawiye clan Habr Gedir, Sheikhaal, & Gugundhabe subclans  southern Somalia 8% 
15 Other Hawiye subclans  southern Somalia 8% 
 
Table 27: Characteristics of the Environment As Modeled in the Somalia Simulation 
Environment   
Number of Regions 2 
Total population 29000 
Number of communities 15 
Number of militants 15 
Wealth values [L, M, H] [20, 100, 500] 
Wealth distribution community 1 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 2 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 3 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 4 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 5 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 6 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 7 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 8 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 9 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 10 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 11 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 12 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 13 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 14 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 15 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Extortion Percent 10% 
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Support Percent 10% 
Weapons presence yes 
          
Figure 33: Community Grievances As Modeled in the Somalia Simulation  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
6 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
8 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
9 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
10 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
11 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
12 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 
13 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
14 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
15 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
Figure 34: Community Affiliations with Militants As Modeled in the Somalia Simulation 
 m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7 m8 m9 m10 m11 m12 m13 m14 m15 
c1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
c5 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
c8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
c9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
c10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
c11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
c12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
c13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
c14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
c15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 35: Intervention Tools Implemented in the Somalia Simulation  
Intervention Tools Parameters 
negotiate  
negotiatemilitants  
infocampaign southern Somalia, against USC/SNA 
supportgovernance southern Somalia 













The tables above show the parameters used as initial conditions for modeling the Somalia 
intervention. Values are based on justification from the previous chapter and additional data from 
the following sources: (Abbink 2009, Bradbury 1994, CIA 2002, EASO 2017, Ingiriis 2017, 
Kaplan 2020, Lewis 2017). I model Somalia as one country with two separate regions: the 
northern Somaliland, which began administrating itself independently in 1991, and the rest of 
Somalia, comprising the remaining southern parts of the country. The foreign intervention was 
confined to the south, with no troops entering Somaliland, making this regional separation 
helpful for observing differences in outcomes between the two areas. I include fifteen 
community identifications, as well as fifteen militant groups. In reality, there were many more 
communities and groups in existence. Somalia’s clan identities can be divided infinitesimally 
into smaller sub-clans and sub-sub-clans, and therefore I select the largest ones and those aligned 
with the most prominent militant groups. The militants include those cited by Ingiriis (2017), 
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with only a couple exclusions of small groups unaffiliated with clan identities. These selections 
are a best reflection of the conflict environment at the time, while abiding by the limitations of 
the computational model which can only compute up to fifteen communities and militants. 
 Only those militant groups that existed during the previous rebellion against Said Barre 
have values for initial strength and external income, reflecting whether or not they received 
outside sources of funding at an earlier time. Despite widespread civilian casualties that occurred 
during the civil war, there is no evidence of militants actively targeting civilian communities as 
an intimidation tactic. Therefore, I do not ascribe any of the groups with terrorist behavior. Also, 
in order to represent successful intercommunity mediation that took place in Somaliland, there 
are no grievances between communities in that region, whereas all groups hold grievances 
against one another in southern Somalia. Tools employed during the international intervention 
were the increase of civilian wealth through humanitarian aid delivery, support of national-level 
governance, and information campaigns and attacks against General Aideed’s USC/SNA. 
Results 
Table 28: Somalia Simulation Strength Results 
 pre sd post sd 
SNM strength 5532 29 5530 32 
SSNM/SNA strength 13885 57 27925 124 
SSNM/SSA strength 13922 50 27967 117 
USF strength 2600 85 2497 113 
SDA strength 2625 166 2486 100 
SDM/SNA strength 13881 58 27941 122 
SDM/SSA strength 13882 60 27934 103 
SNU/SNA strength 13875 59 27946 115 
SNU/SSA strength 0 0 0 0 
  SAMO/SNA strength 13883 58 27942 101 
SAMO/SSA strength 13884 60 27941 105 
Other SSA strength 16475 97 30509 144 
SPM strength 14892 58 28966 95 
USC/SSA strength 15341 65 29350 108 
USC/SNA strength 15348 61 27817 133 
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Table 29: Somalia Simulation Defending Results 
 
Table 30: Somalia Simulation Fighting Results 
 pre sd post sd 
Fighting in Somaliland     
SNM vs USF fighting 0.47 0.02 0.45 0.02 
SNM vs SDA fighting 0.48 0.03 0.45 0.02 
SNM vs Other SSA fighting 0.34 0.00 0.18 0.00 
USF vs SDA fighting 0.84 0.04 0.84 0.02 
USF vs Other SSA fighting 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.00 
SDA vs Other SSA fighting 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.00 
SNM vs SSNM/SNA fighting 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
Fighting in Somalia with USC/SSA     
SSNM/SNA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.91 0.01 0.95 0.01 
SSNM/SSA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.91 0.01 0.95 0.01 
SDM/SNA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.91 0.01 0.95 0.01 
SDM/SSA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.91 0.01 0.95 0.01 
SNU/SNA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.91 0.01 0.95 0.01 
SNU/SSA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.91 0.01 0.95 0.01 
SAMO/SNA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.91 0.00 0.95 0.00 
SAMO/SSA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.91 0.00 0.95 0.00 
Other SSA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.93 0.01 0.96 0.01 
SPM vs USC/SSA fighting 0.97 0.00 0.99 0.00 
USC/SSA vs USC/SNA fighting 0.99 0.00 0.95 0.00 
 pre sd post sd 
Isaaq clan defending 0.86 0.30 1.15 0.43 
Dir clan Issa subclan defending 0.55 0.25 0.45 0.24 
Dir clan Gadabursi subclan defending 0.49 0.30 0.49 0.25 
Darod clan Dulbahante subclan defending 0.21 0.22 0.41 0.26 
Dir clan Bimaal subclan defending 0 0 0 0 
Rahanweyn clan defending 0 0 0 0 
Banaadiri & Bravanese clan defending 0 0 0 0 
Jareer/Bantu defending 0 0 0 0 
Darod clan Marehan subclan defending 0 0 0 0 
Darod clan Leelkase subclan defending 0 0 0 0 
Darod clan Majerteen subclan defending 0 0 0 0 
Darod clan Ogaden/Aulihan subclan defending 0 0 0 0 
Hawiye clan Marusade & Abgal subclan defending 0 0 0 0 
Hawiye clan Habr Gedir, Sheikhaal, & Gugundhabe subclan defending 0 0 0 0 
Other Hawiye subclans defending 0 0 0 0 
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Fighting in Somalia with SAMO/SNA    
SSNM/SNA vs SAMO/SNA fighting 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
SSNM/SSA vs SAMO/SNA 
fighting 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
SDM/SNA vs SAMO/SNA fighting 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
SDM/SSA vs SAMO/SNA fighting 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
SNU/SNA vs SAMO/SNA fighting 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
SNU/SSA vs SAMO/SNA fighting 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
SAMO/SNA vs SAMO/SSA fighting 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00 
SAMO/SNA vs Other SSA fighting 0.85 0.01 0.92 0.01 
SAMO/SNA vs SPM fighting 0.93 0.00 0.96 0.00 
SAMO/SNA vs USC/SSA fighting 0.91 0.00 0.95 0.00 
SAMO/SNA vs USC/SNA fighting 0.91 0.00 0.99 0.00 
 
Following the simulation of intervention, the model shows militant groups in southern Somalia 
experiencing very large increases in strength. This is likely due to the increase in available 
civilian wealth, and is consistent with historical events as militants benefitted from extortion of 
businesses and humanitarian aid delivery. In the results, no one group gains a significant strength 
advantage over any other. This is also consistent with reality, as no militant gained enough 
strength to overpower the others and form a consolidated government.  
The high levels of strength in the model yield increased or persistently high levels of 
fighting. For example, fighting between the powerful USC/SNA and most other groups increases 
from approximately 91% likelihood to 95% likelihood. Fighting between less powerful groups, 
for example with the SAMO/SNA, remain high at about 99%. These levels of fighting despite 
the intervention are reflective of the extremely competitive conflict environment in Somalia 
during the war.  
 The results also show zero civilian defending in the communities of southern Somalia. 
This may be because civilians were always aligned with specific militant groups according to the 
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affiliations matrix. This is somewhat consistent with historical conflict dynamics, with the 
analysis in the previous chapter demonstrating that militant groups often fought directly on 
behalf of the interests of community grievances. However, the results do not capture the high 
proliferation of local militias that emerged during the conflict. They do reflect some of the 
differences between conflict in Somaliland and southern Somalia. In Somaliland, the results 
show the militants remaining relatively weak and with comparatively low probability of fighting. 
By contrast, in Somalia there is high fighting and high gains in strength. This is to be expected 





The following tables show the parameters used as initial conditions for modeling the Afghanistan 
intervention. 
Table 31: Militants and Their Attributes As Modeled in the Afghanistan Simulation 
Militants Initial Strength External Income Benefits Threshold Terrorism 
1 Afghan Government 0 500 4 no 
2 Taliban 0 250 4 yes 
3 al-Qaeda 0 25 4 yes 
 
Table 32: Communities and Their Attributes As Modeled in the Afghanistan Simulation 
Communities Population % 
1 Durrani Pashtuns 8% 
2 Ghilzai Pashtuns 9% 
3 Other Pashtuns 9% 
4 Tajiks 23% 
5 Hazaras 18% 
6 Uzbeks 5% 
7 Turkmen 2% 
8 Qizilbash 1% 
9 Overall minorities 5% 
10 Religious conservatives 10% 
11 Within-community minorities 10% 
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Table 33: Characteristics of the Environment As Modeled in the Afghanistan Simulation 
Environment   
Number of Regions 1 
Total population 300000 
Number of communities 11 
Number of militants 3 
Wealth values [L, M, H] [20, 100, 500] 
Wealth distribution community 1 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 2 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 3 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 4 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 5 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 6 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 7 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 8 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 9 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 10 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 11 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Extortion Percent 10% 
Support Percent 10% 
Weapons presence yes 
 
Figure 36: Community Grievances As Modeled in the Afghanistan Simulation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
4 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 




Figure 37: Community Affiliations with Militants As Modeled in the Afghanistan Simulation 
 m1 m2 m3     
c1 1 0 0     
c2 0 1 0     
c3 0 1 0     
c4 1 0 0     
c5 1 0 0     
c6 0 0 0     
c7 0 0 0     
c8 1 0 0     
c9 0 0 0     
c10 0 1 0     
c11 0 1 0     
 
Figure 38: Intervention Tools Implemented in the Afghanistan Simulation 
Intervention Tools Parameters 
negotiate  
negotiatemilitants  
infocampaign against the Taliban & al-Qaeda 
supportgovernance against the Taliban & al-Qaeda 
increasewealth yes 
leaderbenefits against the Taliban & al-Qaeda 
militantbenefits against the Taliban & al-Qaeda 
conditional benefits against the Taliban & al-Qaeda 
fundmilitants Government, 1000 
cuttingoff against the Taliban & al-Qaeda 
attackmilitants against the Taliban & al-Qaeda 
attacksupporters against the Taliban & al-Qaeda 
weaponsremoval yes/no 
trainassist Government  
protection against the Taliban & al-Qaeda 
 
Values are based on justifications from the previous chapter and additional data from the 
following sources: (Ahmed 2017, Blood 2001, Jones 2018, Navy 2020, Ruttig 2010). 
 I model the Afghanistan case as the initiation of conflict between the Taliban and foreign 
militaries in 2001, and represent the introduction of intervention as the overall increase in 
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intervention involvement once the insurgency escalated.  The intervention therefore represents a 
general timeframe from about 2006 to 2011 during the international “surge.” I include three 
militants: the Afghan government, the Taliban, and al-Qaeda. These three militants are also 
meant to include any affiliates that fought alongside the groups’ cause, such as the Haqqani 
network that also supported the Taliban as part of the insurgency. The three groups are each 
given an initial strength of zero, as during the initial stages of the intervention the Taliban and al-
Qaeda were driven largely out of the country, and the Afghan government had not yet been 
established. The Taliban and al-Qaeda engage in terrorist tactics to intimidate civilians; the 
Afghan government does not (although in reality the Afghan government did engage frequently 
in extortionist and sometimes violent practices). 
 I include eleven different identity groupings that represent a diversity of different types of 
societal cleavages. I represent eight of the largest tribal identities, adding a ninth to encompass 
all of the remaining smallest minority groups. Community 10 represents a 10% proportion of the 
total population that cuts across all different tribes and includes those who identify most with 
religious conservatism. Empirically, this would include the newly-emerged religious elite of 
Pakistani madrassa attendees and their supporters. Community 11 represents a 10% proportion of 
the total population that belongs to one of the existing tribal identities, but lives as a minority 
within their local geographic area. Therefore, they may be marginalized by any proximate 
dominant communities. I pull the 20% of civilians in Communities 10 and 11 equally from the 
populations of the nine tribes, making the assumption that no tribe is more likely to contain 
religious conservatives or community minorities than any other. In reality this is unlikely to be 
the case; for example, Pashtuns may be more likely to be religiously conservative than other 
groups.  
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 The international community used almost all of the available intervention tools in 
Afghanistan starting in 2006 and then throughout the “surge” period. I model their use in support 
of the Afghan government and against the Taliban.  
 
Results 
Table 34: Afghanistan Simulation Results With Weapons Removal 
 Intervention removes weapons 
 pre sd post sd 
Afghan Government strength 668 23 5505 132 
Taliban strength 2356 61 1879 119 
al-Qaeda strength 2543 89 2186 120 
Durrani Pashtuns- defending 2.35 0.40 0 0 
Ghilzai Pashtuns- defending 2.61 0.52 0 0 
Other Pashtuns- defending 2.60 0.63 0 0 
Tajiks- defending 10.27 1.53 0 0 
Hazaras- defending 7.92 0.93 0 0 
Uzbeks- defending 3.61 0.63 0 0 
Turkmen- defending 2.37 0.06 0 0 
Qizilbash- defending 6.36 0.29 0 0 
Ethnic Minorities- defending 1.53 0.37 0 0 
Religious Conservatives- defending 2.52 0.63 0 0 
Intracommunity Minorities- defending 2.61 0.65 0 0 
Government vs Taliban fighting 0.31 0.01 0.35 0.03 
Government vs al-Qaeda fighting 0.29 0.02 0.41 0.02 
al-Qaeda vs Taliban fighting 0.68 0.00 0.70 0.03 
 
I first model the Afghanistan case with the intervention removing weapons from their availability 
to civilians. This leads to a total decrease in civilian defending. In this scenario, overall the 
Afghan government gains in strength to more than twice that of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, with al-
Qaeda maintaining strength greater than that of the Taliban. However, the two strengths still 
remain fairly high, considering the large number of intervention tools utilized to defeat them. 
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This is consistent with historical events, as despite the large amounts of money, effort and time 
invested in Afghanistan, the Taliban and smaller radical groups remain powerful and influential. 
However, the levels of fighting computed by the model are not consistent with real events. The 
model predicts that fighting would be highest between the Taliban and al-Qaeda, which was not 
the case in reality. The model is unable to capture alliances between groups that fight on the 
same side of the war.  
Table 35: Afghanistan Simulation Strength Results Without Weapons Removal 
 Intervention does not remove weapons 
 pre sd post sd 
Afghan Government strength 665 16 2988 32 
Taliban strength 2361 101 244 20 
al-Qaeda strength 2518 134 191 18 
Durrani Pashtuns- defending 2.29 0.34 75 0 
Ghilzai Pashtuns- defending 2.69 0.43 84 0 
Other Pashtuns- defending 2.73 0.48 84 0 
Tajiks- defending 10.37 1.62 204 0 
Hazaras- defending 8.34 1.60 162 0 
Uzbeks- defending 3.73 0.54 19.51 0.38 
Turkmen- defending 2.31 0.29 12.49 0.26 
Qizilbash- defending 6.51 0.56 4.95 0.20 
Ethnic Minorities- defending 1.41 0.34 6.53 0.62 
Religious Conservatives- defending 2.62 0.49 7.56 0.71 
Intracommunity Minorities- defending 2.68 0.67 11.21 0.60 
Government vs Taliban fighting 0.31 0.02 0.08 0.01 
Government vs al-Qaeda fighting 0.29 0.02 0.07 0.01 
al-Qaeda vs Taliban fighting 0.68 0.03 0.42 0.05 
 
The complete lack of civilian defending also seems unlikely, and is inconsistent with history in 
which many communities armed themselves to defend against the Taliban. It is also unrealistic 
that the international intervention would have successfully prevented civilians from obtaining 
weapons. While the U.S. regularly conducted raids to seize arms from civilians suspected of 
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supporting the Taliban, disarmament campaigns did not reach all areas and were likely 
ineffective.  Therefore, I repeat the above simulation without including the removal of weapons 
in the list of intervention tools. The second set of results are shown above. 
In this simulation, with the presence of weapons there is a high incidence of civilian 
defending, particularly amongst the more populous tribes. Also in this simulation, the strengths 
of all three militants is greatly reduced, with the strengths of the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
particularly low. This indicates that civilians in the model are defending against militant groups 
rather than being forced to provide support. Notably, the probability of fighting between the 
Government and the other groups drops to the single digits. This is not consistent with historical 
reality, as the government of Afghanistan continues to struggle to maintain security to present 
day.  
The results from the simulation in which weapons were successfully removed is more 
representative of actual events, particularly in demonstrating the persisting strength of the 
Taliban. In reality, the removal of weapons was probably not successful, but the Taliban may 
have been strong enough to suppress civilians who attempt to militarize against it, suppressing 




The following tables show the parameters used as initial conditions for modeling the Libya 
intervention. 
Table 36: Militants and Their Attributes As Modeled in the Libya Simulation 
Militants Initial Strength External Income Benefits Threshold Terrorism 
1 Qaddafi 200 100 4 no 
2 Opposition 0 500 4 no 
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Table 37: Communities and Their Attributes As Modeled in the Libya Simulation 
Communities Population % 
1 Western Islamist Militias 7.3% 
2 Arab Militias 10.2% 
3 Berber Militias 0.6% 
4 Tuareg 2.0% 
5 Tebu  0.5% 
6 Tawargha Militias 1.6% 
7 Zintani Militias 0.8% 
8 Warfallah Militia 33.3% 
9 Qadhadhfa Militias 2.0% 
10 Misratan Militias 18.3% 
11 Zawiyan Militias 6.7% 
12 Benghazi Militias 10.0% 
13 Eastern Islamist Militias 6.7% 
 
Table 38: Characteristics of the Environment As Modeled in the Libya Simulation 
Environment   
Number of Regions 1 
Total population 300000 
Number of communities 13 
Number of militants 2 
Wealth values [L, M, H] [20, 100, 500] 
Wealth distribution community 1 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 2 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 3 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 4 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 5 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 6 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Wealth distribution community 7 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 8 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 9 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 10 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 11 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 12 [10%, 84%, 6%] 
Wealth distribution community 13 [70%, 28%, 2%] 
Extortion Percent 10% 
Support Percent 10% 
Weapons presence yes 
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Figure 39: Community Grievances As Modeled in the Libya Simulation  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 
Figure 40: Community Affiliations with Militants As Modeled in the Libya Simulation 
 m1 m2      
c1 0 1      
c2 0 0      
c3 0 1      
c4 1 0      
c5 0 1      
c6 1 0      
c7 0 1      
c8 0 0      
c9 0 0      
c10 0 1      
c11 0 0      
c12 0 1      
c13 0 1      
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Figure 41: Intervention Tools Implemented in the Libya Simulation 
 








conditional benefits  
fundmilitants Opposition, 200 
cuttingoff against Qaddafi 
attackmilitants against Qaddafi, 1000 
attacksupporters  
weaponsremoval  
trainassist Opposition  
protection against Qaddafi 
 
Values are based on justifications from the previous chapter and additional data from the 
following sources: (CGRS 2014, Glenn 2017, HRW 2019, IAGCI 2019, WPR 2019) 
 In the Libya case, I model conflict between two militant groups: the Qaddafi regime and 
the opposition. The opposition was actually comprised of a diversity of militarized groups that 
was united through a popular uprising. However, I combine these actors into one single militant 
group as they all fought on the same side. Neither militant engages in terrorism, and the initial 
strength and external income values are chosen to loosely reflect the power distribution and 
support received by each of the two sides as the conflict began.  
As in the other two cases, in Libya there were hundreds if not thousands of different 
possible community identity groupings. I select thirteen of the most prominent ones to represent 
in the model. These include tribal groups such as the Tuareg and Tebu, ethnic-based militias like 
Arab militias and Berber militias, and ideological groups such as Islamist militias. While the 
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majority of communities in the Somalia and Afghanistan cases were lower income, with most 
civilians falling in the “low” income category, in Libya there are many more communities 
comprised of a more “middle-income” population.  
Because the international community maintained a “light footprint” in Libya, there are 
only a few intervention tools modeled in this simulation. I include many of the traditional 
military intervention approaches: funding the opposition, training and assisting them, attacking 
Qaddafi’s forces and cutting off their resources, and protecting Libyan civilians from 
punishment. These were all goals achieved by the implementation of NATO’s no-fly zone. 
 
Results 
Table 39: Results of the Libya Simulation 
 pre sd post sd 
Qaddafi strength 63385 13 62935 91 
Opposition strength 5677 819 36753 620 
Western Islamist Militias- Defending 0.30 0.13 0 0 
Arab Militias- Defending 1.60 0.19 6.05 0.90 
Berber Militias- Defending 0.07 0.03 0.16 0.07 
Tuareg - Defending 0.31 0.10 1.42 0.34 
Tebu - Defending 1.97 0.31 0.89 0.11 
Tawargha Militias- Defending 0.07 0.04 0.34 0.10 
Zintani Militias- Defending 0.10 0.05 0 0 
Warfallah Militias- Defending 5.03 0.37 2.44 0.74 
Qadhadhfa Militias- Defending 0.30 0.08 1.27 0.23 
Misratan Militias- Defending 2.31 0.31 0 0.01 
Zawiyan Militias- Defending 0.86 0.17 0 0 
Benghazi Militias- Defending 1.52 0.17 2.81 0.59 
Eastern Islamist Militias- Defending 0.36 0.09 0.33 0.17 




While the opposition gains in strength significantly following the simulation of intervention, the 
strength of Qaddafi reduces only slightly. There is little to no incidence of civilian defending, 
and the probability of fighting shifts from 9% to 58% after intervention. This is not consistent 
with historical events. In reality, international support led to a complete overthrow of the regime. 
This inconsistency may be because Qaddafi’s strength did not depend on civilian support; 
instead Qaddafi manipulated local conditions in his favor to maintain power. His overthrow 
resulted from tactical gains made by the opposition on the battlefield. Therefore, the local 
interactions simulated in the model do not contribute as significantly to the conflict’s outcome.  
As demonstrated in the case analysis conducted in Chapter 4, local grievances did 
contribute significantly to the events that occurred after the conflict ended, when the many 
different groups forming the opposition splintered and began fighting with one another. The 
computational model is not designed to simulate militant formation or a collapse into violence. 
Therefore, the results of this simulation indicate that the model may be less useful when 
examining conflicts in which local grievances led to a destabilization of peace following the 
defeat of a militant group. It is also of limited value when tactical successes were the strongest 
contributor to conflict outcomes. This weakness may occur particularly when modeling a short 
conflict, as the fighting in Libya concluded after only a seven to eight-month period. The conflict 
did not extend long enough for the militants to start drawing upon civilian bases of support. 
 
5.3 Discussion 
The results above are loosely representative of historical events that occurred empirically during 
the three conflict cases. However, the discrepancies reveal several challenges for using 
computation to analyze these events.  
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First, many of the initial model parameters are based on estimates. This is not only due to 
limited available information, but also because many of these parameters vary over time and 
geographic area. For example, identities such as clan in Somalia and tribe in Libya are fluid, 
changing over time and interpreted differently between populations. Civilians may not 
necessarily identify with these communities, which can be more salient in some areas than in 
others. A survey conducted in Libya by USIP determined that civilians identify mostly with their 
tribe as opposed to other family or national identities only about 21% of the time (Cole and 
Mangan 2016b, 10). As a result, the fixed nature of community values as initial conditions in the 
model are misleading. This poses a challenge for analyzing the model results because values 
could also change as a conflict evolves, leading to an endogeneity problem in which the 
parameters are dependent on the model results. This problem extends to the majority of initial 
conditions set in the model, as displacement of populations, changing economic conditions, and 
the rise and fall of different militant groups can also occur throughout a conflict. There is 
currently no way to represent non-static initial conditions in the model.  
Because the model cannot capture changing conditions, it also fails to account for 
destabilization and fracturing of militant groups. It is unable to model a conflict in which 
community grievances lead to a destabilization of peace. This is evident from the results of the 
Libya simulation. Because of the extremely high number of different militias that fought on the 
side of the opposition during the war, I group them together to represent one large opposition 
faction. This accurately represents the goals of conflict as they existed in March 2011. However, 
by 2012 these actors had turned against one another, and civilians who were not already 
affiliated with these groups also formed militias to defend themselves. Including these smaller 
factions in the initial conditions would have misrepresented the broader conflict between Qaddafi 
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and the opposition, as there is currently no way in the model to represent alliances between 
militants. Thus, the results do not show how significantly local grievances contributed to 
violence later on. 
 Another computational challenge is determining what factors should and should not be 
included in the model parameters. For example, although the model is designed to represent a 
high amount of complexity, the cases examined in this study all push the boundaries of the 
number of communities and militants that can be represented. Because of computing power 
limitations, the number of actors must be kept to a minimum, with a current limit of fifteen 
militants and fifteen communities. However, in these conflicts hundreds and even thousands of 
different actors actually played a role in the fighting. It may be reasonable to group together 
several similar actors if they behave the same way, but complete exclusion of actors who behave 
differently could lead to omissions of important conflict interactions. For example, clans 
unaffiliated with any militant which were omitted from the Somalia simulation may have been 
more likely to switch sides between different combatants, potentially altering their ultimate 
strengths.  
The Somalia case is further limited by the fact that it contains two separate regions. The 
inclusion of two regions significantly slows the computational processing time of the model, to 
the point where performing the analysis as an average of forty separate simulations becomes 
unrealistic. In order to successfully execute the program, the model is run taking an average of 
only twenty simulations, cutting the certainty power of the results in half. In order to avoid this 
problem, the model program should be reprogrammed in a way that makes the representation of 
more than one region more efficient. 
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 When setting the model’s initial conditions, it is also difficult to determine whether or not 
to include certain intervention tools. If the tools were completely ineffective during the actual 
conflict, then it may not make sense to represent their effects in the model. However, omitting 
them could bias the results, either by intentionally influencing the outcome in an anticipated 
direction, or by failing to account for the influence of failed approaches. The Afghanistan 
simulation demonstrates this problem; the results differ dramatically between simulations when 
the removal of weapons is included and when it is not. In Chapter 3 I demonstrated that different 
“effectiveness” of intervention tools can be incorporated into the model, for example by 
modeling the 50% removal of weapons from the environment. Unfortunately, deciding on a 
percent effectiveness to use can seem arbitrary.  
 The timing of the conflicts and their interventions must be carefully interpreted for each 
case. In the Afghanistan example, conflict begins at the same time as the start of the initial 
intervention. Therefore, in the model the introduction of intervention is meant to represent the 
surge from 2006 to 2011. This requires the simplifying assumption that intervention activity 
from 2001 to 2006 did not yet have a significant influence on conflict outcomes. However, such 
an assumption disregards the impacts of failures during early foreign involvement, which created 
tensions around economic payoffs from aid delivery and security assistance, and also contributed 
to widespread corruption and resentment towards the government. Timing is also important for 
analysis of the Libya simulation. Both the conflict and the intervention occurred so quickly that 
there was no time for either combatant to have created a system of civilian support. Therefore, 
grievances and divisions within society were less likely to have had an effect on the conflict’s 
early outcomes. Instead, short-term tactical successes may have been more influential. 
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There are several changes that could be made to the current model in order to tackle its 
weaknesses. Variable functions could potentially replace fixed initial values in order to account 
for variation in populations, incomes, or relationships over time. New frameworks could be 
developed in order to define more clearly when certain intervention tools should be included in a 
simulation, and how the intervention timing should be interpreted. The model could be adjusted 
to account for alliances or factions of militants that fight cooperatively on one side, rather than 
against one other. This would allow the model to account for divisions between militants that 
may later escalate into violence. Finally, the model could be reprogrammed in order to increase 
the maximum number of communities and militants, and to make the modeling of multiple 
regions more efficient and less computationally expensive. This would open the door to the 
possibility of adding geospatial data to the model, in order to create maps of where conflict may 
be likely to occur.  
Despite the significant limitations of modeling historical cases, these simulations still 
reveal interesting and important insights for intervention strategy and policymaking. 
Computational analysis of these three cases supports the argument that civilian support for 
militants may have undermined the goals of interventions in Somalia and Afghanistan, where 
militant groups were never completely defeated despite early tactical successes. However, the 
speed with which intervention in Libya did successfully defeat its enemy militarily may have 
prevented local grievances from influencing Qaddafi’s overthrow. Perhaps a successful 
intervention approach would be to quickly defeat an enemy group on the battlefield, and then 
address underlying grievances while maintaining enough security to prevent destabilization. The 
onset of destabilization cannot be tested using the current model, however evidence from the 
case study in Chapter 4 indicates that communities such as Somaliland were able to prevent 
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destabilization using traditional methods. If traditional dispute resolution had been adopted in 
Libya after Qaddafi’s overthrow, perhaps the intervention would not have precipitated the 







CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The research conducted in this dissertation demonstrates how the interactions between 
civilian communities and militant groups during a civil war may significantly influence the 
success of foreign intervention. If local factors are not taken into account during the planning and 
implementation of intervention operations, then such operations may yield unexpected results 
that perpetuate a continuation of violence. Unfortunately, the complexity of relationships 
between civilian communities makes understanding and anticipating their influence quite 
challenging. The Agent-Based Model (ABM) presented in this project has provided a unique 
way of examining these complex factors in aggregate, such that their collective influence can be 
more easily understood. 
I conclude this project by first summarizing the findings from the computational model 
and the exploration of historical cases. These findings contribute to the existing academic 
literature by demonstrating the importance of local grievances as a motivator of conflict 
violence, and by demonstrating a unique methodology for examining conflict complexity at the 
grassroots level. I also examine the limitations of this study, highlight its contributions to the 
academic literature, and propose future areas to improve and expand upon the existing work. 
Next, I provide several policy recommendations that emerge from this project’s findings. The 
research suggests promising ways that interveners can leverage various tools and strategies, as 
well as pitfalls that may accompany their use. Generally, despite the importance of accounting 
for local grievances, tackling those grievances directly is unlikely to yield successful results. 
Instead, supporting informal dispute resolution actors who address grievances through traditional 
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methods may be more effective. I compare my recommendations to those made previously by 
various scholars and practitioners. I also discuss in greater detail some of the positives and 
negatives of supporting informal dispute resolution, and propose that more research be 
performed in order to fully appreciate the implications of this approach for policy. 
Finally, I examine the implications of foreign intervention for national and local 
sovereignty, addressing some critiques of international “meddling” in the internal affairs of other 
countries. A growing chorus of international voices have joined those of critical scholars in 
pushing back against foreign intervention, arguing that it is most likely to worsen conflict and 
perpetuate instability. I acknowledge these viewpoints while also recognizing that the uncertainty 
of future global events makes it impossible to anticipate the circumstances that could warrant the 
next foreign intervention. Policymakers must be prepared for the event that, if such a scenario 
arises, they should be fully equipped with the knowledge necessary to achieve their intervention 
goals while simultaneously minimizing violence. This project expands the existing knowledge 
about the role of local grievances and how best to navigate them in order to save civilian lives. 
 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
The ABM approach used in this project represents the complexity of a conflict environment in 
which civilians and militants interact with one another during civil war. The model is then used 
to simulate the introduction of various intervention tools and strategies to determine their effects 
on conflict outcomes. One unexpected finding is that more civilians tend to provide support to 
militant groups who are unaligned with any particular civilian community, or who are aligned 
with many civilians under one common community. This is because civilians may seek to 
provide support to any militant that they believe can help them resolve community grievances in 
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their favor, and unaffiliated militants are not limited to receiving support from only those 
communities with whom they are previously associated. Such militants may grow stronger than 
those who only earn support from specific communities with whom they are affiliated. In 
addition, the existence of weapons in a conflict environment substantially reduces the strength of 
militant groups who engage in terrorism tactics against civilian populations. This is because local 
communities are able to arm themselves and protect against attacks, lessening their chances of 
being coerced into providing support. This finding is supported by historical evidence from the 
cases in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya.  
The external “shock” provided by an intervention in a hypothetical, modeled conflict 
environment between a weak government, a strong rebel group, and an extremist organization 
leads to unexpected and complicated responses by civilians and militants. Civilians may not shift 
their support between militant groups in a way that supports the goals of the intervention. In this 
particular environment, the most effective tools are those economic and military approaches that 
have been typically used to directly target militants during previous interventions, such as 
providing funding and training to militants directly, and attacking and cutting off resources from 
their adversaries. The one exception is the provision of benefits to civilians with the condition 
that they change their support to a desired actor. The most effective combined strategy is one 
which combines this tool with the typical economic and military tools, although it leads to a 
large incidence of civilians defending themselves, undermining overall stability.  
This finding is also consistent with evidence from the exploration of cases. In particular, 
strengthening governments and removing weapons may be effective ways to prevent civilians 
from militarizing their disputes and providing support to militants. In Somalia, Afghanistan, and 
Libya, intervention forces were all successful in their initial efforts to overwhelm adversaries 
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using direct military force and assistance to locally-supported militants. They also engaged in 
large-scale humanitarian aid delivery that was meant to alleviate immediate suffering and bolster 
civilian support for the intervention. These actions established peace and security in the short 
term.   
However, weak local governments struggled to maintain security. This undermined 
intervention efforts, threatening the safety of security forces and eroding their reliability in the 
eyes of the civilian population. Weak governments were also unable to provide adequate policing 
or dispute adjudication, and the proliferation of weapons enabled civilians to take up arms 
themselves.  Adversary militants in Somalia and Afghanistan resumed fighting and grew in 
strength, and Libya experienced severe militarization of local groups and a collapse into a new 
civil war. The subsequent use of additional diplomatic and economic intervention tools, 
particularly in Afghanistan, did not succeed in preventing further violence. Overall, the cases 
demonstrate the limits of military intervention for achieving long-term stability, and also draw 
attention to harmful effects from factors not included in the model, such as civilian resentment, 
corruption, and lack of trust for foreign involvement in governance.   
The model also shows that tools which directly remove civilian grievances may fail to 
reduce violence or erode militant strength. This finding is unexpected; this research study 
initially hypothesized that removing these underlying grievances might resolve the reasons that 
civilians provide conflict militants with support. However, alternative relationships influence 
civilians to shift their support in unexpected ways. This often leads to new support for other 
militant actors based on pre-existing relationships, and can backfire if civilians support militants 
who the intervention opposes. The complexity of the conflict environment makes these shifts 
difficult to anticipate.  
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Likewise, in each of the empirical cases, the complexity of local intercommunal 
dynamics as well as concerns about preserving local sovereignty prevented interveners from 
tackling grievances in a meaningful way. Limited attempts to do so in the later stages of 
intervention in Afghanistan still yielded only limited or isolated successes, confirming the 
model’s results. Ultimately, despite leveraging a variety of intervention tools and strategies, 
foreign interveners were unable to overcome the significant influence of internal divisions on 
conflict fighting. The cases indicate that lack of trust may have been an important obstacle to 
effectively resolving conflict between communities. Therefore, traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms such as local leaders or councils are better equipped to confront grievances without 
perpetuating further violence. In Somaliland beginning in 1991, local leaders were able to 
negotiate disputes in the north without escalation into civil war, despite facing similar challenges 
as the rest of Somalia to the south. Some communities in Afghanistan and Libya succeeded in 
doing the same. These findings indicate that, rather than tackling grievances themselves, 
interveners may be more successful in reducing violence by supporting and encouraging these 
more trusted local resolvers of disputes.  
Despite the limits of intervention for effectively resolving important underlying disputes, 
the results from the case exploration also indicate key factors that interveners should examine as 
part of their planning for operations in a foreign civil war. Past conflict in Somalia, Afghanistan 
and Libya indicates that the availability of weapons to civilian populations and the strength of 
the formal government are important influencers of violence that stems from popular grievances. 
If weapons are not readily available, civilians may be less likely to take up arms or form militias. 
If the government is strong or restrictive enough to maintain a monopoly over the use of force, 
non-state actors are also less likely to inflict violence or engage in fighting. Further, the 
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alignment of civilian grievances with the goals of fighting is another critical factor for 
anticipating the role of local disputes in the overall fighting. If they are not aligned, then 
resolving the broader reasons for fighting may not prevent grievances from fueling more conflict, 
and if they are aligned, then a failure to stop the fighting will also fail to resolve grievances.  
Overall, the findings from the model demonstrate the utility of ABM for synthesizing the 
complexity of interactions that occur during conflict. It captures the importance of local 
grievances in contributing to conflict violence and some of the ways that intervention tools may 
influence their role. The exploration of cases confirms these findings and also contributes 
additional insights into factors that are not accounted for in the model. It provides additional 
indicators for interveners to account for during planning stages, reveals the limits of foreign 
intervention for addressing grievances, and finds that traditional dispute resolution holds the 
greatest promise for confronting these underlying issues.  
 
6.2 Limitations, Contributions to the Academic Literature, and Future Research 
Interpretation of the results from the model is subject to several important limitations. In order to 
ensure that the model’s findings are as meaningful and comprehensible as possible, the model is 
limited to include the fewest number of interactions and parameters necessary to capture the 
dynamics of interest. Without these limitations, it would be difficult to trace the causes of the 
model’s findings. However, this leads to an incomplete simulation of actual conflict dynamics, as 
many important factors are not represented. The model therefore serves only as a representation 
of the interactions considered most important in this study, and other researchers may disagree 
with their selection.  
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Many other significant drivers of conflict violence should be kept in mind when 
interpreting the model results, as demonstrated by the case exploration. These factors may 
include the roles of trust, corruption, and animosity towards intervention. The model also does 
not account for the effects of prior interventions, the formation or dissolution of militant groups, 
the creation of alliances, or changes in militant characteristics over time, such as the use of 
terrorism. The characteristics of civilian communities may also be oversimplified, as community 
grievances and affiliations with militants can also vary over time.  
 Measuring the effects of foreign intervention tools in the conflict environment is also 
limited by the exclusion of factors that are not accounted for in the model. For example, each 
tool is represented by a specific change in parameters that is designed to represent the tool’s 
effect, such as an increase in strength to a militant or a change in civilian grievances. This does 
not account for any other side effects that may result from implementation of that tool in an 
actual conflict environment. For example, the tool “increasing the wealth of civilians” does not 
account for shifts that might result in the local economy, or resentment that could erupt amongst 
civilians whose wealth is not increased. The model also does not account for outright failures of 
the intervention; for example, when “negotiating agreements between militant groups,” militants 
could simply participate in the negotiations with the hopes of boosting their own credibility and 
fail to uphold any cessation of fighting. While this study does test a reduced 50% efficiency of 
each tool, it is difficult to identify what this reduced percentage looks like in an actual conflict 
setting. Therefore, this study’s experimentation on the effects of intervention tools and strategies 
is only an approximation of what might occur in reality.  
 The exploration of cases supplements the computational simulation of foreign 
intervention by examining many additional factors and side effects that are unaccounted for in 
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the model. This provides additional insight into how grievances and local-level interactions 
influence conflict violence and the outcomes of intervention. However, this analysis is limited by 
its selection of cases. Interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya were similar in that their 
local communities faced a high degree of grievances and divisions, and these divisions played a 
significant role in contributing to conflict. All three interventions were also considered failures 
by policymakers in their ability to end violence and stabilize a national government.  
This selection of cases was made in order to make the findings of this research more 
relatable and accessible to current policymakers, who may have been involved in the 
implementation of these interventions over the past three decades. Their recency also provides 
some consistency in the nature of warfare, with irregular or asymmetric conflict taking place 
between state and non-state combatants with access to increasingly sophisticated technology. 
However, broadening the cases to include conflicts which were ultimately more successful, such 
as in the Balkans, or which did not experience such a high level of influence from local 
grievances, such as in Sierra Leone, might improve the validity of the study’s findings and 
provide additional insight. Exploring cases further back in time might also be informative. 
Unfortunately, details about local interactions in older conflicts might be difficult to obtain, as 
even in the three relatively recent conflicts examined in this study, information about grievances, 
affiliations, and the behavior of militants at the local level is difficult to find and verify.  
Despite its limitations, this combined computational and case analysis research makes 
several helpful contributions to existing conflict and intervention literature. First, it provides 
quantitative support for the use of optimal strategies and tools during an intervention, as well as 
support for avoiding the direct tackling of local grievances. Second, it demonstrates the use of 
ABM for modeling some of the local level complexity in a conflict environment. It dynamically 
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combines multiple theories of interactions between civilians and militants in conflict, while 
demonstrating their overall simultaneous effects to yield new insights about a conflict system. 
Third, it builds on existing research about civilians as autonomous decisionmaking agents in civil 
wars, whose interests and behavior may often significantly influence violence outcomes. Fourth, 
it provides detailed insight into how such dynamics influenced conflict in Somalia, Afghanistan, 
and Libya, and how foreign interveners failed to address underlying roots of violence. Finally, 
this project draws attention to the importance of information about local dynamics for 
policymakers. While a substantial amount of research about local conflict dynamics does exist, 
there is less work that translates these dynamics into implications for intervention 
decisionmaking.  
There are many possibilities for future research to build upon the computation performed 
in this project. First, the model should be run using new hypothetical conflict cases, in order to 
compare findings under different initial conditions. Because the findings only hold for the 
specific conditions in which they are tested, more cases must be examined in order to test the 
validity of the findings. Second, additional data on empirical conflict cases could be gathered in 
order to improve modeling of the real-life cases. Third, it would be visually interesting to include 
spatial data in the model, in order to generate maps that show geographic areas where civilians 
might shift their support between different groups over time. Finally, the model could be 
expanded to include the effects of additional negative side effects that result from interventions, 
such as backlash against civilian casualties that result from military attacks. 
Future work should also build upon the findings of the case exploration. The cases 
suggest particular indicators that could guide decisionmaking, such as the availability of 
weapons to civilian populations, the strength of the incumbent government, and the alignment of 
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civilian grievances with the objectives of conflict actors. These indicators could be incorporated 
into a framework that helps policymakers anticipate conflict outcomes and establish policy 
procedures. Developing such a framework would require examining more conflict cases, as the 
influence of different variables should be tested in a broader variety of civil wars.  
Future researchers should also determine a method to assess the overall relevance of the 
local factors and grievances that are the primary focus of this project, as compared to other 
important factors that drive conflict violence at the broader level. Such factors include the 
motivations of militants, their outside resources or sources of support, and bureaucratic or 
organizational factors. It remains to be determined whether the local relationships and grievances 
examined in this project have as significant an effect as some of these other contributors to 
conflict. 
 
6.3 Policy Recommendations 
The findings from this project can be used to formulate several important bureaucratic and policy 
recommendations for decisionmakers who are considering foreign intervention.  
 
Recommendation 1: Improve pre-intervention planning and intelligence-gathering  
Interveners must improve their planning processes in order to anticipate how local factors and 
grievances might fuel violence and militarization during intervention operations. They must not 
overlook the important and significant role of these factors, which have substantial impacts on 
the success of different intervention strategies. Otherwise, they may choose tools that 
inadvertently exacerbate conflict, and become caught off guard by unexpected effects of their 
intervention. Interveners should also develop plans for an intervention lasting for a long period 
of time, as involvement in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya all extended longer than interveners 
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had originally anticipated. Even though decisionmakers may not want to consider the possibility 
of engaging in a long-lasting effort, whether due to limited resources or political will, developing 
a long-term plan may prevent unanticipated challenges down the road. In the past, interventions 
have frequently extended well beyond their originally-anticipated time frames. Policymakers 
should plan for long-term stabilization efforts, and any campaign that engages locally on 
community grievances will especially require a significant investment of time.  
 Policymakers should also equip themselves with as much information an intelligence as 
possible about local conflict dynamics and civilian grievances. They should perform assessments 
of weapons presence, government capacity, public opinion, the interests of different civilian 
communities, and their alignment with fighting groups. This could provide indications about the 
extent to which local grievances may pose an obstacle to intervention. Civilian grievances might 
only have a minor impact if they strongly align with broad conflict goals and there is a certain 
chance of military success. Even in such a case, there must be a plan in place for ensuring that 
civilians do not gain enough access to weapons to militarize themselves, and the government 
must be strong enough to peacefully adjudicate disputes between communities. Otherwise, 
renewed conflict could destabilize any gains in peace. Interveners should gather enough 
information about the relationships between civilians and militants to anticipate the effectiveness 
of intervention operations, and to inform how they tailor those operations to different societal 
contexts. 
This recommendation is consistent with previous guidance suggested by prominent think 
tanks, government organizations, and researchers. Two RAND reports describe failures to plan 
for local factors prior to U.S. interventions since 2001, recommending greater attention to these 
factors during planning phases in the future (Jones 2008, Robinson et al. 2014). Prominent 
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political scientist Steven Walt agrees, stating in an article for Foreign Policy that “any foreign-
policy initiative that doesn’t take local identities and conditions into account is likely to fail” 
(Walt 2014). For example, without accounting for factors that influence a militant group’s 
resolve to fight, interveners are more likely to underestimate the cost of achieving victory 
(Sullivan 2007). 
Autesserre (2010) recommends that peace processes implemented by interveners be 
planned over longer periods. The Special Investigator General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 
(SIGAR) Lesson’s Learned Report on Stabilization activities in Afghanistan also emphasizes 
that stabilization takes time, adding that “without the patience and political will for a planned and 
prolonged effort, large-scale stabilization missions are likely to fail” (SIGAR 2018b, xii). 
SIGAR (2018b) and RAND (2008) also reiterate the importance of gathering and analyzing 
greater information about local populations. SIGAR (2018b) argues that “DOD and USAID 
should prioritize developing and retaining human terrain analytical expertise that would allow a 
more nuanced understanding of local communities” (xiii). A better understanding of the conflict 
environment would help inform improved planning efforts by anticipating factors that could have 
a significant impact on the effectiveness of intervention operations. 
 
Recommendation 2: Improve intergovernmental and interagency cooperation  
Interveners should use combined approaches when engaging in foreign intervention, rather than 
relying on only individual tools. In order to facilitate this effort, they should improve cooperation 
between different agencies and organizations. For example, greater cooperation and coordination 
between the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Department of State (DOS), and the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) could improve the ability of the U.S. 
government to effectively implement combined strategies. This would necessitate improved 
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funding for DOS and USAID, which often see their programs dwarfed by the significantly 
better-funded DOD operations (Brooks 2017, Schake 2013). This study finds that the most 
effective combined approaches are those which generally leverage typical military and economic 
tools that directly support or undermine the strength of militant groups. These tools lead to the 
greatest increases in government strength and decreases in violence in the computational model, 
and evidence from the cases also suggests that initial forceful operations are highly successful. 
Greater DOS involvement in these activities, even though they may be spearheaded by the 
military, may help the U.S. government implement them with greater consideration for local 
political contexts.  
Experts and practitioners agree that intervention efforts should be executed more 
collaboratively. U.S. policymakers have already made efforts to encourage greater interagency 
cooperation; during the lead up to the 2011 intervention in Libya, both Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed the importance of collaboration and 
“unity of effort” (Chollet 2016, Clinton 2014). Cooperation between DOS and DOD successfully 
led to building international support for military operations (Quartararo, Rovenolt, and White 
2012). Scholars also stress the importance of integrating intervention efforts between countries. 
A 2017 policy note published by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict 
(GPPAC) concerning UN stabilization operations in Mali emphasizes the importance of working 
cooperatively between the wide variety of organizations involved in peacebuilding (Aulin and 
Divin 2017). Autesserre (2010) goes further, suggesting the creation of consolidated offices and 
departments devoted specifically to the effort of local conflict resolution. Unfortunately, as 
pointed out by GPPAC, consolidation of efforts by large international organizations can also 
alienate a population, creating a perception of foreign meddling and contributing to a lack of 
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local ownership (4). Therefore, these offices and departments should sharpen their focus on 
widespread, systematic and in-depth engagement with local communities, so that they do not 
threaten the legitimacy and trust that is necessary for effective peacebuilding (Aulin and Divin 
2017). 
 
Recommendation 3: Use swift, short-term military operations to establish security, and prioritize 
grassroots economic development over aid delivery in order to prevent corruption 
Both the model and the case exploration find that the optimal intervention strategy is to quickly 
defeat opposed militant groups by attacking them directly and providing support to their 
opponents, while also providing large amounts of aid and other benefits to win civilian support. 
However, the cases also show that a rapid provision of aid and assistance with insufficient 
oversight is highly likely to facilitate corruption by permitting local officials and power-holders 
to funnel money and goods to their informal patronage networks. This approach can therefore, in 
the long run, undermine sustainable economic development, encourage criminal activity, and 
erode civilian support. This may damage any attempts to establish stable governance by hurting 
the population’s trust in government officials and institutions, increasing the likelihood that 
civilians provide support to other militants. Where at all possible, the promotion of local business 
activity should be used to replace the direct provision of humanitarian aid and in-kind benefits to 
civilian communities. Innovative methods for supporting local police and militaries could also be 
designed to promote sustainable business activity, for example by helping support local 
production of supplies required by the government. While taking this approach would be 
significantly slower than delivering handouts, it is also more likely to be sustainable and could 
help build formal and legitimate networks of resources that would contribute to stability in the 
long-term. When direct assistance is required, efforts should be made to keep investment 
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contracts as low in value and as dispersed as possible in order to avoid too rapid delivery of 
outside funds to any one recipient. 
Some practitioners also recommend forceful initial military operations. According to 
RAND (2014) observations from the Balkans, “a sufficiently large footprint to conduct early 
stability operations, during the “golden hour” before any opposition can get organized, may 
prevent the need for a larger or longer deployment later” (64). Even in Libya, where a light 
footprint was arguably required due to sovereignty concerns, U.S. National Security Council 
(NSC) advisor David Chollet says that “[deploying special forces on the ground] may have 
shortened the conflict and given us valuable leverage over the various militias after Qaddafi’s 
ouster” (Chollet 2016, 105). Scholars Sullivan and Karreth (2015) also find that military 
intervention in support of a government that is militarily weaker than a rebel group can be 
extremely effective for ameliorating the strength disparity. 
Autesserre (2010) advises that interveners use military force and other securitization 
approaches to enable local peacebuilding operations as necessary. However, practitioners are 
sometimes hesitant in recommending forceful tactics to achieve political aims due to their 
tendency to alienate civilians (Malkasian 2013, UN 2011a). Conventional military assistance in 
support of incumbent governments can often be ineffective because it does not resolve the 
government’s underlying political liabilities, and rebel groups may avoid attacks by simply 
dispersing and regrouping at a later time (Sullivan and Karreth 2015). Some practitioners also 
consistently warn against arming rebel groups or militias, who could polarize security along 
identity lines and worsen fighting over grievances (Autesserre 2010, Bruno 2008, Chayes 2015, 
Malkasian 2013). While arming them may result in significant military gains (Sullivan and 
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Karreth 2015), their ability to establish security and engage in effective leadership is less certain 
and dependent on a variety of other political and economic factors (Weinstein 2006). 
With regards to the provision of aid and assistance, SIGAR also recommends against 
spending too much money too quickly and in the pursuit of quick gains, as doing so can 
undermine democracy and economic stability by supporting corrupt patronage networks (SIGAR 
2018a, b). However, this recommendation is contradicted by Autesserre (2010), who argues that 
a larger amount of external funding channeled directly to local actors is needed to successfully 
support peacebuilding. In order to avoid corruption, she recommends investing in strong and 
effective oversight. However, several other researchers suggest that such monitoring may not be 
feasible in practice (Chayes 2015, Gibson 2005, SIGAR 2018a). Evidence from the case of 
Afghanistan, in which interveners invested significantly in the delivery and oversight of 
economic assistance, also suggests that corruption is likely to pose a problem despite the 
international community’s best efforts (SIGAR 2018a, b). Given the serious threat that 
corruption can pose to peace, more gradual, long-term and grassroots-driven economic support 
may present fewer risks. This should still be balanced carefully with some amount of emergency 
humanitarian relief, to avoid violence brought on by acute hunger or the absence of basic 
necessities.  
 
Recommendation 4: Avoid direct involvement in resolving local grievances; instead support 
traditional dispute resolution institutions in the long term 
Interveners should avoid direct participation in resolving local grievances themselves. Even if 
concerted efforts are made to gather as much local information as possible, it is unlikely that 
outside actors will have sufficient access to timely details about enough different local contexts 
to successfully tackle them on a widespread scale. Interveners also run the risk of prompting 
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unexpected behavior from civilian communities, who could shift their support in unanticipated 
ways. Therefore, tackling grievances directly is an unrealistic endeavor that is better not to be 
attempted. This does not mean, however, that interveners should neglect them altogether. 
Instead, interveners should first focus their efforts on the rapid defeat of opposed militant groups 
and establishing security as quickly as possible. They can also help strengthen governments and 
limit the availability of weapons in order to prevent civilians from militarizing their disputes. 
Then, over an extended period, they should provide support to informal leaders and any other 
traditional dispute resolution institutions that may themselves tackle persisting local-level 
conflicts. These actors are more likely to be trusted by the civilian population and to fully 
understand the local context of the disagreements. 
  RAND (2008) also advises that interventions address local grievances not by tackling 
them directly themselves, but by working through informal stakeholders with greater knowledge 
about local contexts, stating that “indigenous groups are more likely to be effective in 
influencing locals and countering insurgent ideology than the U.S. military or other international 
actors are” (129). They recommend “providing assistance to credible indigenous groups, such as 
Muslim clerics or tribal elders, that can effectively counter jihadist propaganda” (129).  Such an 
approach engages with local leaders and institutions who have the authority, respect, and the 
knowledge of local contexts to address disputes without the negative side effects that may result 
from direct involvement. Supporting them may involve promoting their legitimacy and authority, 
providing financial or physical resources, and ensuring their protection from violence. It could 
also include such tasks as “setting up local courts to adjudicate competing ownership claims over 
land, organizing a workshop to reconcile two villages in conflict, or building an enterprise in 
whose success two warring communities have a stake” (Autesserre 2010, 35). Conflict resolution 
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at the local level may prevent civilian communities from attempting to rely on militant groups as 
an alternative way of resolving their grievances. Evidence from Somaliland since 1991 and 
isolated towns in Afghanistan and Libya have demonstrated the long-term effectiveness of 
informal institutions. When local stakeholders address conflict independently through traditional 
methods, their efforts may result in peace in spite of destabilizing factors such as weak 
governments, weapons prevalence, and “spoilers” who stand to gain from stoking violence. 
 The effectiveness of traditional dispute resolution as evidenced by the exploration of 
cases may seem to contradict the findings of the computational model. The model suggests that 
removal of grievances by an outside intervener may not substantially reduce fighting, as civilians 
may continue to support militants due to other factors such as militant punishment. Removing 
grievances may also worsen the strength of the government relative to other fighting groups. 
However, it might appear that local leaders succeed in accomplishing these objectives through 
the very same approach: by removing the disputes that exist between communities. As suggested 
by evidence from the cases, their conflict resolution efforts can conversely result in significant 
reductions in violence between communities, providing the government with the opportunity to 
establish control. This discrepancy may occur because the model does not account for the effects 
of trust and legitimacy. An outside intervener is unlikely to be able to establish the strong trust 
relationships with local communities that are necessary for upholding mutually agreed-upon 
solutions to deep and long-standing divisions, and its actions may be viewed as illegitimate to 
communities who seek to protect their own sovereignty. By contrast, local leaders and 
decisionmaking bodies are much more likely to command significant respect in their 
communities, leading civilians to trust them and adhere to their decisions. This legitimacy is not 
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captured in the model, and as a result shifts in grievances simply lead to different and 
unpredictable decisionmaking behavior by civilians.  
Realistically, traditional dispute resolution may not actually remove the underlying 
disputes between communities. Some level of grievance is likely to continually exist between 
civilians, increasing or decreasing in salience over time and in response to catalyzing events. 
Rather than eliminating grievances, traditional leaders instead perform effective adjudication, in 
which they negotiate and enforce solutions that prevent opposing parties from resorting to 
violence. This is different from an attempted removal of grievances by an outside intervener. 
Such efforts are likely infeasible, and even if they are successful, the model suggests that 
communities may continue to support opposed militants due to their patterns of punishment, 
provision of benefits, or their local affiliations.  
 Previous research has examined the merits of supporting traditional dispute resolution 
institutions and some of the ways that this can be implemented. Some studies perform political, 
sociological, and anthropological analyses of traditional dispute resolution practices in specific 
communities, such as the Buems on the border of Ghana and Togo (Fred-Mensah 2000), the 
Fulani in the Sahel (Wilson-Fall 2000), Afghan tribes in the town of Istalif (Coburn 2011a), and 
between clans throughout Somalia (Abdile 2012). Another body of scholars takes a more legal 
and institutional approach, analyzing the strength of informal institutions relative to formal ones 
and how they can be leveraged to mitigate conflict in a variety of different countries (Akinwale 
2010, Bratton 2007, Day 2001, MacFarlane 2006). Practitioners also observe the effectiveness of 
these institutions in the field. One United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report describes how 
customary practices for seeking justice in Libya effectively operate parallel to state-sponsored 
institutions (Elmangoush 2015), while another explains how traditional Loya Jirgas in 
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Afghanistan occasionally step into an official governance role and make decisions at the national 
level (Smith 2019). Researcher Christian Dennys also discusses the role of Afhan Loya Jirgas in 
an article for the NATO Review, describing how local Peace Councils can effectively resolve 
disputes. He suggests that supporting these and other traditional councils could help to expand 
grassroots conflict resolution and restore systems of justice in Afghan communities.  
 A few other analysts support this finding. Sahel expert Nathaniel Powell argues that local 
peace and reconciliation processes have the greatest hope of ending violence in Mali (Powell 
2016). He recommends that France facilitate these processes and limit its support of repressive 
governments, as “a lighter French footprint focused on local peace-building efforts would cost 
less and be more effective in bringing real stability to the region” (Powell 2016). A 2019 study of 
UN Peacekeeping Operations in Cote d’Ivoire from 2011-2016 also finds that “local intergroup 
dialogue activities” help to decrease communal violence (Smidt 2020). Scholar Jon Unruh, when 
analyzing the role of the international community in resolving conflict over land disputes, 
recommends assessing how informal processes work on the ground and building on existing 
local practices to enable peace in the long term (Unruh 2010). USIP also published a detailed 
policy briefing outlining many benefits and pitfalls of supporting traditional dispute resolution in 
Afghanistan, providing more recommendations for best practices in using this approach to 
achieve stability. 
 Researchers have identified certain conditions in which traditional conflict resolution is 
most likely to be successful. When supporting traditional parties, external actors should only 
serve in a neutral mediator role and refrain from being seen taking sides, which could further 
divide communities (Ruttig 2010, Unruh 2010). Unruh (2010) warns that “an international actor 
as an adjudicator carries a significant legitimacy problem and risks subsequent accusations, 
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problems regarding sovereignty, and a collapse of agreements” (Unruh 2010, 114). He cites the 
example of UN involvement in dispute resolution in East Timor that was perceived as biased and 
led to the end of UN participation. Unruh also warns that local dispute resolution mechanisms 
are not a sustainable long-term solution and need to be replaced or integrated with formal ones 
over time, as institutions that work well during periods of conflict may not also work well during 
peacetime. Other analyses support this argument; in a study of violence between artisanal and 
industrial fishermen in Senegal, Dubois and Zorafos (2012) find that informal mechanisms 
struggled to bridge between different cultural contexts and traditions at the national level. 
Some form of bridging should be established between informal institutions and formal 
ones, in order to leverage the strengths of both systems of justice and to increase the likelihood 
of a smooth transition to a shared role for formal institutions in the long term (Coburn 2011b, 
Day 2001, DuBois and Zografos 2012, Menkhaus 2016, Unruh 2010). Evidence from several 
cases holds promise for the feasibility of this integration; in Ghana disputes are effectively 
resolved through a process of passing cases between formal and traditional court systems (Fred-
Mensah 2000). In Ethiopia (MacFarlane 2006) and Nigeria (Akinwale 2010), they often work 
alongside one another by influencing civilian behavior simultaneously. Some distinction should 
still be maintained between informal and formal conflict resolution actors in order to avoid 
corrupt behavior and a lack of clarity in the justice sector (Bratton 2007). Based on the existing 
research, by maintaining a neutral yet supportive role and creating mechanisms for integrating 
informal conflict resolution mechanisms with more formal ones later on, foreign interveners can 
leverage the legitimacy and the strengths of traditional leaders to help communities establish 
peace. 
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Several obstacles also pose challenges to feasible implementation of empowering 
traditional leaders. A USIP report published in 2012 warned that interveners often lack the 
understanding of how to put empowerment programs into practice (USIP 2012). It also argued 
that “conflict environments are not conducive to traditional empowerment approaches,” that 
“agencies leading conflict operations often lack experience with empowerment principles,” and 
politicization of conflicts “creates intense pressure for immediate results,” undermining such 
strategies (USIP 2012, 7). After examining cases of local actor engagement during conflicts in 
Burundi, Guatemala, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, USIP recommends that in order to 
successfully support local leadership, interveners should focus on facilitating the participation 
processes and promoting local learning rather than defending their own interests, and without 
being deflected by political pressures (USIP 2012). Unfortunately, even if interveners manage to 
overcome the bureaucratic challenges to safely deploying knowledgeable experts throughout a 
conflict environment, the political pressure to take sides may be too great. For example, if clan 
leaders in Somalia were to negotiate agreements that were advantageous to al-Shabaab, most 
international interveners might not remain supportive of the process. This calls into question 
whether any non-neutral intervention could ever achieve positive results and reduce violence by 
supporting traditional dispute resolution. 
Severine Autesserre also cites bureaucratic reasons that the UN and some foreign 
diplomatic missions might resist supporting local dispute resolution. She finds that, in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the bottom-up nature of such programs would have threatened 
these organizations’ interests in confronting violence because it “challenged their very identity, 
which centered on the notion that they were macro-level international organizations” (Autesserre 
2010, 216). Working through existing formal institutions may also be more familiar to official 
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foreign organizations, and national-level stakeholders may be viewed as more legitimate by the 
international community. Foreign officials such as diplomats are typically only granted authority 
to work through formal state-sanctioned actors in another country, and they negotiate with sub-
state actors only with the approval of the official government (Autesserre 2010). Based on UN 
experience in Mali, GPPAC recommends working through official and national-level channels to 
address local issues, stating that interventions should “build on existing initiatives and structures, 
which prioritize national stakeholders and relate to agencies that have a permanent presence in 
Mali (such as national offices or permanent missions)” (Aulin and Divin 2017, 15). 
Unfortunately, such formal national institutions may not be viewed as neutral by local 
populations, and barriers may exist between local communities and weak central authorities 
which prevent them from effectively engaging on local issues. 
In addition, international organizations like the UN might resist becoming involved in 
local-level intervention because of an increasingly common norm of nonintervention in domestic 
affairs of other countries. Some actors both internationally and domestically find the notion of 
local-level intervention so outrageous that they designate their advocates ‘paternalists,’ 
‘neocolonialists,’ and ‘neoimperialists’ (Autesserre 2010, 217). As a result, interveners may not 
be interested in pursuing local engagement to begin with, or they may be wary of condemnation 
from countries who view such engagement as unethical. Autesserre recommends promoting 
cultural change within government and international organizations, as well as in the media, to 
highlight the positive benefits that can result from local level conflict resolution programs.  
 There are also several negative side effects that may result from supporting traditional 
dispute resolution actors. First, official national governments themselves may react negatively to 
providing informal actors with decisionmaking authority. According to USIP, their 
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empowerment could threaten the central government’s legitimacy and its official channels of 
control (Gaston, Sarwari, and Strand 2013). Hamid Karzai, the first President of Afghanistan 
following the overthrow of the Taliban, expressed concern about the empowerment of local 
leaders, which he considered to be a form of decentralization that could undermine his 
government’s authority (Jones 2010, Malkasian 2013). In Libya, citizens themselves did not trust 
traditional leaders. A study conducted by USIP found that most Libyan civilians preferred formal 
institutions over tribal forms of leadership (Cole and Mangan 2016b).  
Another problem is that traditional leaders are not immune from the influence of militant 
groups in a conflict. They may abandon any neutrality and align themselves with different 
groups (Bøås 2015). This could potentially worsen the conflict if they make biased or 
unbalanced adjudication decisions, favoring one side or another. In some cases the most trusted 
local leaders for negotiating disputes may even be members of the militant groups that the 
intervention opposes (Buscaglia 2015, Gaston, Sarwari, and Strand 2013). For example, religious 
leaders who joined the Taliban were often the most trusted local adjudicators of disputes in rural 
Afghanistan, which sometimes elevated the Taliban’s influence amongst local populations (Jones 
2010). Relying on such actors could inadvertently lend support to other militants or local 
warlords and cement their community influence. 
 Finally, the decisionmaking of traditional leaders may not align with the foreign policy 
objectives of some foreign interveners. For example, one USIP report argues that their decisions 
may infringe on the rights of women, minorities, and other vulnerable groups (Gaston, Sarwari, 
and Strand 2013). Traditional elders in rural societies are likely to be older, male, and represent 
some of the most prominent rather than minority communities, possibly undermining the 
establishment of fair and representative societies. However, USIP also notes that traditional 
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leaders are often no more fair or balanced than any alternative adjudicators that may exist in rural 
settings (Gaston, Sarwari, and Strand 2013). A formal justice system may be just as likely to 
make unjust decisions that may not be any more consistent with centrally-created laws.   
 Ultimately, support of local adjudication institutions may be challenging and even 
counterproductive if support provided by the foreign intervener undermines the very neutrality 
that earns the trust and respect of local communities. Without that trust and respect, this form of 
adjudication may not be effective. More research and insight from practical experience in the 
field should be pursued in order to further explore the potential of this intervention approach. If 
the international community can devise a manner in which to support and empower the 
independent decisionmaking of traditional authorities, without tainting their authority and 
neutrality, then this could be a promising way for interveners to avoid the costs and information 
barriers of directly tackling local grievances, while still offering a path for their adjudication.  
  
6.4 Opposition to Foreign Intervention and Conclusion 
The findings from this project paint a bleak picture for the future prospects of foreign 
intervention in civil wars. Local grievances clearly contribute significantly to conflict fighting in 
many cases, and this research finds little evidence that tackling these underlying grievances 
directly could lead to more successful outcomes. Local leaders and traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms hold the most promise for resolving disputes. While foreign interveners could 
potentially support such mechanisms, local dispute resolution is possibly more successful in the 
absence of any external involvement, since foreign interveners may struggle to remain neutral. 
Researchers and policymakers may therefore conclude that, considering the high costs and risks 
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of foreign intervention, perhaps the international community would do best by not getting 
involved at all. 
 Many critics around the world condemn interventions in the conflicts of other countries. 
For example, the Foreign Minister of Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) argues 
that the conflict in Libya could end if external parties would cease their involvement (Gallagher 
2019). This perspective is shared by former UN Special Envoy Ghassan Salame, who angrily 
called for an end to foreign interference for the sake of the Libyan people, saying “I am asking 
all the countries to remain outside this situation because there is no military solution” 
(TheDefensePost 2020). In 2014, the Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota pointed to the 
“blind faith in the effectiveness of military action to promote stability” exhibited by countries 
like the United States, France, and the UK in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan (Brockmeier, 
Stuenkel, and Tourinho 2016, 132). He argued that “serious setbacks have demonstrated the 
limitations of strategies that attribute to the use of force a role that it does not and cannot fulfill 
in today’s world” (Brockmeier, Stuenkel, and Tourinho 2016, 132). Academic research supports 
the argument that foreign military intervention prolongs fighting, finding that it may discourage 
commitments to peace or increase polarization between parties (Abu-Bader and Ianchovichina 
2019, Albornoz and Hauk 2014, Regan 2002a). Scholars also argue that it may incentivize 
fighting by creating a moral hazard effect, in which sub-state groups engage in risky fighting in 
the hopes of receiving outside support (Kuperman 2008). 
 Critics also argue that intervention supporting weak governments undermines local peace 
and economic growth because it bolsters the military and intelligence capabilities of oppressive 
regimes, against whom violent movements are often waged in the first place. Researcher 
Nathaniel Powell notes that France’s military operations in the Sahel increase the likelihood of 
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instability because they bolster rogue governments that prey on their populations (Powell 2016). 
This lessens the likelihood of peace in the long term. For example, in Mali, “human rights abuses 
by the national army mean it is often viewed with suspicion, if not hostility,” and “better units, in 
the absence of a clear political process and oversight, may simply become better oppressors” 
(Powell 2018). In attempting to strengthen African governments, intervention has also 
strengthened the power of societal elites, discouraging free-market economies and exacerbating 
the inequalities that divide groups and foster grievances (Levine 2013). Academic research also 
finds that intervention may undermine democracy and worsen human rights by supporting state 
repression (Huang 2016, Mwangi 2015, Sullivan, Blanken, and Rice 2020). Some citizens of 
Sahel countries have pushed back against French intervention through popular protests, 
perceiving French support of authoritarian governments as a self-interested method of exerting 
colonial-style control (Reza 2020).  
 One pretext for intervention that is particularly contentious from a normative perspective 
is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P is a principle that justifies intervention by the 
international community for the purpose of protecting civilians from harm when their 
government is unable or unwilling to do so (Hehir and Murray 2013). However, since the 2011 
intervention in Libya in which R2P was cited as the principal motivation to intervene, some 
countries have lost trust in its good-faith nature. South Africa in particular accused NATO of 
having abused its R2P mandate, and has emerged as a prominent voice in condemning 
interference by Western countries (Adebajo 2016, 1197). According to a policy briefing 
published by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), the country’s 
disapproval is driven by “the selective application of the [R2P] norm” and the tendency of 
Western powers “to use force for reasons that go beyond the mere protection of civilians” (Smith 
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2015, 3). Consequently, South Africa later joined with Brazil, India, Russia, and China in 
opposing Western intervention in Syria against President Bashir al-Assad (Adebajo 2016). 
 Resistance against foreign interference in civil wars often stems from concerns about 
respect for national and local sovereignty. As explained previously in Chapter 4, the United 
Nations Charter specifically recognizes the right of states to their territorial integrity, political 
independence, and freedom from UN intervention in “matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state” (UN 2020). However, sometimes the claim of national 
sovereignty as a counter to foreign intervention is not genuinely invoked. South African backlash 
against Qaddafi’s NATO-assisted overthrow was also motivated by domestic politics, as Qaddafi 
was popular amongst the country’s ruling ANC party. Oppressive governments avoiding threats 
to their own power are also likely to voice sovereignty concerns, given their natural interest in 
preventing external scrutiny into their internal practices. For example, some of the strongest 
critics of foreign intervention have included dictatorial leaders such as the late Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe, who frequently denounced western influence in African affairs while overseeing 
widespread oppression of his own citizens (Australian Government 2010).  
 Condemnation of foreign intervention from scholars and international observers due to its 
ineffectiveness, hypocrisy, and disrespect for sovereignty is well-founded. Ultimately, however, 
the reception of specific foreign engagements varies based on the particular contexts and 
interests of the parties involved. For example, from 2004 to 2012 the government of Pakistan 
discreetly approved U.S. drone strikes on al-Qaeda safe havens and other insurgent targets along 
its border with Afghanistan, while simultaneously condemning the strikes in public and 
encouraging popular protests (Fair, Kaltenthaler, and Miller 2014, Salman Masood 2013, Zenko 
2012). Afghan opinions about the American presence in Afghanistan are similarly muddled. 
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Many civilians living under Taliban-controlled areas are eager to see the departure of U.S. 
troops, who they blame for the on-going conflict, while civilians living in areas under 
government control have more to gain from U.S. stabilization efforts (Ahmadi 2019, Jackson 
2019). In Venezuela, citizens protesting against the oppressive regime of Nicolas Maduro since 
early 2019 are split in their opinions of international involvement, with some people hopeful for 
U.S. assistance in Maduro’s overthrow and others more interested in achieving democracy on 
their own (Faiola and Zuñiga 2019). Finally, in African countries since the Cold War, a 
multitude of different governments and rebel groups have also taken varying stances in favor or 
against interventions, based on their self-interests at the time (Schmidt 2013).  
Overall, according to Micah Zenko, a fellow in the Center for Preventative Action at the 
Council on Foreign Relations, “one of the enduring lessons of military occupations is that most 
people are angry you intervened in their country, some that you stay too long, and the rest that 
you leave too soon” (Zenko 2012). Given the variation in international reactions towards 
intervention, no one-size-fits-all prescription for whether or not foreigners should intervene can 
apply. Instead, the international community should continue to debate each individual 
circumstance on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration all viewpoints concerning ethics 
and practical feasibility. Any potential weaknesses, ineffectiveness, or negative side effects 
should be carefully weighed against the risks of humanitarian losses or threats to international 
security.  
 There is no way to predict the trajectory of future events or precipitating crises that could 
prompt an intervention in a civil war. Foreign interveners may choose to become involved in a 
conflict despite recommendations not to do so, whether for humanitarian purposes or to advance 
selfish interests. A multitude of uncontrollable factors, such as decisionmaker personalities, may 
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also play a role. Therefore, this study suggests ways that interveners may plan to reduce violence 
and re-establish security to the extent possible, should they find themselves on the brink of 
initiating an intervention. This project demonstrates that local grievances between communities 
are a significant factor contributing to persistent conflict. Strong military and economic 
interventions, as well as support for local peacebuilding by traditional leaders, hold the most 
promise for reducing instability that results from local divisions. Policymakers should gather as 
many details as possible about local-level factors in a conflict environment to learn more about 
how grievances may influence the dynamics of fighting. 
 In Chapter 1, intervention “failure” was defined as: (1) violence that erupts as an 
unintended result of intervention, and (2) the continuation of violence despite actions designed to 
stop it. Unfortunately, even despite the international community’s best efforts, some level of 
fighting and instability is still likely to persist. There are ample historical examples of 
intervention failures, and interveners should weigh whether or not the costs to themselves and to 
the local populations most affected by violence are worth the risks. Interveners should also 
temper their expectations of success and anticipate that successful intervention may require a 
long-term, drawn-out effort that is heavily enmeshed in complex local dynamics. This runs 
counter to the interests of most interveners of the past several decades, who have sought rapid 
results from short-term interventions with as limited a footprint as possible. In the future, it will 
be important to overcome limited political will by recognizing the reality that significant time 
and resources will be necessary for any intervention to be successful. This expenditure of 
resources may ultimately be worthwhile if it results in the establishment of peace and the 
protection of innocent civilians plagued by the threat of conflict violence.  
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